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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil religion, a term first used by Rousseau, refers 
to the religious dimension of the polity. Civil religion in 
American society, or American civil religion, has been the 
subject of an extensive field of literature generated by 
American philosophers, historians, theologians, social scien-
tists, poets, and novelists since the inception of the nation. 
Stimulated by the work of Robert Bellah, the concept of Amer-
ican civil religion has recently generated interest among 
American sociologists, leading to a sociological debate on 
American civil religion. The debate is wide-ranging, begin-
ning with disagreement about the definition of American civil 
religion and its existence in American society. Among sociol-
ogists who accept the assumption that American civil religion 
exists, there is still considerable controversy over the 
historical origin and continued development of American civil 
religion. There is also fierce debate raging on such issues 
as the structural differentiation of American civil religion 
from other social institutions and on the functions (if any) 
performed by American civil religion. The major objective 
of this study is to examine the social science literature on 
American civil religion in an attempt to order the literature 
into a coherent, comprehensive, and logical set of definitions 
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and assumptions open to empirical examination. In order to 
arrive at a set of sociological propositions concerning Amer-
ican civil religion, the sociological literature will be 
highlighted and selectively reviewed, with representative 
studies examined as typical of a particular model of American 
civil religion. The purpose of this study is not to assemble 
a patchwork quilt comprised of every piece ever written about 
American civil religion. The purpose is to construct a rep-
resentative theoretical map of the most significant American 
civil religion studies and to glean from these studies a set 
of propositions which would be testable by sociological 
methods. 
Models of American Civil Religion 
The first objective of this analysis, addressed in 
parts I and II, is to define the central concept of American 
civil religion. ~1uch of the intellectual debate surrounding 
the concept of American civil religion is based upon a lack 
of consensus for a precise definition. Richey and Jones 
(1974:14) report "at least five broad, and to some extent 
interrelated meanings of civil religion" in the literature: 
folk religion, transcendent universal religion of the nation, 
religious nationalism, democratic faith, and Protestant civic 
piety. The five meanings of American civil religion can be 
seen as models, and will be used collectively as a device 
for ordering the literature. Because the five models are 
not mutually exclusive, some studies contain elements of 
more than one model, but the majority of the studies can be 
usefully classified as representative of a particular model. 
Folk Religion 
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Folk religion is a civil religion conceived of as 
emerging from the daily life experiences and expressions of 
the American populace. The major functions of civil reli-
gion according to the folk religion model are legitimation of 
cultural values and social integration. Alexis de Tocque-
ville's two-volume work, Democracy in America (1966), con-
tains one of the first intellectual developments of American 
folk religion. During his contact with the American people 
in the 1830s, Tocqueville observed that a fusion of demo-
cratic and moral principles was expressed in the daily behav-
ior and customs of Americans. Tocqueville's ensuing model of 
democratic, republican religion assumed that liberty, law, 
morality, and religious belief were symbiotically related in 
American society, serving as a basis for social cohesion. A 
classic sociological analysis of American folk religion is 
found in W. Lloyd Warner's (1961) examination of the Memorial 
Day celebrations in an American city. Warner's folk religion 
is a functioning set of civic rituals which are socially 
integrating and identity-reinforcing for citizens. A more 
controversial treatment of American civil religion as folk 
religion is presented by Will Herberg (1960). Herberg's folk 
religion is the deification of the American way of life, seen 
by Herberg as derived from, but standing above, the American 
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biblical religions of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Juda-
ism. Herberg's folk religion legitimates, integrates, and 
deifies American society, placing it in a self-transcendent 
position above traditional religion. The folk religion model 
is also represented by the work of religious historian Martin 
Marty (1959), who describes American folk religion as a 
religion-in-general lacking the theological content and 
prophetic force of denominational religions. Marty's por-
trayal of folk religion is echoed by Roy Eckhardt (1958) and 
Franklin Littell (1962) and typifies Andrew Greeley's (1972: 
166) definition of folk religion as the religion of comfort, 
reassurance, and self-righteousness. 
Transcendental Universal Religion of the Nation 
The transcendent universal religion of the nation 
model portrays American civil religion as a set of transcend-
ent ideals by which the society is both integrated and 
ultimately judged. Transcendent universal religion is 
capable of greater challenge to society than folk religion, 
due to its prophetic capacities. Religious historian Sidney 
Mead's (1963; 1975) "religion of the republic" is an example 
of the transcendent universal model of American civil re-
ligion. Mead's religion of the republic consists of a syn-
thesis of democratic and deistic values which challenges both 
sectarianism and national self-transcendence. Mead traces 
the historical development of a transcendent American 
civil religion, which distinctly departs from the folk 
religion model of American civil religion as a deification 
of the American way of life. In 1967 a sociological model 
of transcendent universal American civil religion was intro-
duced by Robert Bellah. Using the method of systematic 
examination of presidential inaugural addresses, Bellah 
documented the existence and institutionalization of civil 
religion as an aspect of the American religious dimension. 
Bellah's model proposes that American civil religion exists 
as an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs, pro-
viding cohesion and prophetic guidance through times of 
national crisis. Bellah cites examples of the unifying and 
prophetic manifestations of American civil religion through-
out American history, noting that at times the symbols of 
American civil religion have also been misused for national 
self-reinforcement and self-transcendence (Bellah, 1975). 
The folk religion model is thus partially contained within 
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the transcendent universal model, with folk religion repre-
senting the distortion of universal ideals into national pub-
lic theology. Bellah believes, however, as does Mead, that 
the ideals of American civil religion have universal applica-
tion which transcends American society (Richey and Jones, 
1974:16). Greeley (1972:116) calls the transcendent univer-
sal model of American civil religion "elite" civil religion, 
representing the highest ideals of the nation. The transcen-
dent universal model of American civil religion has stimulated 
the greatest amount of contemporary sociological response. 
Empirical tests of the transcendent universal model include 
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content analyses by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978) and Thomas 
and Flippen (1972) and individual belief surveys by Wimberly 
(Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976). Of the four studies, 
only Thomas and Flippen failed to find support for a tran-
scendent universal religion of the nation. 
Religious Nationalism 
The third model of American civil religion noted by 
Richey and Jones (1974:16) is religious nationalism. Reli-
gious nationalism represents a worldview wherein the nation 
itself is glorified and adored, becoming self-transcendent. 
The idolatrous component is highly manifest in the model of 
religious nationalism, as compared to the latent self-
transcendence of the folk religion model. Like folk reli-
gion, religious nationalism also functions to reinforce 
cultural values and integrate citizens. Rousseau's original 
conception of civil religion comes close to being a model of 
religious nationalism. Social integration, rather than 
nationalism, was Rousseau's intended objective, but his 
state-sponsored civil belief system which would insure good 
citizenship and political legitimacy has nationalistic poten-
tia1. There has been little systematic examination of reli-
gious nationalism as a distinct model of American civil 
religion. Religious nationalism has been conceived as the 
opposite type in the transcendent universal model (Bellah, 
1975), or as folk religion taken to its most idolatrous 
extreme (Marty, 1959). Bellah is not unaware of the 
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manifestations of religious nationalism in the United States, 
but treats these phenomena as examples of the "broken cove-
nant" between the nation and its transcendent authority 
(Bellah, 1975). Marty (1974) has developed a typology of 
American civil religion in which one type, priestly, self-
transcendent civil religion, is presented as a form of reli-
gious nationalism. Although Bellah and Marty work from 
different models of American civil religion, both agree that 
there is a dynamic tension between transcendent and self-
transcendent modes of American civil religion. 
Democratic Faith 
The democratic faith model of American civil religion 
is primarily represented in the writings of philosophers and 
theologians who have attempted to construct a humanistic 
philosophy based on the American ideals of justice, liberty, 
and equality. Democratic faith typically refers neither to 
a transcendent authority nor to a self-transcendent nation 
and is thus more a humanistic value system than a transcen-
dent religion. The common faith of John Dewey is a classic 
example of democratic faith. Dewey's common faith was based 
on the conscious and dedicated pursuit of democracy. Dewey 
believed that this pursuit was religious, as any experience 
had religious values as long as it produced "a better, 
deeper, and enduring adjustment in life" (Dewey, 1934:14) 
Adjustment was not seen as a psychologically passive accommo-
dation to society but was to be found in working for liberal 
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goals and building social institutions which would facilitate 
individual freedom. Devotion to building these institutions 
was Dewey's religion (Clebsch, 1973:176-177). Dewey's common 
faith best serves as an example of how the humanistic values 
of American civil religion could be embodied in the personal 
value system of an individual citizen. Because Dewey's 
common faith is more of an individual belief system than a 
cultural value system, the elaboration of common faith or the 
democratic faith model it illustrates is not treated further 
in this volume. 
Protestant Civic Piety 
Richey and Jones (1974:17) note that a particular model 
of American civil religion as Protestant civic piety is to be 
found among the writings of some Protestant theologians and 
American religious historians (e.g., Winthrop Hudson, 1970; 
H. Richard Niebuhr, 1959; John Smylie, 1963; Ernest Tuveson, 
1968) . The Protestant civic piety model emphasizes that the 
origin of American civil religion can be found in the fusion 
of the American and Protestant historical traditions. The 
Protestant civic piety model typically contains the follow-
ing elements: (1) the theistic conception of a transcendent 
authority for the nation, (2) the legitimation of Protestant 
values as applied to national life, and (3) the integration 
of Protestant citizens as Americans. Charles Long (1974) 
has objected to the narrowness of the Protestant civic 
piety model, which tends to ignore the contributions of 
non-whites and non-Protestants to the value system of Ameri-
can civil religion. Although Protestant civic piety is the 
least comprehensive of the five models of American civil 
religion and has generated the least sociological interest, 
the model w~ll be explored in some detail in part I, chapter 
II of this study, as the concept of Protestant civic piety 
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has historical importance for tracing the origins of American 
civil religion. 
The five models of American civil religion differ (with 
partial overlapping) in their conceptions of (1) the defini-
tion of American civil religion, (2) the origins of American 
civil religion, (3) the relationship between American civil 
religion and other American institutions, (4) the functions 
performed by American civil religion, and (5) the current 
existence and future evolution of American civil religion. 
Due to the confusion created by varying models, there is a 
need for conceptual clarification in the field of American 
civil religion research and a further need for the generation 
of logical, testable propositions concerning American civil 
religion. Because the transcendent universal model of Amer-
ican civil religion is the most comprehensive of the five 
models and has received the most theoretical and empirical 
attention from contemporary sociologists, it will serve as 
the basic model from which definitions and assumptions are 
derived. Parts III and IV of this volume will explore four 
basic propositions concerning American civil religion, 
derived from the transcendent universal model of Bellah. 
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specifically, the four propositions are adapted and condensed 
from John A. Coleman's (1970) evolutionary theory of civil 
religion, which is an outgrowth of Bellah's transcendent 
model of American civil religion. Coleman's definition of 
American civil religion is contained in the first proposi-
tion, while the remaining three propositions concernthefunc-
tions and development of American civil religion and its 
relation to other social institutions. 
Basic Propositions 
Proposition I 
American civil religion is the religious symbol system 
which relates the citizen's role and American society's place 
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning. 
Proposition II 
American civil religion is structurally differentiated 
from both the political community and the religious community. 
Proposition III 
American civil religion performs specialized religious 
functions performed neither by church nor state. 
Proposition IV 
The differentiation of American civil religion from 
political and religious communities follows the general 
direction of cultural evolution. 
11 
The remainder of the study will continue the review of 
the American civil religion literature in a search for log-
ical and empirical support for the stated propositions. The 
search consists of an inductive process by which the exist-
ing data concerning American civil religion are gathered, 
ordered, and formalized for the eventual purpose of being 
tested against new data. The result is a synthesis of Amer-
ican civil religion theory, testable by sociological methods. 
PART I 
THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CIVIL RELIGION 
CHAPTER II 
THE FOUNDATIONS: ROUSSEAU AND DE TOCQUEVILLE 
The term civil religion first appears in Rousseau's 
The Social Contract. The relationship between a society's 
religious and political ideals has been discussed throughout 
the history of social thought, but Rousseau provides the 
first description of a belief system explicitly labeled civil 
religion. Rousseau's civil religion emerges in the context 
of his larger interest in the legitimacy of the social bond. 
In a chapter entitled, "Of Civil Religion," added shortly 
before the publication of The Social Contract, Rousseau advo-
cates a religion of civil virtue which would consecrate and 
legitimate common social life. 
Rousseau arrives at the necessity for a civil religion 
after examining various ways that religion may function in 
relationship to the social order. Rousseau observes that 
throughout history political institutions have depended upon 
religious legitimacy. Primitive societies were often theoc-
racies, and monarchs claimed divine inspiration to strengthen 
collective loyalty. But the power of religious institutions 
and the divisiveness of religious sectarianism have ultimately 
proven threatening to political stability. Rousseau examines 
and rejects three religious types which threaten the social 
order. The first is "the religion of man as man . without 
13 
14 
temples, without altars, without rites . . what may be 
called natural divine law" (Rousseau, 1960:300). This pure 
form of Christianity fails to bind the citizen to the state, 
teaching instead detachment from worldly affairs. Rousseau 
(1960:302-303) sees the true Christian destined for slavery 
under tyranny. The second type is the "religion of the citi-
zen," the religious nationalism of primitive societies. This 
type of theocracy gives each nation its own exclusive deities. 
"Its dogmas, its rites, its forms of worship are all pre-
scribed by law" and facilitate social cohesion. But because 
everything outside the society is judged "infidel, alien, and 
barbarous" it makes citizens "bloodthirsty and intolerant" 
(Rousseau, 1960:301). Theocratic nations are likely to 
become involved in self-destructive warfare. The third type 
of religion, the religion of the priest, is exemplified by 
modern separation of church and state. Church-state separa-
tion threatens social unity by giving citizens "two legisla-
tive orders, two rulers, two countries, imposes on the two 
contradictory systems of duty and makes it impossible for them 
to be at the same time devout individuals and good citizens" 
(Rousseau, 1960:301). In Rousseau's opinion, nothing could 
be worse than this dual, contradictory system which destroys 
social unity. 
Rousseau concludes that social cohesion could best be 
served by the requirement that the political leader establish 
articles of a "purely civil" religion "not with the precision 
of religious dogmas, but treating them as a body of social 
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sentiments without which no man can be either a good citizen 
or a faithful subject" (Rousseau, 1960:305). The dogmas of 
civil faith were to be kept simple, including only the fol-
lowing ideas: the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, 
beneficent God; life after death; the reward of just behav-
ior and the punishment of transgressions; and the sanctity 
of the social contract and the law. Civil intolerance would 
be prohibited, for in Rousseau's judgement intolerance leads 
to cleavage and the ultimate disruption of civil life. No 
citizen could be forced to believe in the dogmas of civil 
religion, but those who did not could be banished from the 
society, "not on grounds of impiety, but as lacking in social 
sense. ... " (Rousseau, 1960: 306) . 
In the ideal society that Rousseau envisioned in The 
Social Contract, civil religion would serve a dual function. 
Established by and under a political ruler, civil religion 
would legitimize the political order without establishing a 
competing religious authority. The dualism of religion of 
the priests would be avoided. Civil religion's ban on intol-
erance would insure that divisive sectarianism would be avoid-
ed. Civil religion, conceived by Rousseau as a state-directed 
religion of good citizenship, would perform the social func-
tions of insuring political legitimacy and social cohesion. 
Although Rousseau's civil religion proclaims a belief in an 
all-powerful God, there is no evidence of a prophetic func-
tion. In this final position, Rousseau's thought was congru-
ent with that of his contemporaries Voltaire and Montesquieu, 
who also believed that religion should be under the state, 
because some type of religion, however false, was required 
to maintain social order and morality (Cobban, 1934:78-79). 
Rousseau's civil religion is ultimately a form of self-
transcendent, religious nationalism. 
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Alexis de Tocqueville's description of a "republican 
religion" in the nineteenth-century United States has been 
influential both for historians and sociologists of American 
civil religion. Tocqueville's view of civil religion differs 
significantly from that of his predecessor and countryman 
Rousseau. Rousseau arrived at his conception of civil relig-
ion by abstractly considering the requirements of the ideal 
society. Tocqueville discovered republican religion during 
an empirical examination of American life in the 1830s. 
Rousseau wrote of a civil religion established by the state, 
while Tocqueville observed a form of civii religion which 
emerged precisely in the situation of church-state separation 
that Rousseau believed would undermine social cohesion. Both 
Rousseau and Tocqueville were motivated by an interest in the 
role of religious ideals in the European political future. 
Tocqueville's reliance on the American case as a predictive 
type led him to be a forerunner of American historians and 
social scientists who would describe American civil religion 
as a folk religion of the American people (e.g., Marty, 1959; 
Herberg, 1960; Warner, 1961). 
During Tocqueville's tour of America in 1831, he was 
impressed by the popularity of both religious values and 
democratic ideas. 
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On my arrival in the United States the religious 
aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my 
attention; and the longer I stayed there, the more I per-
ceived the great political consequences resulting from 
this new state of things (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:308). 
predisposed to see "the spirit of religion and the spirit of 
freedom marching in opposite directions" (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 
1966:308), as was the case in France, Tocqueville was chal-
lenged to seek further explanation of the surprising Arneri-
can situation. Focusing on the character and habits of the 
American populace and relying on interviews and observation, 
Tocqueville constructed a model of a democratic and republi-
can Christianity which functioned as a nonsectarian folk 
religion. Republican religion is specifically the moral law 
which affects political life indirectly, but significantly, 
through its influence on customs and domestic life (Tocque-
ville, Vol. I, 1966:304). The various American religious 
denominations might disagree on specific matters of denomi-
national doctrine, but could all agree on general Christian 
mores. Even American Catholics, whose specific beliefs 
diverged most strongly from the American Puritan heritage, 
adhered to republican religion so as to "constitute the most 
republican and most democratic class in the United States" 
(Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:300). Tocqueville concluded that 
the minority status of American Catholics gave them a vested 
interest in supporting republican religion's tenets of equal-
ity and freedom. Tocqueville's democratic and republican 
Christianity did not encompass Jewish Americans, but their 
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subsequent inclusion by Herberg (1960) under the generalized 
umbrella of American folk religion follows the lines of 
Tocqueville's logic for Cathologic inclusion. 
Tocqueville presented a model of American civil reli-
gion in which religious belief and morality were fused with 
a political system of democratic values and laws. Such a 
fusion might generally imply the existence of a state church 
or a politically established belief system like that pro-
posed by Rousseau. Instead, Tocqueville believed that the 
symbiotic relationship between American religious and polit-
ical values was due particularly to the innovative American 
feature of legal nonestablishment. Tocqueville noted that 
religious toleration was first observed in the United States 
under the Catholic proprietorship of Maryland, which prior 
to the 1654 Puritan overthrow demonstrated more religious 
freedom than did any of the other colonies (Strout, 1973: 
xii). Ultimately, Puritanism solved the paradox of religious 
dogmatism versus political freedom through the institutional-
ization of legal nonestablishment. The separation of the 
denominations from political institutions left religion free 
to inform political decisions without being dependent upon 
the success or failure of a particular government. 
In America religion is perhaps less powerful than 
it has been at certain periods and among certain nations; 
but its influence is more lasting. It restricts itself 
to its own resources, but of these none can deprive it; 
its circle is limited, but it pervades it and holds it 
under undisputed control (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:312). 
When religion and politics are undifferentiated, religious 
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institutions become vulnerable to political limitations. 
"The alliance which religion contracts with political powers 
must needs be onerous to itself, since it does not require 
their assistance to live, and by giving them its assistance 
it may be exposed to decay" (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:311). 
Tocqueville believed that the danger is particularly acute 
in democratic systems, which by their nature insure systems 
of leadership turnover and internal self-modification. Change 
is a predictable feature of democracies which could threaten 
the eternal values of a religious system. If religious val-
ues embody democratic principles, however, this threat is 
reduced. 
Although religious values might not require political 
institutionalization for their persistence in society, differ-
entiation of religious and political institutions could lead 
to internal value conflict. Rousseau suggested this conse-
quence in his warning that church-state separation disrupted 
social cohesion by giving citizens contradictory systems of 
loyalties (Rousseau, 1960:301). Rousseau, however, was con-
trasting denominational religious institutions (which he called 
the ''religious institutions of the priests") with political 
institutions. Tocqueville's republican religion was suffi-
ciently nondenominational to act as a generalized belief 
system which could bind divisions of religious and political 
loyalties. In Tocqueville's model, republican religion per-
formed a socially integrating function as a mechanism for 
preventing liberty from degenerating into anarchy. 
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Tocqueville observed that "liberty .. is generally estab-
lished with difficulty in the midst of storms; it is perfect-
ed by civil discord ... " (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:247). 
He believed that republican religion could function to pre-
vent civil discord from destructively dividing the society. 
By emphasizing the cohesive function of republican 
religion for American society, Tocqueville necessarily lim-
ited its prophetic potential. Republican religion was rooted 
in public opinion and could serve the conservative forces of 
the "tyranny of the majority." Tocqueville feared that the 
power of majority opinion in democracies would feel threat-
ened by reform measures and would become unable to make "a 
strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose" (Tocqueville, 
Vol. II, 1966:236). Strout points to this issue as a contra-
diction in Tocqueville's model. 
Tocqueville never recognized this implicit conflict 
in his theory. Similarly, he produced another paradox 
by his admiration both for vigorous intellectual freedom 
and a wide moral and philosophical consensus that could 
tame the majority's will. Religion favored the latter 
at the price of diminishing the former .... His fears 
about the tyranny of the majority were to some extent 
historically grounded in the very factor of popular reli-
gion that he identified instead of with influences favor-
ing liberal democracy (Strout, 1973:340). 
Republican religion by definition rested on a generalized 
moral consensus, but this consensus has functioned historic-
ally to provide both transcendent and self-transcendent 
interpretations of the American destiny. Conservative move-
ments, such as the pro-slavery forces of the 1850s as well 
as reform movements like abolitionism, would use religion as 
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a moral base for action. 
Tocqueville's model of republican religion was the 
first to describe a generalized democratic belief system, 
based in the religious and moral traditions of a society, 
which is observed to be structurally and functionally differ-
entiated both from the political and religious institutions. 
Republican religion appears to have been derived from the 
American denominations but not to be delimited by any partic-
ular church or sect. Republican religion supported a demo-
cratic political system but did so indirectly by infusing 
the folkways and mores of citizens. Democracy and equality 
were thus political ideals with a religious dimension to be 
interpreted within the American historical tradition. Tocque-
ville hoped that republican religion could be generalizable 
to Europe, but he also recognized the singularity of the 
American experience (Tocqueville, Vol. I, 1966:329-330). 
Tocqueville's model of democratic and republican religion has 
thus had its greatest impact on American historical and 
social thought. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CIVIL RELIGION OF AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS HISTORIANS 
American religious historians have demonstrated con-
siderable interest in the concept of American civil reli-
gion. In a review of civil religion literature, Phillip 
Hammond (1976:170) notes that Sydney E. Ahlstrom's 1,000-
page volume, A Religious History of the American People 
(1972), focuses upon American civil religion as one of its 
major themes. Bedell, Sandon, and Wellborn's Religion in 
America (1975) also devotes considerable attention to the 
topic of American civil religion. Civil religion in Amer-
ica has additionally been a subject of special concern for 
a number of well-known American religious historians. 
H. Richard Niebuhr (1959) and Winthrop Hudson (1970) have 
concerned themselves with Protestant civic piety, locating 
the origin and boundaries of civil religion in the American 
Protestant tradition. Ernest Tuveson (1968) demonstrates 
the tendency of Protestant civic piety to become a type of 
religious nationalism under certain historical and social 
conditions. Sidney Mead (1963; 1975) has devoted a consid-
erable portion of his career to documenting the concept of 
a transcendent universal civil religion of the American 
nation. Other religious historians such as Martin Marty 
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(1959; 1976) and Franklin Littell (1962) see American civil 
religion now becoming differentiated from its Protestant 
roots and developing into a generalized and secularized folk 
religion of the American people. Each of these differing 
but partially overlapping conceptions of civil religion 
among American religious historians has contributed signifi-
cantly to the current status of American civil religion as a 
sociological construct. 
Protestant Civic Piety 
Richey and Jones (1974) note that a particular view of 
American civil religion as a form of Protestant civic piety 
is to be found among the writings of the following histor-
ians: Jerald C. Brauer (1965), William Clebsch (1968), 
Winthrop Hudson (1970), H. Richard Niebuhr (1959), James 
Smylie (1963), and Ernest Tuveson (1968). These religious 
historians have emphasized that the origins of American civil 
religion can be found in the fusion of American Protestant-
ism and nationalism. The works of Hudson, Niebuhr, and 
Tuveson serve as representatives of the Protestant civic 
piety model. 
Winthrop Hudson 
In his "Introduction" to Nationalism and Religion in 
America (1970), Winthrop Hudson attributes the origin of Amer-
ican civil religion to Protestant civic piety. Using histor-
ical sources of data including sermons, inaugural addresses, 
and writings of theologians and politicians from 1640 to the 
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twentieth century, Hudson concludes that the American colon-
ists were bound together by their common political and reli-
gious traditions. The common religious tradition was the 
Puritan Protestantism of Great Britain and the predominate 
political belief was what Edmund Burke (quoted in Hudson, 
1970:xxv) described as a "fierce spirit of liberty." The 
fusion of these traditions in America formed the basis for 
the new nation's civil religion. 
Tracing the roots of American civil religion to British 
religious and political traditions, Hudson (1970:xxiii) notes 
that at the time of the American Revolution over 80 percent 
of the colonists claimed British heritage. To Hudson, this 
heritage implies the existence of a common set of religious 
beliefs. Although the American colonists represented various 
denominations, Hudson sees an overriding influence of British, 
Puritan Protestantism. Hudson (1970:xxiii) views the early 
American denominations as being divided only on "subordinate 
issues," not by the "fundamentals of faith." Later in Amer-
ica, prophets of the Great Awakening, such as Jonathan 
Edwards, would emphasize the unity of heart and basic brother-
hood of God's people in the new nation. Hudson argues that 
the puzzling phenomenon of American nationalism which united 
the colonies during the Revolution sprang in part from the 
bonds of a shared faith originating in a common cultural her-
itage. "The outward interests of the colonists may have been 
diverse but they were made brothers by an inward common devo-
tion to freedom, both civil and religious" (Hudson, 1970:xxiv). 
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The relationship between British Puritanism and demo-
cratic values is traced to Sir Edmund Coke's Institutes of 
the Laws of England, which emphasized the tradition of 
ancient Saxon and British liberty, continually threatened by 
the Normans. Hudson also cites the importance of John Foxe's 
Acts and Monuments of Matters Most Special and Memorable 
(known as the "Book of Martyrs"), which portrayed the Brit-
ish as the modern successors to the ancient Hebrews' special 
relationship with God as the chosen people. The relation-
ship between Puritanism and civic values was most directly 
stated by Puritan leader Oliver Cromwell, who considered 
"religion" and "civil liberty" to be "the two greatest con-
cernments that God hath in this world" (quoted in Hudson, 
1970:xxviii). This fusion of Protestant and democratic be-
liefs was given greater life in the colonies. Some American 
colonists identified themselves with the Biblical Hebrews 
and saw their move to the new nation as an exodus. Hudson 
(1970:xxx) compares this exodus to the one made previously 
by the Saxon ancestors crossing the English Channel from the 
Continent to establish a tradition of liberty in a new land. 
There are two assumptions critical to Hudson's descrip-
tion of American Protestant civic piety. He first assumes 
that British history embodied democratic values which were 
then expressed and experienced within the Puritan tradition. 
Second, Hudson assumes that the American colonists experi-
enced sufficient British identification to try to build a 
new Britain in the new world. According to Hudson (1970:xxxi), 
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the American colonists believed that "the struggle to pre-
serve their liberties was a struggle to preserve the liber-
ties of Great Britain." The American Revolution was 
conducted against a tarnished England in order to reestab-
lish its original ideals in the colonies. Both assumptions 
are supported by Hudson's historical data. Of interest to 
sociologists is the fact that Hudson describes an American 
civil religion derived from the values of a colonial culture 
which functioned as mechanisms for the social cohesion of 
the colonies. 
Ernest Tuveson 
Elements of Protestant civic piety may be found in 
Ernest Tuveson's (1968) study of the millennial role of Amer-
ica throughout history. According to Tuveson's historical 
analysis, during the Protestant Reformation Biblical scholars 
began to believe for the first time that the millennium was 
to be a utopia built on earth by Godly men (Tuveson, 1968:ix-
x) . America soon became the chosen nation of the chosen 
people who were to establish God's kingdom in the world. 
Once the nation was established by members of Protestant 
sects who literally viewed themselves as a millennial people, 
subsequent national history came also to be interpreted in 
millennial themes. Tuveson pinpoints two millennial themes 
which have alternated throughout American history. The dom-
inant theme is (1) withdrawal from the world of evil, thereby 
setting a silent example for other nations. American 
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isolationism preceding each of the major World Wars exempli-
fies the withdrawal theme. The second and subordinate theme, 
(2) active messianism, could be inspired by the right situa-
tion. Manifest destiny, the Civil War, and the eventual 
involvement in the World Wars provided opportunities for 
active messianism to dominate (Tuveson, 1968:213-214). "The 
expansion of the nation, the Civil War, the entry into the 
second World War--all would have occurred in the course of 
things. But millennialist ideas did influence national ex-
pectations about their outcome and results" (Tuveson, 1968: 
13). Tuveson's evidence of the influence of Protestant mil-
lennial motifs is drawn from the Bible, sermon texts, politi-
cal speeches and nineteenth century popular.magazines. 
Tuveson makes no effort to bring in data which might not 
support the millennial thesis, and no soiological data are 
used. Despite these limitations, Tuveson's study is an inter-
esting historical account emphasizing the Calvinist founda-
tions of Protestant civic piety which is neither wholly 
divinely transcendent nor totally nationally self-transcendent. 
Instead, there is a dialectic tension between prophetic ideals 
and their nationalistic application in specific historical 
situations. 
H. Richard Niebuhr 
A prophetic model of Protestant civic piety has been ad-
vanced by H. Richard Niebuhr (1959). Viewing American Protes-
tantism as a social movement rather than as an institution, 
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Niebuhr traces the influence of Puritanism, Evangelicalism, 
and social gospelism on American civil beliefs. Niebuhr 
concurs with Hudson and Tuveson that American civil religion 
is based on the Protestant civic piety of the early colon-
ists, but he challenges the idea that the Puritan settlers 
and their descendants hoped to establish an earthly kingdom 
of God in America. Niebuhr (1959:xii) stresses that the 
early Puritans and Quakers envisioned a kingdom of God based 
on the "sovereignty of God." To illustrate this hypothesis, 
Niebuhr (1959:174) quotes Lyman Beecher who identified the 
New England Puritan law and the subsequent laws of the repub-
lic with the moral law of God: 
Our own republic in its constitution and laws is of 
heavenly origin. It was not borrowed from Greece or Rome, 
but from the Bible. . . . It was God that gave these 
elementary principles to our forefathers, as "the pillar 
of fire by night and the cloud by day" for their guidance. 
Niebuhr believes that it was the Evangelical movement in Amer-
ican Protestantism which undermined the prophetic function of 
American civil religion to emphasize the idea that American 
Christians are a specially favored and chosen nation. "Hence-
forth the kingdom of the Lord was a human possession" (Nie-
buhr, 1959:179) and the function of American civil religion 
moved from that of transcendence to national self-transcendence. 
Niebuhr credits the social gospel movement of the end of the 
nineteenth century with "institutionalizing 11 the concept of 
American self-transcendence. 
As propagandists they (the social gospel reformers) 
sought the extension of democratic institutions--if nec-
essary by recourse to military force--in order that all 
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the world might share in the blessings of the kingdom of 
God on earth (Niebuhr, 1959:184). 
Niebuhr's concept of American civil religion is dis-
cussed entirely within the context of the boundaries of the 
Protestant movement. Niebuhr is exclusively concerned with 
the prophetic function of Protestant civic piety, its ero-
sion, and the call for prophetic renewal. Niebuhr's descrip-
tion of the self-transcendent phase of Protestant civic piety 
corresponds to Tuveson's (1968) analysis of the tension be-
tween prophetic and nationalistic applications of American 
civil religion. Unlike Tuveson, Niebuhr recommends a return 
to the original, Puritan-based civil religion. "Apart from 
God and his forgiveness nationality and even Christianity 
particularized in a nation become destructive rather than 
creative" (Niebuhr, 1959:xvi). 
Charles Long (1974:211-221) criticizes the historians 
who defined American civil religion in the Protestant, civic 
piety tradition. Long suggests that we consider the meaning 
of the words "American" and "religion" in the concept of 
American civil religion. 
If by "American" we mean the Christian European 
immigrants and their progeny, then we have overlooked 
American Indians and American blacks. And if religion 
is defined as revealed Christianity and its institutions, 
we have again overlooked much of the religion of Ameri-
can blacks, Amerindians and the Jewish communities .. 
In short, a great deal of the writings and discussions 
of the topic of American religion has been consciously 
or unconsciously ideological, serving to enhance, justi-
fy and render sacred the history of European immigrants 
in this land (Long, 1974:212). 
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Long's main objection to the notion of American civil reli-
gion as Protestant civic piety is that the concept is narrow 
and contributes to the historical and cultural invisibility 
of certain American groups. As Richey and Jones (1974:12) 
note, Protestant civic piety is the least comprehensive of 
the five meanings of American civil religion. The concept 
of Protestant civic piety, as used by Hudson, Tuveson, and 
especially Niebuhr, refers only to Protestant beliefs about 
the role of the American nation rather than to a differenti-
ated civil belief system available to all American citizens. 
Sidney Mead's Transcendent Universal 
Religion of the Nation 
Religious historian Sidney Mead (1963; 1975) challenges 
the thesis that American civil religion can be narrowly de-
fined as Protestant civic piety. Mead documents an American 
civil religion based on a synthesis of deistic and democratic 
principles and characterized by a synergistic cosmopolitan-
ism. Mead locates the origin of American civil religion in 
the Western European tradition by which emerging nations 
adapted the ideal of Christian universalism to their own 
nationalistic interests. The United States departed from 
the European pattern by separating church from state and re-
fusing to establish any of the denominations. America became 
a nation based on the legitimacy of religious diversity (Mead, 
1963). Clebsch (1968:209) also notes that American religious 
pluralism began as a historical accident which led to an 
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official policy of government religious neutrality. By acci-
dent, the colonies harbored groups of different faiths, each 
of which was required to interact tolerantly with the others 
in order to ensure its own survival. Far from diluting Amer-
ican religiosity, pluralism stimulated it. Clebsch (1968:209) 
cites Roger Williams as the father of "the distinctly American 
theory that unrestrained varieties of religious expression 
heighten the spiritual vigor of a single society." 
Both Mead (1963:134) and Clebsch (1968:210) agree that 
early American pluralism was dominated by the Protestant tradi-
tion. Mead (1963:135) believes, however, that by the second 
half of the nineteenth century American had "two religions," 
the Protestant orthodoxy of the denominations and a "religion 
of the Republic." The latter was the civil religion of adem-
ocratic society. 
This was rooted in the rationalism of the Enlighten-
ment (to go no further back) and was articulated in terms 
of the destiny of America, under God, to be fulfilled by 
perfecting the democratic way of life for the example and 
betterment of all mankind (Mead, 1963:135). 
Although Mead agrees that the two faiths were synergistically 
interrelated in American life, the tradition of religious 
pluralism prevented the religion of the Republic from being 
circumscribed by Protestant orthodoxy. Under a pluralistic 
system, no one denomination could claim to function as "the 
church." Mead (1975:71) contends that, from its inception, 
the United States itself began "assuming the traditional func-
tion of the church." Mead (1975:48) cites G. K. Chesterton's 
statement that the United States was the only nation founded 
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on a creed. The American creed was based on the Jeffersonian 
theory of equality and envisioned the United States as a new 
homeland for the world's homeless. According to John E. 
Smylie (quoted in Mead, 1975:72-73), "American Protestantism 
endowed the nation with churchly attributes, with three the-
ological notes in particular." First, America became "the 
primary agent of God's meaningful activity in history." The 
beliefs that the millennium would begin in America and that 
it was America's role in history to evangelize the world both 
illustrate this religious function of the state. Mead also 
concurs with Smylie that in the United States it was the 
nation itself, not a religious denomination, which functioned 
as the primary social setting for the discovery of personal 
and group identity. Finally, "as the nation became the pri-
mary community for fulfilling historic purposes and realiz-
ing personal identity," it also began to assume "a churchly 
function in becoming the community of righteousness" (Smylie 
quoted in Mead, 1975:73). These functions could be, and some-
times were,performed in the interest of religious national-
ism. The natlon-as-church was always in danger of becoming 
heteronomous toward other nations and attempting to super-
impose the American value system on the world. Mead believes, 
however, that the theological tradition of the religion of 
the Republic was essentially theonomous, or ruled by God. 
Historically, the social structure of American religious 
pluralism necessitated tolerance. The vitality of the reli-
gion of the Republic was derived from its toleration of 
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diversity, not from the establishment of one set of religious 
precepts. Generalized from a national to an international 
setting, the religion of the Republic pointed to universal-
istic values. 
As the Christian sects carried the universal vision 
until it was, largely in spite of them, incarnated in a 
religiously pluralistic commonwealth, so perhaps that 
commonwealth is the bearer in history of the cosmopoli-
tanism which, when and if incarnated in world institu-
tions, may compel the nation-churches to live side by 
side in overt peace under law ... (Mead, 1975:77). 
Mead describes a religion of the American republic 
which emerged under the structure of religious pluralism. 
Only within a pluralistic system, in which no denomination 
could be established, could the nation itself begin to ful-
fill the traditional religious functions of providing a major 
source of social cohesion, personal meaning and identity, and 
prophecy for historical roles. Religious differentiation is 
described as producing a differentiated and highly general-
ized religion of the Republic, partially separate from the 
denominations but also standing over them to insure against 
the self-transcendent and particularistic tendencies of the 
individual denominations. On the pluralistic international 
scene, the values of American civil religion could perform 
similar religious function and serve as prophetic guidelines 
to world unity while guarding against the tendency of nation-
alism. Mead is exceptional among American religious histor-
ians for tracing American civil religion from its Protestant 
origins beyond Protestant particularism and self-deifying 
nationalism to potentially universalistic application. The 
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key to this logical progression is Mead's focus upon the 
unique social form of American religious pluralism in the 
generation of a divinely transcendent American civil religion. 
The History of American Folk Religion: 
Martin Marty 
In The New Shape of American Religion (1959), ]1artin 
Marty attempts to document the emergence of American civil 
religion as a fourth major American religion, independent and 
differentiated from Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. 
Marty agrees with Mead (1963) that American civil religion 
was born in the natural religious beliefs of the nation's 
Protestant-deist founders, and has been nurtured by the Amer-
ican tradition of religious pluralism. r1arty's position de-
parts from that of Mead and also from that of the Protestant 
civic pietists in its evaluation of American civil religion 
as a religion-in-general which lacks the moral and theologi-
cal rigor of denominational religion. Marty's (1959:2) Arner-
ican religion-in-general is a syncretistic belief system in 
which generalized religious sentiments have replaced partie-
ularistic theological content. Franklin Littell (1962:194-
195) describes American religion-in-general as the "hearty 
and uncritical affirmation of everything American" typified 
by the popular mass media slogan, "Go to the Church of Your 
Choice, but GO TO CHURCH!" The God of religion-in-general, 
according to Marty (1959:34-39) is an understandable and man-
ageable being who is comforting and "an American jolly good 
fellow." The prophets of religion-in-general are popular 
American clergymen, such as the Rev. Billy Graham and 
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Dr. Norman Vincent Peal, who have attracted cross-denomina-
tional support. Religion-in-general is described by Marty 
as a popular, highly generalized symbol system concerned 
with the religious aspects of being an American. Religion-
in-general is portrayed as a type of American folk religion, 
serving a predominantly integrative function for American 
society. 
Marty cites the erosion of American Protestantism as 
the main factor contributing to the rise of American folk 
religion. Protestant dominance declined in a religiously 
plural society that soughttotolerate and even integrate 
Roman Catholicism and Judaism. Along with Protestant "capit-
ulation" to Catholics, Jews, and liberals, the American eco-
logical trends toward urbanism and suburbanism hastened the 
decline of Protestant civic piety and the rise of religion-
in-general (Marty, 1959:4-5). Marty is unclear about the 
specific impact of ecological trends upon American religion, 
implying that, because suburban Protestantism often lacks 
prophetic force, it has degenerated into religion-in-general. 
Marty (1959:45-66) also suggests that the rise of religion-
in-general may simply be one of the many symptoms of the 
American cultural shift from inner-directedness to other-
directedness. Marty concedes that the seeds of folk reli-
gion's vision of God as a benevolent, manageable deity were 
sown in the Protestant conception of covenant. 
The winds of erosion first blew in the original 
adaptation of Calvinism to· the American scene. 
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The federalist or covenantal idiom in Puritanism, which 
forced God to keep his half of the bargain, was the be-
ginning of the effort to manage Him (Marty, 1959:4). 
once begun, the social transformation from Protestant civic 
piety to religion-in-general has continued to the point of 
dominating contemporary American religious life. 
In a more recent statement, Marty (1974) has expanded 
his treatment of American civil religion to include four 
sub-types of civil religion. Marty delineates two basic 
types of civil religion, one divinely transcendent and the 
other nationally self-transcendent. The former, transcend-
ent civil religion, "sees the nation 'under God,'" while the 
latter, self-transcendent civil religion, stresses national 
self-worship (Marty, 1974:144). Within each basic type of 
civil religion there are two styles of religious leadership. 
Civil religion may be either celebrative, affirmative, cul-
ture building,and therefore priestly, or "dialectical and 
judgemental" and therefore prophetic (Marty, 1974:145). 
Figure 1 summarizes Marty's typology. 
Priestly transcendent civil religion is portrayed as a 
version of folk religion which received ritual expression 
through Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal style of fostering 
national cohesion during the cold war years. Eisenhower's 
statement that "America is the mightiest power which God has 
seen fit to put on his footstool" (quoted in Marty, 1974: 
147) exemplifies the concept of divine transcendence and 
aptly illustrates the integrative and affirmative qualities 
RELIGIOUS 
STYLE 
Priestly 
Prophetic 
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CENTRAL THEOLOGICAL AFFIRMATION 
Divine Transcendence 
Priest: Eisenhower 
Prophet: Lincoln 
National 
Self-Transcendence 
Priest: Nixon 
Prophet: Sidney Mead 
Fig. 1. Types of American Civil Religion (Marty, 1974) 
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of the priestly style of American civil religion. Prophetic 
transcendent civil religion is demonstrated by Abraham 
Lincoln's prophetic role during the Civil War. Lincoln 
called upon those involved on both sides of the conflict to 
seek knowledge of and obedience to God's will. 
Priestly self-transcendent civil religion is the type 
of American civil faith which most closely approximates the 
concept of religious nationalism. The nation replaces God 
as ultimate authority. An extreme example of priestly, 
self-transcendent American civil religion can be found in 
the John Birch Society's patriotic vision of America. But 
religious nationalism is not limited to political extremists. 
Marty cites Richard M. Nixon as a more moderate priestly in-
fluence. Analysis of Nixon's speeches reveals his tendency 
to use religious terminology to describe ·his personal vision 
of the nation. Marty (1974:152) notes that, although Nixon's 
speeches contained elements of both prophecy and idolatry, 
his predominant emphasis was upon "the promise of American 
life as a religious ultimate." 
Although Richey and Jones (1974) see Sidney Mead as a 
maior prophet of transcendent, universal civil religion, 
Marty portrays Mead as the prophet of prophetic self-
transcendent civil religion. Marty (1974:154) observes 
that God often gets ignored in Mead's advocacy of a univer-
salistic, world civil religion. Marty's evaluation of Mead 
is debatable (see Richey and Jones, 1974:15-16) and unless a 
stronger case can be built, prophetic, self-transcendent 
civil religion is the weakest cell in Marty's typology. 
Harty concludes his analysis of types of American civil re-
ligion by suggesting the future possibility of a dynamic 
tension between the priestly and prophetic modes of civil 
religious expression. 
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Despite the inclusion of two divinely transcendent 
types of civil religion in Harty's (1974) typology of Ameri-
can civil religion, Marty is best known for his emphasis on 
the nationally self-transcendent types which typify American 
religion-in-general. Marty's view of American civil reli-
gion is that of an eroded, Protestant civic piety which has 
become the suburbanized, homogenized, and syncretic religion 
of the American public. The only positive function Harty 
attributes to religion-in-general is that of national inte-
gration, exemplified by the Eisenhower administration. 
Otherwise, American civil religion is portrayed by Harty as 
particularly corrosive to denominational Protestantism, de-
ficient in providing alternative normative standards. 
John A. Coleman (1970:75) has suggested that the alarm with 
which Protestant churchmen such as Marty view American civil 
religion is testimonial to its emergence as an autonomous 
religious system no longer under the sponsorship of organized 
religion. 
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Conclusion 
American religious historians, through their research 
into the American religious tradition, were among the first 
to document the emergence of an American civil religion 
which overlapped with, but was also differentiated from, the 
denominations. For Hudson, Niebuhr, Tuveson, and the other 
Protestant civic pietists, America's civil religion was a 
nationalized version of Puritanism. The functions of Protes-
tant civic piety were to foster cohesion by extending the 
Puritan covenant to the national level and to provide pro-
phetic guidance to a new nation under God. But the United 
states did not remain a totally Puritan or even completely 
Protestant nation. Mead was the first religious historian 
to recognize fully the impact of religious pluralism on Amer-
ican civil religion. As the American religious structure 
became progressively differentiated and Protestant symbols 
became restricted in their applicability to the denomina-
tions, the symbols of American civil religion expanded to 
fill the void. Every American, Protestant or not, could po-
tentially identify with the values of liberty and equality 
and believe in the divine guidance of a nation throughout 
history. And according to Mead, the unifying and prophetic 
value system found in American civil religion had interna-
tional applicability. Other historians such as Marty, 
Littell, and Eckhardt were concerned that the emerging val-
ues of American civil religion constituted a watered-down 
version of Protestantism which competed with the denominations 
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in the field of religious meaning systems. In Marty's view, 
differentiation of religious structures has led to the gen-
eralization of civil religious values to the point where 
theological content is lost and national self-transcendence 
becomes the result. Marty, Mead, and the Protestant civic 
pietists agree on the existence of American civil religion 
and the manner of its emergence in American life but dis-
agree profoundly on its present form, functions, and depth. 
This same debate is raging within contemporary sociology. 
PART II 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 
CHAPTER IV 
FOLK RELIGION 
Some of the earliest sociological studies of American 
civil religion treated it as a folk religion emerging from 
the daily life experience and expressions of the American 
populace. According to Richey and Jones (1974:15), folk re-
ligion "emerges out of the ethos and history of the society" 
ultimately to become "an idolatrous faith competing with 
particularistic religions." Andrew Greeley (1972:173) de-
fines folk religion as "the religion of comfort and reassur-
ance~ the religion of self-righteousness," which may be 
contrasted with American civil religion in its more noble, 
theoretical, "elite" form. For Greeley, the difference be-
tween folk and elite types of American civil religion is 
the difference between idolatry and prophecy. 
W. Lloyd Warner 
A classic sociological analysis of American civil re-
ligion is found in W. Lloyd Warner's (1961) examination of 
the Memorial Day celebrations of a Massachusetts city in the 
late 1930s. Warner's symbolic study of Memorial Day cere-
monies is conducted within the theoretical framework of his 
larger unit of analysis, the "American symbol system." 
According to Warner (1961:17), symbol systems function to 
organize individual and collective memories.and future 
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expectations in a way which strengthens and unifies the 
group. Symbol systems become sacred when they "reduce and 
help control the anxieties and fears felt by members of the 
species because of insecurity in the moral and natural en-
vironment" (Warner, 1961:11). Warner attributes the present 
diversity of American symbol systems, both sacred and secu-
lar, to the division of labor and complexity of the social 
structure. However, as American symbol systems become more 
differentiated, Warner notes an opposing phenomenon: the 
generalization and standardization of symbols used commonly 
by all members of the public. This generalization of Ameri-
can symbols is derived from the need to maintain societal 
cohesion on some level (Warner, 1961:14). Warner cites the 
ceremonial rituals of such American holidays as Thanksgiving, 
the Fourth of July, and Memorial Day as units of analysis of 
general symbol systems which have become sacred to Americans. 
In "An American Sacred Ceremony," Warner (1974) does 
not use the term "American civil religion" nor does he de-
scribe a normative, civil religious system. Instead, he 
selects the celebration of Memorial Day as one "important 
occasion in the American ceremonial calendar" (Warner, 1974: 
90). It is Warner's thesis that Memorial Day ceremonies 
function as religious rituals to ease the individual's anxi-
eties about death and to unify diverse segments of the com-
munity in a way in which competing, particularistic religious 
organizations are unable to accomplish this. Memorial Day 
is examined as "a cult of the dead which organizes and 
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integrates various faiths and national class groups into a 
sacred unity" (Warner, 1974:91). The basic symbolic themes 
of Memorial Day are the sacrifice of the soldier's life for 
his country and the obligation of the living also to sacri-
fice for the good of the society. The theme of individual 
sacrifice is symbolized in various rituals including the 
wearing of blood-red poppies and the participation in public 
parades to the cemeteries where the war dead are buried. 
warner (1974:97) stresses the unifying function of these 
folk rituals. 
Here we see people who are Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish and Greek Orthodox involved in a common ritual in 
a graveyard with their common dead. Their sense of sep-
arateness was present and expressed in the different 
ceremonies, but the parade and the unity gained by doing 
everything at one time emphasized the oneness of the 
total group. Each ritual also stressed the fact that 
the war was an experience where everyone sacrificed and 
some died, not as members of a separate group, but as 
citizens of a whole community. 
Rather than positing an ideal system of American civil 
religion, Warner takes his data from the life of the Ameri-
can folk. The indicators of Warner's folk religion are func-
tioning sets of civic rituals which are socially integrating 
and identity-reinforcing. This "ceremonial model" of Ameri-
can civil religion has been critiqued by historian John F. 
Wilson (1974) for including too extensive a range of phenom-
ena as indicators of American civil religion. Wilson con-
eludes that Warner fails to differentiate criteria for civil 
religious symbolism from other forms of cultural symbolic 
behavior. "If civil religion is viewed as coterminous with 
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all rites and beliefs it truly is generic religion and is not 
specifically useful in differentiating the set of rites and 
beliefs primarily concerned with civic polity" (Wilson, 1974: 
126). Warner's greatest contribution to the study of Ameri-
can civil religion was the suggestion that a broad range of 
potential indicators of American civil religion may be found 
in public ritual. Subsequently, scholars such as Wilson 
would legitimately call for evidence of greater differentia-
tion between American civil religion and other cultural sym-
bol systems. 
Conrad Cherry is one contemporary sociologist who has 
been inspired by Warner's symbolic analysis of American civil 
religion. Cherry (1970:304) defines American civil religion 
as the "distinctively religious tradition which draws upon 
American history for its revelatory events and personages, 
treats official documents . . as sacred scriptures and em-
bodies itself in American civic institutions." In "American 
Sacred Ceremonies" (1970), Cherry explores three historical 
examples of ceremonial occasions which served the ritual ex-
pression of American civil religion: the funerals of national 
founders Thomas Jefferson and John Adams in 1826, and the 
funeral of Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. The three events are 
examples of what Warner called national "cults of the dead" 
in which the living and dead are united, the living are also 
united together, and all members of the society are united 
with God and his purpose for the nation (Warner, 1974:109). 
Cherry notes that the Kennedy funeral had a special potential 
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for national unity due to the presence of millions of citi-
zens via television. Although the Kennedy funeral displayed 
the particularistic religious symbols of Roman Catholicism, 
the symbols of American civil religion were also in evidence. 
Cherry (1970:307) selects the eulogy offered by Archbishop 
Terence J. Cooke as the part of the service richest in civil 
religious symbolism. The eulogy emphasized Kennedy's role 
in furthering the American dream and called upon his succes-
sors to fulfill the dream of freedom and opportunity for all. 
Citizens could feel united with Kennedy's vision, one anoth-
er, and God's purpose for America if they would take up 
Kennedy's task of building a greater nation. 
Warner stressed the unifying functions of national 
sacred symbol systems. Cherry is cognizant of the potential 
for both unity and divisiveness in American civil religious 
symbolism. 
. . American sacred ceremonies invoke the arche-
typal themes and myths that have continuous popular 
appeal to the American people. A comparative historical 
study of the themes and myths in their cultic context 
would reveal both the unifying and the divisive functions 
of the American mythology (Cherry, 1970:308). 
Cherry believes that the funerals of Jefferson and Adams were 
able to transcend political divisions and unify a young na-
tion in 1826. Robert Kennedy's funeral in 1968 found the 
nation sufficiently pluralistic to defy complete cohesion. 
Although many citizens experienced a sense of gathering to a 
common purpose in their pledges to renew the values which 
Kennedy exemplified, others saw his violent death as a sign 
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that justice, peace, and freedom would never become truly 
realized in American daily life. Cherry concludes that the 
divisive function of American sacred ceremonies suggests 
that American civil religion is not a monolithic entity but 
a "national religious point of view" composed of different 
"sects" divided along regional, ethnic, class, and ideolog-
ical lines (Cherry, 1970:309-310). The Memorial Day cere-
monies which Warner observed unifying a small city in the 
1930s could have failed to unite a larger metropolis in the 
1970s. Such ceremonies might even have divided segments of 
the population during the American involvement in the Viet-
namese war, when the symbol of individual sacrifice for the 
nation was not universally valued, especially by the young. 
By suggesting the sub-differentiation of civil religious 
symbol systems, Cherry makes a point relevant to Wilson's 
concern that civil religion symbols are so general as to be 
virtually indistinguishable from other cultural symbols. 
Cherry agrees that American civil religious symbolism is of-
ten so highly generalized as to lack clarity. "Words such 
as freedom, democracy, providence, and (especially) God which 
recur in the celebrations of the national faith seem to lack 
uniform meaning for contemporary Americans" (Cherry, 1971: 
18). Cherry does not specifically connect the increasing am-
biguity of American civil religious symbols to the increas-
ing differentiation of American life. However, Parsons's 
(1971:26-27) thesis that increased structural differentia-
tion is accompanied by increased value generalization 
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supports Cherry's independent observations of the increasing 
loss of clarity and specificity of these same symbols. 
Cherry's observations of the Jefferson, Adams, and 
Kennedy funerals do not entirely support the concept of 
civil religion as folk r~ligion. Although Cherry's method 
of analysis begins with the ritual expressions of the Ameri-
can folk, his conclusions partially challenge the idea that 
a set of national folk symbols exists which can unify the 
American populace. Cherry also challenges the assumption of 
the folk religion concept that American civil religion is 
ultimately banal and idolatrous. Cherry observes that the 
ritual expression of American civil religion has been nation-
ally self-transcendent at times, but at other times as in 
Archbishop Cooke's eulogy of Robert Kennedy, it has stressed 
the divinely transcendent theme of American destiny under 
God. 
Will Herberg 
Possibly the best-known description of American civil 
religion as folk religion has been presented by Will Herberg 
(1960; 1974). Like Warner, Herberg does not begin his anal-
ysis with a normative definition of American civil religion, 
but concludes instead, from the results of popular polls and 
opinion surveys of the 1950s, that there is "an organic 
structure of ideas, values and beliefs that constitutes a 
faith common to Americans and is generally operative in their 
lives" (Herberg, 1974:77). The particular ideas, values, 
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and beliefs of American civil religion are democratism, hu-
manitarianism, idealism, optimism, egalitarianism, moralism, 
inner-directedness, individualism, and free enterprise (Her-
berg, 1960:76-90). These symbols, which represent "the 
American Way of Life," function as a common American reli-
gious symbol system in the manner outlined by Robin Williams. 
According to Williams (1952:312), all functioning societies 
possess a common religion whose symbols provide an overarch-
ing sense of cohesion even in the face of internal conflict. 
According to Herberg, it is the American Way of Life which 
gives a pluralistic America this overarching basis of unity. 
Herberg agrees with other analysts of American civil 
religion, such as Mead and Clebsch, that it is the structur-
al differentiation of American society which contributes 
directly to the emergence of American civil religion. Her-
berg explores two sources of differentiation: religious · 
pluralism and ethnic pluralism. For Herberg, the history of 
the emergence of American civil religion is the history of 
the American immigrant experience and the adaptation of each 
immigrant group to the American way of life. Herberg 
selects religion as the only identifying characteristic im-
migrants were not expected to give up in order to become 
good Americans. It was permissible for the assimilating im-
migrant to retain his religion, in part because of the tradi-
tion of religious pluralism, but also because the predominant 
religions, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, were sim-
ply three different representations of similar religious 
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symbols: the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of mankind, 
and the dignity of the individual. Herberg concludes that 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are three major 
branches of "American Religion" and that identification with 
one of these branches is necessary for one's acceptance by 
American society (Herberg, 1960:38-39). The renewal of reli-
gious interest observed during the 1950s in America could be 
interpreted as a reflection of the social need to identify 
with a community, with community becoming increasingly iden-
tified in religious terms as ethnic bases of identification 
declined. Herberg concluded that the religious revival of 
the 1950s was compatible with secularism, as one of the 
changes which had contributed to secularism--namely, the 
assimilation of ethnic groups--also contributed to the need 
for identification within a religious community (Herberg, 
1960:41). According to Herberg, American religion as a syn-
cretic blend of Puritanism and Americanism first emerged in 
the mid-nineteenth century and later became an "unembar-
rassed religionization of the American Way" as the ethnic 
churches dissolved into the more generalized traditions of 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism to become mere 
branches of American religion (Herberg, 1974:84). In this 
evolutionary scheme, immigration and assimilation are the 
major independent variables which contributed to the rise of 
American religion as a unifier of differentiated groups. 
Herberg stressed that despite the cohesive function of 
American religion it is not a common denominator religion 
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synthesized from the religious symbols of the biblical reli-
gions. American religion is a·true folk religion, an "organ-
ic structure" of norms, values, and beliefs which can be 
observed actually functioning in the daily social life of 
the American people (Herberg, 1974:76-77). Although Ameri-
can religion is neither sponsored by nor dominated by other 
religious organizations, there is little conflict between 
American civil religion and the American denominations. The 
only sources of tension observed between American religion 
and other religious organizations are to be found among the 
still-remaining ethnic churches, a few sects such as the Je-
hovah's Witnesses who oppose some manifestations of American 
civil religion such as the pledge of allegiance to the Amer-
ican flag, and a small group of critical theologians with 
views similar to .those of Martin Marty. With these excep-
tions, the relationship between American civil religion and 
the biblical religions in America is harmonious, due to the 
fact that American civil religion is not perceived as a sep-
arate competing religion by its American adherents (Herberg, 
1974:85). 
The indicators of American civil religion cited by Her-
berg are the American symbol systems noted by Warner (1961). 
Herberg locates evidence of American civil religion in the 
apotheosis of national life, the religionization of national 
values, the divinization of national heroes such as Washing-
ton and Lincoln, and the transmutation of American history 
into a redemptive history (Herberg, 1974:78). The spiritual 
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aspect of American civil religion is evidenced by the near-
unanimous American belief in a "supreme being" and the ten-
dency of Americans to see national history and endeavors as 
"moral crusades overseen by God." As symbolic evidence, Her-
berg describes the Great Seal of the United States which de-
picts an unfinished pyramid "representing the American 
national enterprise, and over it the all-seeing eye of God" 
(Herberg, 1974:80). This image suggests a prophetic dimen-
sion of American civil religion, but Herberg cautions that 
the structure of American religion as overarching the tradi-
tional biblical religion leads ultimately to a self-transcend-
ent position . 
. . America's civil religion is not, and cannot 
be seen as, authentic Christianity, or Judaism, or even 
a special cultural version of either or both. Because 
they serve a jealous God, these biblical faiths cannot 
allow any claim of ultimacy or absoluteness . . . short 
of God .... To see America's civil religion as somehow 
standing above or beyond the biblical religions, . 
as somehow including them and finding a place for them 
in its overarching unity, is idolatry, however innocent-
ly held and whatever may be the subjective intentions of 
believers (Herberg, 1974:87). 
Herberg portrays American civil religion as a genuine 
folk religion. The symbols of American culture and American 
civil religion are not differentiated because American civil 
religion is the American culture religionized. Herberg has 
no problem viewing American folk religion as a genuine civil 
religion, and points to Athenian and Roman civil religion as 
ancient examples of the congruency between a society's civil 
religion and its culture. Herberg's folk religion functions 
primarily as a mechanism for the pattern-maintenance of 
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American culture and the integration of American society. 
Andrew Greeley (1972:163), in an evaluation of Herberg's 
American folk religion, observes that "not since Emile Durk-
heim has anyone so astutely described the social-integration 
dimension in a religion." Yet Greeley questions Herberg's 
conclusion that the prophetic dimension found in biblical 
religion is absent from American civil religion. Greeley 
acknowledges that the prophetic function is lacking in Amer-
ican civil religion in its popular folk religion form. 
American civil religion as folk religion comforts, reassures, 
and celebrates conformity. However, Greeley believes there 
is another "elite" form of American civil religion based on 
the American values of the right to dissent. According to 
Greeley, the tradition of dissent has at times produced 
forces to counteract the self-transcendent tendencies of folk 
religion. For example, American clergymen who have protested 
war or racial injustice have done so not only from the per-
spective of their biblical traditions, but also from the 
tradition of dissent embedded in American civil religion 
(Greeley, 1972:167). 
Conclusion 
The concept of American folk religion, which was devel-
oped in the historical analyses of Marty, Littell, and Eck-
hardt, has been elaborated by the sociological analyses of 
Warner and Herberg. As social scientists attempting objec-
tive analyses, neither Warner nor Herberg was burdened with 
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a need to warn the public of the dangers of folk religion. 
As Greeley (1972:165) notes in comparing the sociological to 
the historical treatments of American civil religion, "while 
Herberg's analysis is astute, the reader in the 1970s may be 
inclined to find both Marty and Eckhardt to be irritable and 
irritating." The major contributions of Warner are the loca-
tion of American civil religion in the national symbol sys-
tems and ritual celebrations of the American public and the 
recognition that such symbols and ritual behaviors perform 
the religious function of uniting believers in a moral com-
munity. Herberg built upon this premise to explore his 
thesis that folk religion had replaced the American biblical 
religions as the major unifying force in American society. 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism had become religious 
sub-structures subsumed under, but remaining partially dif-
ferentiated from, the overarching folk religion. As a result 
of folk religion's overarching position, it must ultimately 
foster an attitude of national self-transcendence. Warner's 
and Herberg's careful elaboration of an integrative and self-
transcendent American folk religion, based on studies of sym-
bolic behavior and surveys of American values, stimulated 
other sociologists to question whether folk religion was the 
only manifestation of American civil religion. Might Ameri-
can civil religion have an "elite" form as Greeley suggests? 
If American civil religion were to manifest the functions 
traditionally associated with religious systems, a prophetic 
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dimension could be expected. Perhaps the greatest contribu-
tion of the folk religion tradition in sociology was the 
stimulus of further inquiry into the manifestations of Amer-
ican civil religion in American life. 
CHAPTER V 
THE TRANSCENDENT CIVIL RELIGION 
OF ROBERT BELLAH 
It is ironic that in the 1950s, a time of religious re-
vival in the United States, historian Marty and sociologist 
Herberg found American civil religion manifest as a general, 
popular folk religion with little specific theological con-
tent. In the 1960s and early 1970s, popularly characterized 
as a nonreligious, "God Is Dead" era of American history, 
sociologists such as Robert Bellah and Andrew Greeley began 
to write of a transcendent, universal religion of the Ameri-
can nation. Transcendent universal religion of the nation 
is the second model of a civil religion reported by Richey 
and Jones (1974:15-16) in their review of the American civil 
religion literature. Within this model, American civil reli-
gion is portrayed as a set of divinely transcendent, norma-
tive ideals by which a society is defined, integrated, and 
ultimately judged. Transcendent universal religion differs 
from folk religion in two important respects. First, tran-
scendent religion assumes a system of national ideals which 
exist as social facts apart from the extent of their accept-
ance by the American populace at any point in time. Folk re-
ligion, in contrast, takes the daily life behavior of the 
public as its major data source. Second, transcendent 
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religion is seen as fulfilling all the functions attributed 
to traditional religious systems. The functions of folk re-
ligion are limited to only two of the traditional social 
functions performed by religion: the creation and legitima-
tion of cultural meaning and social integration. Memorial 
nay rituals, for example, help legitimize the war experience 
as an act of national purpose and rededicate the living to 
the goals of the nation. These rituals are socially inte-
grating and identity reinforcing but are ultimately nation-
ally self-transcendent. Transcendent universal religion is 
a civil religion capable of fulfilling the integrating and 
legitimizing functions of folk religion, with the additional 
function of divine prophetic guidance. 
The Definition of American Civil Religion 
In 1967, in an arti~le entitled "Civil Religion in 
America," Robert Bellah introduced the concept of transcend-
ent universal religion of the nation into the field of soci-
ological discourse. Bellah's model of American civil religion 
flows from the Durkheimian assumption that moral facts, along 
with social facts, are sui generis, and that social cohesion 
rests upon common moral understandings rooted in religious 
meaning structures (Bellah, 1975:ix). Bellah's model is 
based also on Parsons's (1966:10-11) theory of a religiously-
based moral order, although Bellah does not necessary accept 
all of Parsons's assumptions. Bellah asserts that American 
civil religion exists as a social fact, subject to the same 
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type of inquiry as other religious systems. Bellah defines 
American civil religion as an institutionalized collection 
of sacred beliefs about the American nation, providing cohe-
sion through national times of crisis (Bellah, 1974a:29). 
civil religion is "that religious dimension found I think in 
the life of every people, through which it interprets its 
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality" 
(Bellah, 1975:3). The symbols of American civil religion 
and their institutionalization in American society may be ob-
served through systematic examination of national documents. 
Specifically, Bellah examines the Declaration of Independence 
and the inaugural addresses of American presidents as indica-
tors of the beliefs and values of American civil religion. 
Central to the American civil belief system in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was a belief in the existence 
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of God, in the American nation being·subject to God's laws 
and in the divine guidance and protection of the nation 
(Bellah, 1974a:26-27). Common civil religious values were 
liberty, justice, charity, personal virtue, and individual 
freedom. America was often characterized by its early citi-
zens as a new Israel, a wilderness which could be revealed 
as a paradise for God's chosen people (Bellah, 1975:x-xiii). 
According to Bellah (1975:153), these American beliefs, val-
ues, and symbols have a sacred dimension in that "they have 
revealed what reality is and how we should act in relation 
to it." 
Although the symbols of American civil religion are 
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often rich in biblical imagery, they are clearly differenti-
ated from the symbols of American denominational religion. 
Bellah (1974a:29) observes that from its inception American 
civil religion did not oppose and in fact shared much in 
common with Christianity; yet American civil religion "was 
neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian." 
The differentiation of American civil religion from Christi-
anity was not accomplished in order to placate members of 
minority religions. The differentiation occurred early in 
American history because national founders such as Franklin, 
washington, and Jefferson determined that there should be a 
division of functions between American civil religion and 
Christianity. 
Under the doctrine of religious liberty, an excep-
tionally wide sphere of personal piety and voluntary 
social action was left to the churches. But the churches 
were neither to control the state or be controlled by it. 
The national magistrate, whatever his private religious 
views, operates under the rubrics of the civil religion 
as long as he is in his official capacity . " ( 19 7 4a: 
29-30). 
Bellah notes the official behavior of President John F. Ken-
nedy as a modern illustration of the relationship between 
American civil religion and the American denominations. The 
Kennedy inaugural address of January 20, 1961, was filled 
with civil religious imagery but was void of any reference to 
denominational religion. Roman Catholic Kennedy reminded the 
nation that the rights of man were given by God, and that the 
achievement of national goals was dependent upon God's will, 
but refrained from mentioning Christ, Christian churches, or 
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Roman Catholicism (Bellah, 1974a:21-23). Bellah concludes 
that the separation of church and state in the United States 
has not prevented the political sphere from developing a re-
ligious dimension. It is this religious dimension of the 
polity as expressed through sacred beliefs, symbols, and 
rituals which Bellah distinguishes as the American civil re-
ligion (Bellah, 1974a:24). 
The History of American Civil Religion 
In The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in 
Time of Trial (1975), Bellah traces the symbolic history of 
American civil religion from seventeenth century Puritanism 
through the mid-1970s, stressing the unifying symbolism of 
the American "covenant" conceived of as existing between God 
and the citizens of the society. The covenant symbolism of 
American civil religion emerged initially in the parallel re-
ligious and political ideologies of the New England Calvin-
ists. The Puritan religious dialectic of personal liberation 
through conversion, balanced by the moral obligation of cove-
nant, is compared to the political process of revolution bal-
anced by constitution (Bellah, 1975:32). Bellah stresses the 
close parallel between the religious and political dialectics 
of the Revolutionary period and believes their similarity 
represents more than mere formal analogy. Both religious 
conversion and political revolution are liberating processes 
whose potential for anarchy require counteraction through 
establishment and institutionalization. The American 
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constitution was written by men who had experienced the cli-
mates of spiritual conversion and political revolution. The 
constitution is an "external covenant" with a religious 
foundation, requiring periodic revival of its moral directive 
(Bellah, 1975:34). By conceiving of the United States Con-
stitution as a type of covenant, Bellah provides an analogue 
for his model of American civil religion. The Constitution 
is clearly a political document guiding the political organi-
zation of a society, yet it also is based on the religious 
ideal of citizens bound to a higher moral order. The image 
of Constitution-as-covenant symbolizes the religious dimen-
sion of the American polity. 
The Functions of American Civil Religion 
The concept of an American covenant is strongly suggest-
ive of the unifying function of American civil religion. 
Bellah does not maintain that the potential for unity is al-
ways fulfilled. Instead, Bellah observes that the new Ameri-
can covenant was violated at once in the genocide of the 
American Indians and the institution of slavery. It required 
the revivalism of nineteenth-century evangelicalism and abol-
itionism, guided by the moral example of an Abraham Lincoln, 
to restore the covenant. Bellah views the twentieth century 
as a "new time of trial," as the American covenant is torn 
both internally and externally by two major sources of divi-
sion: racial conflict and economic instability. Exploring 
the first source of division, Bellah finds that the civil 
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ideal of egalitarianism sometimes failed to unify an ethni-
cally plural society. From the genocide of the American 
Indians, slavery, nativism, anti-Semitism, to twentieth-
century racism, the dominant majority of Americans could 
sometimes see themselves as a "chosen people" engaged in a 
"holy war" against a "sinful" minority group (Bellah, 1975: 
101). As Cherry (1970:308) observes, in a culturally differ-
entiated society, the values of American civil religion can 
become sub-differentiated to the point at which they foster 
societal division rather than cohesion. Bellah (1975:106) 
notes that, at certain periods of cultural change, a "trans-
valuation of roles" may be observed which "turns the despised 
and oppressed into symbols of salvation and rebirth." The 
1960s romanticization of the American Indian and the intense 
public reaction in the 1970s to the slavery experience drama-
tized in Alex Haley's Roots serve as two recent examples of 
the transvaluation of minority roles. It remains to be seen 
whether such an altered image of the minority has a signifi-
cant impact on the integration of that minority. 
Along with their inability to unite ethnic groups in an 
egalitarian structure, the values of American civil religion 
have failed to prevent structural cleavage in the economic 
sphere. Bellah traces the origins of twentieth-century eco-
nomic strains to the early fusion of the Protestant Ethic 
with the developing capitalist system. Puritan Cotton Mather 
ceased serving as the archetypal American to be replaced by 
the utilitarian Benjamin Franklin (Bellah, 1975:71). Bellah 
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believes that American capitalism was originally concordant 
with the civil religious ideal of individualism, but twenti-
eth-century multinational corporations and interlocking 
directorates render that association obsolete today. As a 
result, "there is far more tension between basic American 
values and the capitalistic economic system than is usually 
assumed" (Bellah, 1975:116). Bellah argues that the Puritan 
view of work as a calling never sanctioned transforming work 
and the pursuit of wealth into ends-in-themselves. He be-
lieves that the American pursuit of material objects, fos-
tered by advertising and central to the continuation of the 
existing economic system, clashes with the spiritual values 
stressed by the American national founders. The existence 
of large corporations does not embody individualism, the dis-
tribution of wealth does not exemplify egalitarianism, and 
freedom to choose a nonmaterialistic life-style does not 
really exist as an option available to the American masses. 
Bellah concludes that the external structure of American 
civil religion has been stretched to the breaking point by 
the economic development of the United States. A form of 
democratic socialism based on the idealistic principles of 
freedom and egalitarianism is recommended as an economic re-
vival of the original ideals of the American covenant (Bellah, 
1975:136-138). 
The paradoxical potential of American civil religion 
for fostering both unity and division in society is symbol-
ized by Bellah in the concept of the "broken covenant." The 
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image of a broken covenant is itself suggestive of a dialec-
tic. When Bellah (1975:142) states that "today the American 
civil religion is an empty and broken shell," he does not 
mean that American civil religion has disappeared from Amer-
ican culture. Instead, the broken covenant signifies a soci-
ety temporarily unable to be informed by its values and 
temporarily unable to institutionalize these values in a 
binding way. 
Until we are all angels, external law and restraint 
are necessary for any kind of social existence. But in 
a republic an external covenant alone is never enough. 
It is the nature of a republic that its citizens must 
love it, not merely obey it. The external covenant must 
become an internal covenant and many times in our history 
that has happened. In a series of religious and ethical 
revivals, the external covenant has become filled with 
meani~g and devotion. Even though that inner meaning 
and devotion has often been betrayed, genuine achieve-
ments have been left behind. It is better that slavery 
has been abolished. It is better that women have the 
vote. But the internal covenant can never be completely 
captured by institutions; its life is that of the spirit 
and it has its own rhythms (Bellah, 1975:142). 
The dialectic of the broken covenant is also employed 
in Bellah's exploration of the transcendent and self-transcen-
dent applications of American civil religion. Like historian 
Mead, Bellah has from the very beginning stressed the prophet-
ic function of American civil religion. Bellah (1974b:225) 
believes that at the core of American civil religion is the 
belief that "the nation is not an ultimate end in itself but 
stands under transcendent judgement." American civil reli-
gion has value for American culture only to the extent that 
it recognizes an ultimate reality higher than the society 
itself. Bellah's model of a transcendent civil religion is 
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in marked contrast to the folk religionists' view of American 
civil religion as culturally reinforcing and socially inte-
grating affirmation of the American way of life. Bellah 
(1976b:l67) argues that 
American civil religion has never been primarily an ide-
ology intended to reinforce the authority of the state or 
cast a halo over institutions. The American civil reli-
gion has been quite explicitly oriented to a level of 
reality that transcends the state and institutions and 
relatively to which state and institutions are viewed as 
only conditionally legitimate. 
Bellah contends that to conceive of American civil religion 
as folk religion is to see only public theology and not the 
genuine American civil religion. Transcendent American civil 
religion originated with the belief in a power higher than 
the citizen and the society, and that belief has been period-
ically renewed at significant moments in American history. 
For example, the tradition of morally-based civil disobedi-
ence, legitimized by Thoreau, found modern expression in the 
civil rights movement and the opposition to the Vietnamese 
war (Bellah, 1974a:40). Bellah is particularly interested 
in Abraham Lincoln as a civil religious prophet.· Bellah 
cites Lincoln's opposition to the Spanish-American War 
(Bellah, 1974a:39) and Lincoln's 1857 speech attacking the 
Dred Scott decision of the United States Supreme Court 
(Bellah, 1976b:l68) as examples of the institutionally crit-
ical potential of American civil religion. 
Bellah is aware that the transcendent dimension of 
American civil religion is not always recognized by American 
society. At times the symbols of American civil religion are 
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used to support a pattern-maintaining public theology or are 
twisted into religious nationalism. Religious nationalism 
is the third model of American civil religion noted by 
Richey and Jones (1974:16). The direct opposite of transcend-
ent American civil religion, religious nationalism represents 
a world view wherein the nation itself is personified and 
adored. Cherry distinguishes between religious nationalism 
and the transcendent universal religion of Bellah and Sidney 
Mead. "Religious nationalism implies a corporate attitude 
of unconditional reverence for the nation and for its intend-
ed goals." Transcendent civil religion, in comparison, "sug-
gests a national attitude of reverence for a transcendent 
sovereign authority whose designs cannot be identified as 
one-to-one with the designs of the nation" (Cherry, 1971:17). 
There has been little systematic examination of religious 
nationalism as a specific model of American civil religion. 
Marty's (1974:152) analysis of priestly self-transcendent 
civil religion, embodied in the John Birch Society and some 
of Richard Nixon's speeches, indicates that religious nation-
alism may be one manifestation of American civil religion. 
Bellah is not unaware of the past and present effects of re-
ligious nationalism in the United States, such as imperial-
ism, national isolationism, and racism. But Bellah treats 
these phenomena as examples of the broken covenant between 
the nation and its transcendent authority. Religious nation-
alism emerges when a society fails to remain informed by 
civil religion's prophetic message. Religious nationalism 
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is transcendent universal religion turned idolatrous. In 
Bellah's view, the transcendent and idolatrous applications 
of American civil religion are not separate forms of civil 
faith but good and evil sides of the same phenomenon. The 
variables which Bellah highlights as intervening in American 
society to foster the ideology of religious nationalism in-
clude the rise of science, the market economy, and industrial 
capitalism, which work together to facilitate self-transcend-
ent interpretations of civil religion (Bellah, 1975:xiii). 
Bellah's symbol of the broken covenant illustrates that 
an overarching, meaning-endowing, prophetic American civil 
religion can be forgotten by a society and its leaders, leav-
ing a nation floundering in internal division, meaningless-
ness, and self-transcendence. Each of Bellah's major works 
on American civil religion has stressed the need for the re-
newal and reinstitutionalization of the original values of 
American civil religion. "Civil Religion in America" (1967) 
concludes with a prophetic call for the application of the 
underlying ethical principles of American civil religion to 
current national problems. In The Broken Covenant (1975:151), 
Bellah continues the prophetic warning: "We must reaffirm 
the outward or external covenant that includes the civil re-
ligion in its most classical form." Bellah looks to religious 
revival as the most promising vehicle for the renewal and re-
institutionalization of American civil religion. Bellah 
(1974b) postulates that American society may turn in the 
ideological direction of humanistic religious revolution 
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characterized by religious pluralism and heralded by some of 
the new religious movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Among 
the new religious organizations which are most likely to 
facilitate a renewal of American civil religion are millen-
nial movements presenting ethical criticisms of modern Amer-
ican society and possessing democratic structures. The 
necessity for the latter attribute, a democratic structure, 
limits the field; for as Bellah (1975:160) observes, "the 
more egalitarian the group, the more ephemeral it is." Some 
of the most successful religious movements to emerge in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, such as The Unifica-
tion Church of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon and the Children 
of God, are authoritarian in structure and unlikely to ern-
body the traditional civil values of individualism and egal-
itarianism. Regardless of the source, Bellah believes that 
the religious renewal of the values of American civil reli-
gion is essential for the future of American society. 
Bellah's own belief in the potential of American civil reli-
gion to guide American society is not, however, sufficient 
to make him optimistic about American civil religion's restor-
ation. Despite his own faith, Bellah (1974b:272) objectively 
concludes that "the crisis in the civil religion is deepening 
more rapidly than I had expected." 
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Bellah's Typology of American Civil Religion: 
General and Special Civil Religion 
Bellah is able to discern numerous dimensions and mani-
festations of American civil religion. Bellah (1975:142) 
writes of American civil religion manifest as an internal 
covenant and as an external covenant. This distinction re-
fers to the moral ideals of American civil religion as com-
pared to their external institutionalization in society. Both 
manifestations are considered by Bellah to be social facts 
subject to sociological investigation. Bellah (1976a:l67) 
also writes of the American civil religion as compared to 
public theology. Here Bellah compares the original transcend-
ent ideals of American civil religion to their self-transcend-
ent application by different groups at various times in 
history. In addition to these varying forms of American 
civil religion Bellah isolates two additional manifestations: 
general civil religion and special civil religion. 
General civil religion, based on universal values, is 
the type of civil religion considered for many centuries to 
be a necessary prerequisite for political and social order. 
General civil religion provides the type of religious disci-
pline necessary as the basis for the responsible, moral citi-
zenship that leads to an integrated society. Bellah finds 
the idea of general civil religion evident in the writings 
of various American leaders. 
Roger Williams, for example, for all his insistence on 
the separation of church and state, believed that such 
general religion was essential for what he called "govern-
ment and order in families, towns, etc." . . Elsewhere 
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Franklin emphasized the importance of general religion 
when he wrote, "If men are -so wicked as we now see them 
with religion, what would they be without it?"--which in 
turn foreshadows Eisenhower's famous remark, "Our govern-
ment makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt 
religious faith--and I don't care what it is" (Bellah, 
1976a:l56). 
Tocqueville's concept of republican religion is a comprehen-
sive classical analysis of general civil religion. Republi-
can religion is the moral law which affects political life 
through its influence on customs and daily life (Tocqueville, 
Vol. I, 1966:304). Through republican religion's general-
ized synthesis of democratic values and belief in a supreme 
being, a foundation of good citizenship and social cohesion 
is built. 
In the United States a special form of civil religion 
developed which is congruent with, but partially differenti-
ated from, the general values of the culture. In the case 
of the United States, special civil religion came to be 
based particularly upon the specific democratic values de-
rived from the Declaration of Independence and the Revolu-
tionary tradition (Bellah, l976a:l56). Special civil 
religion is American civil religion as it has been documented 
by Bellah's systematic examination of national documents. 
For example, the general belief in democratic values exempli-
fies general civil religion, while the derivation of these 
beliefs from the American Constitution illustrates special 
civil religion. Special civil religion is also evidenced in 
the belief in America as a "new Israel" (Bellah, 1976b:l67). 
Bellah (l976a:l56) notes the partial overlapping of general 
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and special civil religion in American society, and observes 
that most religious groups in the United States have been 
able to affirm aspects of both general and special civil re-
ligion. Figure 2 illustrates the central attributes of gen-
eral and special civil religion, presented here as varying 
along the Parsonian continuum of value generalization, which 
Parsons (1966:23) classifies as a process of modernization. 
Bellah's typology of general and special civil religion is 
more descriptive than predictive. Bellah suggests that forms 
of civil religion may vary in generality, ranging from the 
universal general civil religion to the particular special 
civil religion, but fails to specify the conditions under 
which special civil religion develops as a religious form 
which is partially differentiated from general civil reli-
gion. Bellah's typology of civil religion remains a cate-
gorical tool most useful for describing different levels of 
value generalization observable in civil religious symbol 
systems. 
Conclusion 
Bellah is the first to develop a sociological model of 
a transcendent American civil religion. According to John F. 
Wilson (1974:127-129), Bellah's model specifically refers to 
several distinct dimensions and functions of American civil 
religion neglected by previous models. According to Wilson, 
the most central dimension of Bellah's model is ideological. 
The ideological dimension of American civil religion is that 
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Fig. 2. Generality of Civil Religious Values (Bellah, 1976a) 
74 
of a nation living out God's will on earth. Through use of 
the motif of a new Israel Americans are able to locate their 
role in history and legitimize national actions as God's will. 
The ideological dimension of American civil religion points 
to its prophetic function, as God is seen as the higher au-
thority governing and judging the society. A second dimen-
sion of Bellah's model refers to the civil religious figures 
who have been major prophets or priests of American civil re-
ligion. George Washington and Abraham Lincoln are obvious 
leaders, and modern prophets such as John Kennedy and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. are also important. Even self-transcendent 
figures such as Richard Nixon have made contributions to the 
history of American civil religiop. A third dimension of 
Bellah's model is the specific historical events and the 
places· associated with them which have become sacred to the 
American people. Gettysburg, Washington, D.C., and the 
Alamo are sacred places representing sacred history to many 
Americans. The recollection of these historical events func-
tions both to define the society's role in history and to 
unify its citizens. A final dimension in Bellah's model of 
American civil religion is the ceremonial dimension. Bellah, 
like Warner and Cherry, focuses upon the ritual expression 
of civil religion as indicators of its ideology. The cere-
monies of a presidential inaugural, Memorial Day, or the 
Fourth of July provide opportunities to observe ceremonial 
civil religious behavior. 
Wilson (1974:129) concludes that Bellah's model of 
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American civil religion is superior to Warner's folk reli-
gion model, although both include some of the same dimensions 
and sources of data. Bellah's model succeeds where Warner's 
fails in pointing out specific types of symbolic behavior 
and belief which refer to the religious dimension of the 
American polity. Unlike Warner and Herberg, who tend to 
view all cultural symbolism as civil religious, Bellah dif-
ferentiates civil religious from other types of cultural 
symbolism. Wilson observes that Bellah's differentiation of 
civil religious phenomena makes his model more productive 
than Warner's for generating empirical research. Bellah's 
model of American civil religion also contains an additional 
element missing from the folk religion model: theology. 
The central, theological dimension of Bellah's American civil 
religion refers to a transcendent God. In contrast to the 
theologically contentless folk religion of Marty, Warner, 
and Herberg, Bellah stresses the transcendent and universal 
features of American civil religion which could make it, in 
Bellah's words, "simply one part of a new civil religion of 
the world" (quoted in Richey and Jones, 1974:16). Of all of 
the elements of Bellah's model of American civil religion, 
it is its theological dimension which has generated the 
greatest amount of subsequent controversy. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE RESPONSE TO BELLAH 
The reaction to Bellah's sociological model of a tran-
scendent universal American civil religion was considerable. 
several books (e.g., Cherry, 1971; Novak, 1974; Richey and 
Jones, 1974) and numerous articles (e.g., Cherry, 1970; Cole-
man, 1970; Fenn, 1972, 1974, 1976; Greeley, 1972: Chap. 7; 
Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978; Neuhaus, 1970; Stauffer, 1973; 
Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Wimberly, 1976) appeared in direct 
response to Bellah's model. Contemporary social scientists 
were not responding simply to the concept of American civil 
religion. Historical models (e.g., To~queville, Hudson, Marty, 
and Mead) have been well-known but have stimulated little 
sociological attention. The folk religion models o£ Warner 
and Herberg have become sociological classics but generated 
only sporadic sociological inquiry in the 1970s (e.g., 
Cherry, 1970; Greeley, 1972). Bellah renewed intellectual 
inquiry into American civil religion by seriously postulat-
ing the existence of a transcendent universal American 
civil religion which, in its impact on American culture, 
went far beyond ceremonial occasions. Bellah also sug-
gested a systematic method for the study of American civil 
religion through the examination of national documents. 
Bellah's model and his methods stimulated two types of 
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response: theoretical and empirical. Theoretical statements 
by Cherry (1970; 1971), Fenn (1970; 1972; 1974; 1976), 
Greeley (1972), and Stauffer (1973) serve as representative 
of the most significant theoretical evaluations of Bellah's 
model of American civil religion. Relevant empirical tests 
of Bellah's model include published studies by Jolicoeur and 
Knowles (1978), Thomas and Flippen (1972), and Wimberly 
(1976). 
Theoretical Response 
Richard Fenn 
Bellah's most outspoken critic has been Richard Fenn 
(1972; 1974; 1976). Fenn is skeptical of Bellah's entire 
American civil religion model, but the heart of Fenn's cri-
tique is based on hi~ disagreement with Bellah's basic 
assumptions concerning the function of religion in contempor-
ary American society. At the center of the controversy be-
tween Bellah and Fenn are questions concerning the existence 
of the United States as a society and the ability of reli-
gion to provide a basis for social integration. Both Bellah 
and Fenn ask the following questions, but arrive at different 
conclusions: (1) Does American society exist as an ideolog-
ical whole? (2) Can religion provide moral integration for 
modern society? (3) Does American civil religion exist as a 
social fact of contemporary life? (4) Can civil religion pro-
vide a basis for twentieth-century ideological renewal? and 
(5) Is it a proper role for the scientific observer to call 
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for a reaffirmation of civil faith in a morally torn society? 
Bellah's model is based on an affirmative response to all 
five questions, while Penn's critique is based on a negative 
response. 
Penn doubts Bellah's basic premise that American civil 
religion exists as a social fact institutionalized in the 
American social structure. Penn's doubts about the institu-
tionalization of American civil religion are based on his 
general analysis of American society. A summary of Penn's 
(1970) critical response to Parsons's (1966:10-11) model of 
a religiously based moral order can be seen as a preview of 
Penn's subsequent position on the inviability of contempor-
ary American civil religion. Penn assumes that modern Amer-
ican society is involved in the process of secularization, 
characterized by differentiation within cultural and social 
systems as well as between these system levels. Religious 
pluralism is one by-product of this differentiation. To the 
extent that plural systems are internalized by personality 
systems, they become bases for different religious affilia-
tions and thus sources of ideological conflict rather than 
sources of cohesion. For example, the differentiation of 
the social from the personality system leads to a situation 
in which the individual's choice of ultimate meaning systems 
is not tied to his social role performances. An American 
could succeed or fail in his economic role regardless of his 
choice to be Presbyterian or agnostic. Under a system of 
structural pluralism, it is left up to the individual to 
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attempt to integrate private religious choices with the nor-
mative system of society (Fenn, 1970:133-135). Fenn (1970: 
118) observes that "secularization implies the increasing 
autonomy of both personality systems and role patterns from 
the prescriptions of the normative order," with the result 
that the normative order must fail to persist. Fenn asserts 
that the only remaining functions of religion in modern soci-
ety are (1) providing expressive functions for groups and 
individuals, (2) defining ethnic or traditional boundaries 
between groups, and (3) legitimating demands of local groups 
for control over institutions such as education. Religion 
continues to provide integration only for societies which 
have difficulty training and motivating a labor force (Fenn, 
1972:17). Fenn believes that the sources for the new, non-
religious legitimacy in advanced societies are legal, polit-
ical, and economic, based on the society's capacities to 
meet popular demands for political participation and a high 
consumption level (Fenn, 1972:17). 
Fenn sees no overarching religious tradition in the 
United States capable of binding moral force. Fenn's posi-
tion on the deterioration of the religious basis of the nor-
mative order has direct implications for the study of American 
civil religion. Fenn (1976:165) acquiesces to the possibility 
that American civil religion could have provided an overarch-
ing value system in the nineteenth century but argues that 
American civil religious symbolism fails to bind cultural, 
societal, and personal spheres of action in contemporary 
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America. Fenn does not deny that American civil religion 
once developed. He suggests instead that American civil re-
ligion developed early in the nation's history (under condi-
tions which he does not specify) and then failed to persist 
under the contemporary conditions of differentiation at all 
system levels. 
Fenn (1976) has developed a typology of American civil 
religion in response to Bellah's typology (see part II, chap-
ter 2:57-59) which illustrates his differentiation thesis. 
Penn's two categories of American civil religion are pro-
duced by differentiation within religious culture. Fenn 
(1976:162) proposes that structural differentiation within 
modern society will increase the degree of separation between 
forms of religious culture. This phenomenon is illustrated 
by the emergence of two types of American civil religion, 
societal and personal civil religion. Societal civil reli-
gion combines national and biblical symbols and provides the 
motivational base of corporate actors within the social sys-
tem. Personal civil religion expresses ethical piety and 
assists the identity development of individual persons (Fenn, 
1976:162). Figure 3 summarizes Penn's typology. Fenn (1976: 
162) sees societal civil religion as comparable to Bellah's 
special civil religion, while personal civil religion is an-
alogous to Bellah's general civil religion. (See figure 2, 
chapter 5.) Fenn argues that the differentiation of forms of 
American civil religion at the societal and individual levels 
is evidence that there is no overarching form of American 
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Fig. 3. Personal and Societal Civil Religion (Fenn, 1976) 
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civil religion which can bind the individual to society. In 
Fenn's view, American religious culture currently possesses 
no macro-level function, although values are manifestly im-
portant to the individual personality. "The relevance of 
personal identity or ultimate ends to any complex, large 
scale organization is extremely tenuous'' (Fenn, 1976:165). 
Applying this analysis to the religious dimension of the pol-
ity, Fenn concludes that societal civil religion (Bellah's 
special civil religion) has lost its function for contempor-
ary society. 
An evaluation of Penn's versus Bellah's typology is 
made difficult by the fact that Penn's categories of societal 
and personal civil religion are based on structural differ-
entiation, while Bellah's types of special and general civil 
religion vary along a continuum of value generalization. 
Value generalization and structural differentiation are com-
plementary, but not identical, processes, (Parsons, 1971:26-
27). Penn's conclusion that societal civil religion is ex-
actly what Bellah means by special civil religion is open to 
question. Figure 4 presents the two typologies as if they 
were structurally parallel, as Fenn concludes. According to 
figure 4, Bellah's special civil religion becomes progress-
ively weakened in its ability to unite citizens with differ-
ing personal value systems. However, it is possible to agree 
with Penn's differentiation thesis without accepting the 
assumption that special civil religion has lost its unifying 
potential. Figure 5 accounts for the possibility that 
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elements of both general and special civil religion could be 
present at the societal level. Although societal and person-
al types of civil religion may be differentiated, as Penn ob-
serves, both types may be subsumed under Bellah's category of 
special civil religion. Neither Bellah nor Penn currently 
takes the synthetic perspective suggested by figure 5, al-
though this perspective is as logically possible as either 
of the independent typologies. Until there is further sys-
tematic development of both typologies and further specifica-
tion of the factors assumed to produce typological variation, 
neither Bellah's nor Penn's typology of American civil reli-
gion is likely to generate productive empirical research. 
Penn and Bellah differ on more than their models of 
American civil religion or on their general theories of reli-
gion. Moral cleavage accompanies their intellectual debate. 
Penn operates within the traditional, scientific role of 
ethical neutrality by dispassionately observing the increas-
ing irrelevance of societal values to individual purpose. 
If there is a contemporary crisis of faith and morality, 
Penn serves as its detailed observer and analyst. Penn's 
philosophical stance concerning American civil religion is 
expressed at the conclusion of a recent clarification of his 
theory. 
If the separation of the symbols and institutions 
relevant to national authority from those relevant to 
the individual's search for identity which will survive 
the threat of death has antinomian implications, it will 
not be for the first time in Western religious history 
(Penn, 1976:166). 
86 
Fenn views Bellah as a sociologist stepping unwarrantedly in-
to a prophetic role. Bellah's own commitment to the values 
of American civil religion makes the validity of his scien-
tific view problematic for Penn. In Penn's (1976:160) eval-
uation, Bellah's model of American civil religion represents 
"the new orthodoxy ... Bellah (1976a:l57), in turn, affirms 
his ethical neutrality by arguing that if the particular 
values of American civil religion can be historically and 
socially documented, their weakening may also be observed. 
A prophetic call for the renewal of American civil religion 
is therefore justified for the preservation of a society's 
identity. The moral cleavage between Bellah and Fenn is 
most deeply expressed in Bellah's rebuke of the scientist 
who would examine a disease but avoid exploring its cure. 
The philosophical distance between Bellah and Fenn is so 
great that recent theoretical exchange between the two soci-
ologists (Bellah, 1976a, 1967b; Penn, 1976) has been tainted 
by personal bitterness that impedes productive discourse. 
Andrew Greeley 
Greeley devotes a chapter of The Denominational Society 
(1972:156-174) to 11 The Civil Religion... Unlike Fenn, Greeley 
has no problem conceiving of an overarching normative order 
in American society. 11 The sociologist, accustomed as he is 
from reading Durkheim and Weber to expect religion in soci-
ety, is not terribly surprised by these sacral underpinnings 
of the American consensus .. (Greeley, 1972:157). After 
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reviewing the folk religion models of Eckhardt (1958) , Her-
berg (1960), and Marty (1959), Greeley concludes that there 
is more to the American normative consensus than a watered-
down system of religion in general. Folk religion is only 
one observable manifestation of American civil religion. 
The other manifestation is the noble, prophetic elite form 
of American civil religion. Greeley's concept of elite 
civil religion corresponds to Bellah's model of transcendent, 
universal American civil religion (Greeley, 1972:167-173). 
Greeley agrees with Bellah's location of the symbols of Amer-
ican civil religion in national documents and civic celebra-
tions. Greeley·also agrees that the symbols of American 
civil religion reveal that the American nation has a reli-
gious dimension represented, in part, by the celebration of 
sacred places and sacred days. Like Bellah, Greeley finds 
no contradiction in the possibility that folk and elite forms 
of American civil religion could exist alongside of one an-
other in the same society. 
It is easy to be cynical about America's civil re-
ligion, as we have noted before, but then it is easy to 
be cynical about the principles of any religion because 
the most noble of religious ideals are anything but uni-
versally honored in practice, no matter what the religion 
be or what the society in which the religion operates. 
Folk religion, the religion of comfort and reassurance, 
the religion of self-righteousness, are not new in the 
world. Neither is turning religion into a justification 
for pursuing the selfish goals of the community, but the 
difference between the theory and the practice should 
not cause the observer to lose his respect for the theory 
and for its power to be a norm against which the failures 
can be evaluated (Greeley, 1972:173). 
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Greeley's response to Bellah is an affirmation of the tran-
scendent, universal model of American civil religion. Both 
Bellah and Greeley agree that the consensual basis of Ameri-
can society has a sacred dimension. Both recognize the le-
gitimating, integrating, and prophetic potential of American 
civil religion in its elite form, but recognize also that 
the values of American civil religion can be practiced in 
self-legitimating and self-worshiping forms. 
Conrad Cherry 
Cherry (1970; 1971) has been inspired by Warner's 
method of symbolic analysis of American sacred ceremonies to 
accumulate data supportive of Bellah's model of transcendent 
universal American civil religion. Through his analysis of 
American cults of the dead such as the funeral ceremonies of 
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Robert Kennedy, Cherry con-
cludes that American civil religion performs legitimating 
and integrating functions for American society. Cherry, like 
Bellah, finds that the American covenant is sometimes broken, 
or weakened, in its integrative ability in modern society. 
Early in the nation's history, the funeral services of Jef-
ferson and Adams were able to overarch national divisions to 
unify a young nation. By 1968, American society was suffi-
ciently differentiated that Robert Kennedy's funeral failed 
to bind certain groups who saw Kennedy's death as evidence of 
the failure of national values. According to Cherry, the di-
visive potential of American civil religion is not new in 
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American history. Cherry (1970:309) finds that Confederate 
war propaganda used during the Civil War "relied heavily on 
the time-tested motifs of the national faith" and is a clear 
example of the "capacity of the same theme both to unify and 
divide the nation." Despite his observation of the sometimes 
divisive effects of American civil religion, Cherry would not 
agree with Fenn that American civil religion entirely lacks 
integrative potential. Although modern American civil reli-
gion is differentiated along regional, ethnic, and socio-
economic lines, it is a discernible "national religious 
point of view." Cherry concludes that "the myths, symbols, 
and sources of revelation of civil religion are sufficiently 
continuous and uniform to constitute an isolable religion 
that has operated vigorously in the American public sphere" 
(Cherry, 1970:310). American civil religion need not be a 
monolithic entity to remain more integrative than divisive 
for the majority of citizens. 
Another aspect of American civil religion observed by 
Cherry is its dual relationship to American values and goals. 
American civil religion has "offered both uncritical religious 
sanction and prophetic criticism of the culture" (Cherry, 
1970:313). American sacred ceremonies, such as Memorial Day 
rituals, are often culturally reinforcing rites of folk reli-
gion. But Cherry believes that the observers of American 
civil religion have been too ready to identify this religion 
with the banal celebration of the American way of life. "If 
the national faith has issued in 'cookie prayers' in the 
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public schools, it has also been expressed in solemn occa-
sions when American citizens dedicate themselves to high 
human ideals" (Cherry, 1970:304). Some American sacred cere-
monies are notable for their prophetic messages. For exam-
ple, Lincoln's second inaugural address attributed the Civil 
war to the wrath of God descending on the American people. 
Archbishop Cooke's eulogy for Robert Kennedy noted the dis-
crepancy between the American civil value of freedom and its 
unequal distribution in American life. These and other Amer-
ican ceremonies serve as indicators "that the civil religion 
need not be insensitive to the limitations and shortcomings 
of the nation, that religious expressions of national ideals 
need not be uncritical ones" (Cherry, 1970:314). 
Cherry, like Bellah and Greeley, has no difficulty con-
ceiving of an American civil religion which is both integrat-
ive and divisive, legitimating, and prophetic. Cherry (1970: 
314) points out that this dual relation of American civil re-
ligion to American culture is typical of most forms of reli-
gion. As Peter Berger (1967:97-100) observes, religion in 
Western history has been both a "world-maintaining" and 
"world-shaking" force. It would be reasonable to assume 
that American civil religion would also perform both func-
tions. The folk religion model, which focuses only upon 
world maintenance, is limited in its perspective. Bellah's 
model provides for both world-maintaining and world-shaking 
manifestations of American civil religion, and is therefore 
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more congruent with the observed relation of religious forms 
to their cultural contexts. 
Empirical Response 
Thomas and Flippen 
Only a few empirical studies have specifically investi-
gated transcendent civil religion in America. Thomas and 
Flippen's (1972) content analysis of the editorials of a na-
tional sample of newspapers published during the "Honor Amer-
ica" weekend, July 4, 1970, is one of the earliest empirical 
responses to Bellah's model of transcendent universal Ameri-
can civil religion. Thomas and Flippen attempted to deter-
mine the existence of an independent American civil religion 
which could "provide a transcendent goal and me~ning system 
for the political process, and to motivate the achievement of 
national, political goals" (Thomas and Flippen, 1972:219). 
The purpose of the study was a specific test of Bellah's the-
sis of a universal transcendent civil religion in American 
society. The coding instrument, intended to distinguish be-
tween civil religion items and their secular equivalents, re-
lied on the mention of God as the main criterion of civil 
religiosity. For example, "God has blessed America" would 
be coded as a civil religion item; "America has been blessed," 
as a secular item (Thomas and Flippen, 1972:221). Analysis 
of data indicated that a fairly large number of secular civil 
themes were found in the Honor America editorials, but few of 
the themes specifically referred to a deity. Thomas and 
92 
Flippen conclude that, although many of the values Bellah 
attributes to American civil religion are significant values 
of American culture, these values are not commonly attrib-
uted to divine origin. Therefore, "a well-defined thesis of 
civil religion may be more the creation (and fantasy) of the 
liberal political intellectual elite than active faith among 
the masses" (Thomas and Flippen, 1972:224). 
An alternative interpretation of Thomas and Flippen's 
findings is suggested by an evaluation of their measurement 
instrument. Many sociologists of religion would not agree 
that the defining criterion of religiosity is a belief in a 
supreme being. Presence or absence of a "sense'' of ultimate 
meaning is a more commonly accepted contemporary criterion 
of religiosity (e.g., Bellah, 1964; Yinger, 1963; Stauffer, 
1973) , although this criterion is difficult to operational-
ize. Thomas and Flippen's reliance on the mention of God to 
separate civil religion items from secular items may have un-
fairly limited the number of items that could be considered 
religious. Even if it were agreed that a test of Bellah's 
particular model of transcendent universal American civil re-
ligion would require some notion of a transcendent being, it 
is not evident that the reference to God must be explicit. 
It is not clear that the editorialist who wrote "America has 
been blessed" did not assume or wish to imply that it was 
God who did the blessing. Unfortunately, there is no way to 
measure items which reflect cultural values which may be so 
generally associated with supernatural origins that the need 
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to state the origins explicitly may be considered unnecessary. 
Despite the difficulties in developing an accurate measure 
ment of civil religious symbols, Thomas and Flippen's data 
actually show that secular civil themes were commonly ex-
pressed, but the transcendent nature of these themes could 
not be demonstrated. 
Jolicoeur and Knowles 
Another content analysis, conducted by Jolicoeur and 
Knowles (1978), found evidence of a civil religion of tran-
scendent values among Masonic fraternal orders. Data were 
collected from issues of The New Age, a national Masonic 
journal, from 1964 to 1974. Jolicoeur and Knowles used a 
coding guide for civil religion items which was more general 
than that used by Thomas and Flippen (1972) and which in-
cluded fewer items. One item, the mention of "founding fa-
thers: is coded as a civil religion item by Jolicoeur and 
Knowles (1978:11) although Thomas and Flippen (1972:221) 
coded the same item as secular. This lack of agreement be-
tween the coding forms used in the two studies hinders the 
accumulation of a body of comparative data concerning Ameri-
can civil religion. Based on their own coding scheme, Joli-
coeur and Knowles found support for Bellah's model of tran-
scendent American civil religion in The New Age. Unlike the 
editorials reviewed by Thomas and Flippen, nearly half (46.5 
percent) of The New Age issues mentioned "God. 11 Belief in 
God was frequently cited in the context of references to the 
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united States, United States history, and national goals. 
In the Masonic journal, "belief in God is also viewed as the 
foundation of American success and strength" (Jolicoeur and 
Knowles, 1978:12). It is interesting that Jolicoeur and 
Knowles discovered symbols of a transcendent American civil 
religion, not among the "liberal intellectual elite" expected 
by Thomas and Flippen, but among a traditional conservative 
segment of the American public, Masonic lodge members. Un-
fortunately, due to the differences between the measurement 
instruments used by Jolicoeur and Knowles and by Thomas and 
Flippe~ it is not possible to compare the conclusions of the 
two content analyses in a meaningful way. 
Ronald C. Wimberly 
Two studies conducted by Ronald c. Wimberly (Wimberly 
et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976) were designed to provide an 
empirical test of Bellah's model of transcendent universal 
American civil religion. Both studies were surveys of indi-
vidual belief systems. Civil religious belief measurement 
items were designed to measure the transcendent aspects of 
American civil religion cited in Bellah's (1967) work (see 
Appendix). The majority of civil religion items mentioned a 
transcendent God, as in the item "We should respect the pres-
ident's authority since his authority is from God." The few 
items which did not mention a supreme being linked Christian-
ity to the political system, as in "Good Christians aren't 
necessarily good patriots" (Wimberly et al., 1976:893). The 
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civil religion measurement items, combined with items measur-
ing denominational religious belief, were administered first 
to a small sample (115) of orthodox Protestants. Factor 
analysis of the survey data revealed the presence of a sep-
arate civil religious dimension which was clearly differen-
tiated from indicators of denominational religion. In the 
first order factoring, civil religion items clustered to-
gether more distinctly than the denominational religion 
items. Second-ordering factoring confirmed that, although 
the civil religious dimension was positively related to as-
pects of denominational belief and behavior, civil religion 
remained a distinct dimension clearly separable from denom-
inational religion. 
A second survey (Wimberly, 1976) used measurement items 
drawn predominantly from the earlier study, supplemented 
with additional items measuring degrees of political commit-
ment. Data were gathered from a heterogeneous sample of 574 
persons which included subsamples of church attenders and 
persons with political interests. Factor and cluster analy-
sis of the data indicated that first order factorings and 
clusterings showed a discrimination between civil religion 
indicators and indicators of both denominational religion 
and political dimensions. Higher order analyses found the 
civil religion dimension loading near two of the denomina-
tional religion indicators (belief and behavior) and close 
to one political commitment indicator (belief). Wimberly 
interprets these findings as a confirmation of a distinct 
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civil religious belief system which may prove to be an "in-
tervening link" between denominational belief and political 
commitment (Wimberly, 1976:350). Due to the transcendent 
content of the civil religion indicators, Wimberly is con-
vinced that he has made a valid measurement of the transcend-
ent civil religion of Bellah's model, and not of public 
theology. The fact that Wimberly's civil religion items 
factored together, clustered tightly, and had fairly high 
communalities indicates reliability of the instrument as a 
whole. Wimberly (1976:349-350) concludes that his research 
''extends support for the civil religion hypothesis" of 
Bellah and advances civil religion to "the status of a 
social scientific concept." The remaining empirical task is 
the determination of the function of American civil religion 
in American society. 
Conclusion 
The response to Bellah has been immediate and mixed. 
On the theoretical front Richard Penn emerges as Bellah's 
most adamant and sophisticated antagonist. Penn doubts the 
very existence of American civil religion and is particularly 
skeptical of Bellah's transcendent model of American civil 
religion. In contrast, both Greeley and Cherry are comfort-
able with the idea of an overarching belief system for soci-
ety and find Bellah's model of transcendent universal civil 
religion to be a productive analysis of civil religion in 
its elite form. The theoretical state of American civil 
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religion within contemporary sociology has become a pro-
Bellah versus anti-Bellah debate which is far from being 
over. Other voices in the next round of the debate will be 
heard in the following chapter as the issue of theoretical 
clarification of American civil religion is addressed more 
specifically. 
The empirical response to Bellah's model is still in 
its infancy. Studies which attempt to determine if American 
civil religion exists are hampered by the absence of a clear 
definition of American civil religion which is universally 
accepted in the social sciences. It has been particularly 
difficult to develop a criterion for the measurement of the 
transcendent aspect of American civil religion. It remains 
unclear whether including mention of God in an item is suffi-
cient to insure indication of transcendent belief, or omis-
sion of God proves secularity. Each of the studies reviewed 
relied on a different civil religion measurement instrument, 
making comparison of results extremely difficult. Wimberly's 
instrument was subject to the most sophisticated examination 
and appears to be the most promising instrument for future 
individual belief research on American civil religion. 
Wimberly's research, which directly challenges Penn's assump-
tion that a civil religious dimension does not exist, could 
become the foundation upon which an adequate body of empiri-
cal data could begin to be built. But it is evident that 
some of the methodological problems of American civil reli-
gion measurement are embedded in the current chaos of 
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American civil religion theory. Until a logical, coherent 
model of American civil religion can be systematized in the 
form of testable propositions, American civil religion is 
likely to remain elusive to empirical investigators. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
The analysis of differing traditions of American civil 
religion research and differing theoretical models of Ameri-
can civil religion illustrates the contemporary need for con-
ceptual clarification. There are gaps in the body of 
knowledge concerning American civil religion, varying defini-
tions of American civil religion leading to conceptual debate 
among major theorists, and difficulties generating precise 
measurement instruments. Much of the confusion can be 
traced to the coex~stence of the five models of American 
civil religion: folk religion, democratic faith, religious 
nationalism, Protestant civic piety, and transcendent uni-
versal religion of the nation (Richey and Jones, 1974). The 
five models have different emphases, but are also intercon-
nected at various points. As Richey and Jones (1974:18) 
observe, "the very diversity of conceptualization represented 
in this fivefold typology illustrates both the complexity of 
the issue and the pioneer character of the study and debate." 
In order to simplify the complexity and move American civil 
religion research out of its pioneering stage, selection of 
the most productive model or synthesis of models is in order. 
Because the transcendent universal model of Robert Bellah is 
the most comprehensive and has been the most empirically 
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productive of the five models, it will serve as the basic 
model from which definitions and assumptions concerning Amer-
ican civil religion will be derived. 
The transcendent universal American civil religion of 
Bellah (1967; 1975) is the most comprehensive of the five 
models, due to the fact that it includes the other four 
models as possible manifestations of the basic model or as 
departures from it. Bellah (1975), who placed the origins of 
American civil religion within the American Puritan tradition, 
includes the Protestant civic piety model as· typical of early 
American civil religion. Bellah would argue, however, that 
Protestant values have to be universalized and generalized to 
integrate diverse groups into the American tradition. The 
1961 inaugural speech of Catholic President John F. Kennedy 
illustrates the success of this generalization of values 
(Bellah, 1974a:21-23). The transcendent universal model also 
contains the options for the expression of folk religion and 
religious nationalism. Through the image of the ubroken cov-
enant," Bellah (1975) symbolizes the idolatrous application 
of American civil values to public theology and national self-
worship. Bellah does not directly address the democratic 
faith model of personal value construction, but Bellah him-
self exemplifies individual .adherence to a humanistic (and in 
Bellah's case, theological) belief system shaped by the values 
of American civil religion. The transcendent universal model 
of American civil religion advanced by Bellah is the most 
inclusive of the five models because, by describing American 
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civil religion in its ideal, normative form, all civil reli-
gious behavior directed toward or away from the ideal can be 
measured and included for analysis. 
Examination of various models of American civil reli-
gion presented in the literature led John F. Wilson (1974) 
to evaluate the utility of each model for furthering research. 
Wilson concluded that the model of American civil religion 
developed by Bellah (1967) is the most productive, making 
"visible, and even intelligible, ranges of phenomena in Amer-
ican history ... " (Wilson, 1974:130). The productivity of 
the model is based on its specificity in distinguishing the 
religious aspects of American symbolism and its inclusion of 
empirically productive sources of data such as the pronounce-
ments of civil religious figures like Lincoln, religious 
events endowing ·symbolic meaning to civil faith, places 
associated with civil religious events, and ceremonial rit-
uals. Although Wilson's own use of these data sources failed 
to find sufficient evidence to support Bellah's transcendent 
hypothesis, Wilson believes that the negative findings in no 
way negate the testability of the model. As has been previ-
ously noted, the transcendent universal model of American 
civil religion has stimulated more recent sociological empir-
ical studies (e.g., Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978; Thomas and 
Flippen, 1972; Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976) than 
have alternative models. 
One of the limitations of Bellah's transcendent univer-
sal model of American civil religion has been the absence of 
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a precise definition of American civil religion which dis-
tinguishes American civil religion from other religious 
forms and from civil society. Bellah originally defines 
American civil religion as an "institutionalized collection 
of sacred beliefs providing cohesion through national times 
of trial." The sacred beliefs of American civil religion 
are to be found and delineated through examination of nation-
al documents (Bellah, 1974a). John A. Coleman (1970), work-
ing with the transcendent universal model, has derived a 
more specific definition of American civil religion. Cole-
man suggests that a definition of civil religion should be a 
logical outgrowth of a definition of religion. Since there 
is almost as little sociological consensus concerning the 
definition of religion as the definition of civil religion, 
Coleman follows Bellah's (1965:171) defin~tion of religion as 
"a set of symbolic acts which relate man to the ultimate 
conditions of his existence" (Coleman, 1970:68). Religion is 
further defined as providing sources of social and personal 
identity by assisting individuals in dealing with questions of 
ultimate meaning and by suggesting a value system to guide 
self-concept formation and role performance. Coleman ob-
serves that it is not necessary for religion explicitly to 
relate the individual to his nation or citizen role. Univer-
salistic religions, for example, attempt to transcend the 
limitations of national identification. However, there are 
often pressures, both from religious systems and political 
systems,to extend religious symbolism to the citizen role. 
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Religious organizations may require social support for their 
continuance. Political systems may need religious legitimacy 
for the support of national values and social control mechan-
isms. Thus, a need for a civil religious system which 
relates the citizen's role and the society to issues of ulti-
mate concern may develop. Bellah (1967:173) suggested that 
the need for a civil religious symbol system was most likely 
to be demonstrated "at a moment of great social crisis 
or at a time of momentous political transition." This role 
of civil religion would be analogous to the traditional role 
of religion in providing symbols of identity and ultimate 
meaning at critical moments of the individual life cycle, 
such as birth and death. 
Using Bellah's general definition of religion and its 
functions, and applying these to cases in which religious 
symbols are extended to the society and the citizen's role, 
Coleman develops the most precise definition of civil reli-
gion to emerge from the literature. 
Civil religion is a special case of the religious 
symbol system, designed to perform a differentiated func-
tion which is the unique province of neither church nor 
state. It is a set of symbolic forms and acts which re-
late man as citizen and his society in world history to 
the ultimate conditions of his existence. Civil reli-
gion, however, is not always or usually clearly differ-
entiated from the church or the state (Coleman, 1970:69). 
Coleman's definition of civil religion has been condensed and 
slightly reworded to form a basic definition of American civil 
religion, stated in the form of the following sociological 
proposition: 
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Proposition I: 
American civil religion is the religious symbol system 
which relates the citizen's role and American society's 
place in space, time, and history to the conditions of ulti-
mate existence and meaning. 
Coleman's definition, stated in Proposition I, is a 
logical outgrowth of Bellah's sociology of religion and 
Bellah's transcendent universal model of American civil reli-
gion. In his 1975 work, Bellah offers a similar definition, 
calling civil religion "that religious dimension, found ... 
in the life of every people, through which it interprets its 
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality" 
(Bellah, 1975:3). Coleman's definition has the advantage of 
including reference to both the individual and societal 
levels of civil religion, and has the potential to guide 
contemporary sociological research into American civil reli-
gion more specifically than have previous definitions. 
PART III 
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AND 
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 
FROM A11ERICAN DENOMINATIONS AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 
Coleman (1970:69) has defined civil religion as a 
"special case of the religious symbol system, designed to 
perform a differentiated function which is the unique prov-
ince of neither church nor state." But civil religion as 
it has been observed throughout history "is not always or 
usually clearly differentiated from the church or state." 
Coleman (1970:74) proposes, however, that "in America we 
find almost a unique case of civil religion differentiated 
from both church and state." Coleman expects American 
civil religion to be differentiated from political and 
religious communities as a consequence of the general de-
gree of differentiation in advanced societies. Only in a 
society such as the United States, where religious and po-
litical institutions are differentiated, would a further 
differentiation of an institutionalized set of civil be-
liefs be expected. Coleman's assumption is summarized in 
the form of the second major proposition concerning the 
history and development of American civil religion: 
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proposition II: 
American civil religion is structurally differentiated 
from both the political community and the religious commun-
ity. 
Theoretical Studies 
Talcott Parsons 
Determination of the level of differentiation of Amer-
ican civil religion from other social institutions is par-
tially dependent upon the criterion of differentiation. 
Parsons (1971:26) defines differentiation as "the division 
of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more 
units of structures that differ in their characteristics 
and functional significance for the system:" In the general 
action system, differentiation may occur within systems or 
between major system levels. Types of differentiation rele-
vant to the discussion of religious symbol systems include 
differentiation within the cultural system, within the so-
cial structure, between social and cultural systems, and be-
tween social and personality systems. Differentiation with-
in the cultural system can take place, for example, along 
the line of generality of religious values. Particularistic 
values, such as religious fundamentalism, may arise to coun-
teract the differentiation of more universal value systems. 
Differentiation within the cultural system may account for 
the differentiation of particularistic American public theol-
ogy from the more transcendent universal values of Bellah's 
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model of American civil religion. The separation of reli-
gious and political institutions in historic times serves as 
an example of differentiation within the social structure. 
The further differentiation of a civil religious structure, 
not dependent on political or religious communities, would 
be an extension of this type of differentiation. Differen-
tiation between system levels occurs because the two systems 
do not exactly overlap. The development of denominational 
pluralism in the United States is an example of congruent 
differentiation from the cultural system of Judeo-Christian 
values. Differentiation between social and personality sys-
tems would be evidenced when religious communities are chal-
lenged by individual autonomy. Richard Fenn (1970:133-135) 
has observed that the differentiation of the social from the 
personality system leads to a situation in which the individ-
ual's choice of ultimate meaning systems does not affect his 
social role performances. Fenn (1976:165) concludes that 
due to the differentiation between system levels, no reli-
gious symbol system, including American civil religion, is 
capable of binding cultural, social, and personal spheres of 
action. 
In the Parsonian model, three other processes of struc-
tural change accompany differentiation: adaptive upgrading, 
inclusion, and value generalization. Parsons (1971:26) spec-
ifies that differentiation at any level results in higher 
evolution if and only if each new unit has greater adaptive 
capacity than the old, previously undifferentiated unit. 
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parsons calls this process adaptive upgrading. With adaptive 
upgrading a wider range of resources becomes available to 
differentiating units than had been available to their pre-
decessors. Both the processes of differentiation and adap-
tive upgrading pose problems for the integration of new units. 
The problems can be solved by the inclusion of the newly 
differentiated units within the normative structure of the 
society. Ultimately, the processes of differentiation, adap-
tive upgrading and inclusion are completed by value general-
ization. If newly differentiated units are to gain legitima-
tion in the increasingly complex social structure 11 the value 
pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of general-
ity in order to insure social stability" (Parsons, 1971:27). 
The relationship between differentiation, adaptive upgrading, 
inclusion, and value generalization as outlined by Parsons 
is important for tracing the development of American civil 
religion. The transcendent universal model portrays an Amer-
ican civil religion which is differentiated from other social 
institutions, yet is sufficiently generalized to overarch and 
integrate these institutions during times of national crisis. 
Robert Bellah 
Using a definition of differentiation which is similar 
to that of Parsons, Robert Bellah (1964) has developed a the-
ory of religious evolution based on differentiation. Bellah 
traces the course of religious change through five ideal 
typical historical stages: (1) primitive religion (primarily 
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Australian religions); (2) archaic religion (religions of 
Africa, Polynesia, and early religions of the Middle East and 
china); (3) historic religion (transcendental religion in-
cluding Judaism, Islam, and early Christianity); (4) early 
modern religion (the Protestant Reformation); and (5) modern 
religion (post-Reformation religions in Western nations) . 
The major evolutionary process which Bellah specifies is 
differentiation. Through the five successive stages, the 
evolution of religious symbol systems moves from compact to 
differentiated forms, the self becomes differentiated from 
the world, and religious institutions become differentiated 
from other institutions (Bellah, 1964:358). Bellah's five 
stages and the indicators of differentiation for each stage 
are summarized in figure 6. 
Although Bellah does not mention American civil reli-
gion in his general treatment of religious evolution, he 
makes several observations which can aid the construction of 
a theory of the differentiation of American civil religion. 
Bellah sets the stage of original church-state differentia-
tion in the period of historic religion. Prior to this 
stage, religious and political institutions were not clearly 
differentiated. The Protestant Reformation of the early 
modern period initiated the uneasy religious pluralism of 
Europe which partially motivated American settlement by mem-
bers of Protestant sects. At the same time that this struc-
tural differentiation of religious institutions was occurring, 
religious symbol systems were multiplying. According to 
INDICATORS OF 
DIFFERENTIATION 
Religious 
Organ1zation 
Religious Symbol 
Systems 
Self-World Rela-
tionship 
PRIMITIVE 
(Most examples drawn 
from Australian 
religion) 
No religious organiza-
tion exists apart 
from society 
Monistic--religious 
myths overlap sig-
nificantly with 
daily life activ-
ity 
Fusion of self with 
myth in ritual 
RELIGIOUS STAGE 
ARCHAIC 
(Religions of Africa, 
Polynesia, and early 
religions of Middle 
East, India, 
and China) 
Emergence of the cult 
The beginnings of du-
alism in the objec-
tification of mythic 
beings 
Increased distinction 
between humans and 
gods 
HISTORIC 
(Transcendental religions--
Islam, Judaism, Early 
Christianity, etc.) 
Emergence of differenti-
ated religious collec-
tivities, including 
church-state differen-
tiation 
Dualistic--natural and 
supernatural worlds 
are separated 
Clearly structured s~lf­
concept emerges to 
face transcendent 
reality 
Fig. 6. Bellah's Stages of Religious Evolution (Bellah, 1964) 
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INDICATORS OF 
DIFFERENTIATION 
Religious 
Organization 
Religious Symbol 
Systems 
Self-World Rela-
tlonship 
RELIGIOUS STAGE 
EARLY MODERN 
(Protestant Reformation} 
Rejection of religious hierarchy 
(papal authority} and estab-
lishment of a "religious two 
class system: elect and rep-
robates" (369} 
Focus upon the direct relation-
ship between the individual 
and transcendent reality 
This-worldly orientation of 
self-involvement 
MODERN 
(Post-Reformation religion 
in Western nations) 
Denominational pluralism and privati-
zation of religion 
Multiple symbol systems open to indi-
vidual selection 
Multi-dimensional self, conceived of 
as capable of transforming both 
self and world 
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Bellah, modern religion represents a distinctive evolution-
ary state in which traditional religious worldviews were 
challenged, first by the rational ethics of Kant and later 
by humanism. Bellah views this process as one of evolution 
from primitive monism, through historical dualism to a 
modern structure of infinite possibilities. The modern 
effects of differentiation include the ''collapse of meaning" 
and the "failure of moral standards"; yet in Bellah's view 
there are also "unprecedented opportunities for creative 
innovation in every sphere of human action" (Bellah, 1964: 
373-374) . One such religious innovation which could be seen 
as congruent with the differentiation of religious organiza-
tions and symbol systems is the emergence of a differenti-
ated American civil religion. According to Bellah (1975), 
the symbols of American civil religion emerged initially in 
the parallel religious and political ideologies of the New 
England Calvinists. Bellah's analysis does not set the dif-
ferentiation of American civil religion at any one point in 
American history, but cites the reemergence and reaffirmation 
of civil religious themes throughout history, especially dur-
ing national times of trial. 
John A. Coleman 
Coleman's (1970) theory of the differentiation of Amer-
ican civil religion, from which Proposition II is derived, is 
logically consistent with the assumptions of both Parsons 
(1971) and Bellah (1964) concerning differentiation of 
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religious symbol systems. Coleman draws upon Bellah's (1964) 
religious evolutionary stages to illustrate the differenti-
ation of contemporary civil religion from both religious and 
political communities. It is Coleman's thesis, borrowed 
from Bellah (1967), that civil religion is "the essential 
middle term" necessary for the understanding of church-state 
differentiation (Coleman, 1970:68). In the stages of primi-
tive and archaic religions, society, religion, and civil re-
ligion are observed to be undifferentiated. In historic or 
early modern religious systems, church-state separation be-
gins to be observable for the first time. Although politi-
cal and religious organizations become differentiated, often 
posing conflicts of interest, forms of civil religion are 
not yet differentiated. Civil religion may be controlled 
either by religious organizations or by the state. In modern 
societies, civil religion may be observed in one of three 
forms: (1) continuing to be undifferentiated, and sponsored 
by either religion or the state; (2) holding monopoly status 
as a form of secular nationalism; or (3) differentiated 
civil religion controlled neither by religious organizations 
nor by the state (Coleman, 1970:69). 
Type 1: Continued undifferentiated 
civil religion 
Coleman suggests that just because civil religion 
appears to be undifferentiated within a society, its absence 
should not be assumed. In these cases, the functions of 
civil religion will be performed either by religious or 
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political organizations. Civil religion will appear either 
as "Church-Sponsored Civil Religion" or "State-Sponsored 
Civil Religion" (Coleman, 1970:70). 
Church-sponsored civil religion 
In cases where an established religious tradition pro-
vides the context for sacred civic symbols, civil religion 
may be said to be church-sponsored. The church "lends rit-
ual to coronations of emperors and kings and adapts its doc-
trine of providence to questions of national destiny" (Cole-
man, 1970:70). The Christian-sponsored divine right of 
kings exemplifies church-sponsored civil religion. Modern 
examples of church-sponsorship in the Judaic and Islamic 
traditions include modern Israel and the Khomeini government 
of Iran. In these cases a differentiated civil religion is 
not discernible, as political and religious symbols systems 
are intertwined under the sponsorship of a dominant reli-
gious tradition. Other examples of church-sponsorship of 
civil religion "can be found throughout Latin America, in 
the Orthodoxy of Greece, in Buddhism in Ceylon" (Coleman, 
1970:70). Internal conflict, endemic to societies in which 
an institutionalized religion performs the functions of 
civil religion, includes strains created by the pressures of 
religious minorities and the likelihood that the traditional 
religion may be resistant to modernizing trends (Coleman, 
1970:71). 
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state-sponsored civil religion 
Civil religion sponsored by the state, exemplified by 
Imperial Rome and Restoration Japan, is evidenced in cases 
where the political system institutes a nationally self-
transcendent cult. Structural weaknesses of civil religion 
dominated by the state, observable in the Roman and Japanese 
cases, include the problem of value specificity which chal-
lenges the values of competing religious organizations. 
There may also be problems of rigidity associated with self-
transcendence (Coleman, 1970:72). 
Type 2: Secular nationalism 
Coleman views secular nationalism as a functional 
alternative to civil religion to the extent that secular 
nationalism provides a legitimating symbol system which com-
petes with the symbol system of religious organizations. 
Secular nationalism arises as the alternative source of 
civil religion when the historic national religion is 
either too traditionalistic or too closely tied to pre-
revolutionary regimes to serve as the civil religion of 
a modernizing politico-economic regime (Coleman, 1970: 
72) . 
The secular nationalism of the U.S.S.R. is a prime example 
cited. Other examples include Turkey after Ataturk's revol-
ution and the Third Republic of France. The strains inher-
ent in secular nationalism as a replacement for civil 
religion include persecution of religious citizens and lim-
itations on religious and civil liberties. Secular nation-
alism can also be weakened, as in the case of the Third 
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Republic of France, when its adherents are restricted to an 
elite group (Coleman, 1970:72). 
Type 3: Differentiated civil religion 
Coleman relies directly on Bellah's (1964) evolution-
ary assumptions to predict the emergence of a differentiated 
form of civil religion in the most institutionally differ-
entiated societies. The United States is such a differenti-
ated society, characterized both by church-state separation 
and religious pluralism. The differentiation of these struc-
tures makes religious or state domination of civil religion 
virtually impossible. Secular nationalism is also an unlike-
ly choice for the United States, if Sidney Mead (1967) is 
correct in his portrayal of the transcendent quality of the 
traditional American cqnception of civil faith. Thus, Cole-
man concludes that, in the United States, "we find almost a 
unique case of civil religion differentiated from both church 
and state" (Coleman, 1970:74). 
Conrad Cherry 
Coleman's conclusion, that American civil religion has 
emerged as an institutionalized religious symbol system, dif-
ferentiated from both religious and political communities, 
does not stand alone in sociological theory and research. 
The differentiation of American civil religion from the Amer-
ican denominations has been observed by several contemporary 
sociologists. Bellah's (1974a:21) model of transcendent uni-
versal American civil religion assumes that in the United 
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States civil religion is "elaborate and well institutional-
ized" and "rather clearly differentiated from the churches." 
Bellah cites the 1961 Kennedy inaugural address as an example 
of how civil statements can be religious, yet nondenomina-
tional. Conrad Cherry (1971) believes that the differentia-
tion of American civi~ religion from the American denomina-
tions is a recent, mid-twentieth century development. 
During the early history of the nation, and continuing into 
the twentieth century, the values of American civil religion 
were usually expressed in Protestant terms by Protestant 
spokesmen, resulting in an American civil religion which 
largely reflected Protestant civic piety. But the American 
tradition of religious pluralism, advocated by most of the 
Protestant denominations, opened the way for the differentia-
tion of alternative religious systems. 
Only after Protestantism lost its powerful grip on 
the public life of the nation did the civil religion 
begin to dislodge itself from Protestant articulation 
and custody .... It took such factors as the impact of 
non-Protestant immigrants, a Supreme Court determined to 
de-Protestantize the public schools, and a pluralization 
of values in many religions of American life through 
modern means of communication to break through this con-
fusion of Protestantism and the religion of America 
(Cherry, 1971:15). 
Franklin Littell agrees with Cherry and Bellah that immigra-
tion and the fairly recent ascendancy of non-Protestants to 
positions of national power mark the point of differentiation 
of American civil religion from Protestant civic piety. 
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Not until the modern period when Catholics and Jews and 
others have come into full and unabashed participation 
in the public life of the nation, as symbolized by the 
1960 election, has the old Protestant culture-religion 
been frontally challenged (Littell, 1967:33). 
The origin and early history of American civil religion is 
located within and dominated by the Protestant tradition. 
Yet contemporary American civil religion, whether viewed as 
folk religion or as the transcendent universal religion of 
the nation, is portrayed as a belief system which has become 
differentiated from Protestantism and has been sufficiently 
generalized to include Americans from varying religious 
traditions. 
Perhaps as a by-product of its differentiated status 
in relation to·other American religious organizations, Amer-
ican civil religion has existed "in a relationship of.ten-
sion" to some other American religions (Cherry, 1971:16). A 
major example of this relationship of tension is found in the 
rejection of civil religion's symbols and ceremonies by sects 
such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members refuse to 
salute the American flag or pledge allegiance to the nation. 
Martin and Peterson (1978) find, for example, that members of 
American sects such as Assembly of God, Seventh Day Advent-
ists, and Jehovah's Witnesses display lower levels of civil 
religiosity, as measured by opinion items, than members of 
more established denominations. Hembers of these sects re-
ject American civil religion as a religious option, and the 
values of American civil religion are not sufficiently gen-
eral to avoid conflict with the sectarian values of these 
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particular organizations. The very generalization of values, 
a process Parsons (1971) observes as accompanying the differ-
entiation of a new social form, has been a source of conflict 
between American civil religion and traditional American de-
nominations. Articulate American churchmen, such as Marty 
and Eckhardt, have condemned American civil religion as an 
"American Shinto," or at best as a watered-down religion-in-
general. Marty (1959) criticizes what he sees as American 
civil religion's banality, emphasis on conformity, and tend-
encies toward national idolatry. Churchmen like Marty have 
viewed American civil religion as a poor substitute for a 
theologically rigorous denominational religion. Whether or 
not Martin Marty's folk religion model of American civil re-
ligion is accepted by contemporary scholars, the degree to 
which American churchmen have perceived American civil reli-
gion as a threat to traditional religion is an indicator of 
the degree to which American civil religion has differenti-
ated as a separate, potentially competing, religious system 
in American society. 
Empirical Studies 
Samuel Mueller and Paul Sites 
An empirical study by Samuel Mueller and Paul Sites 
(Mueller and Sites, 1977; Sites and Mueller, 1978) provides 
relevant data concerning the contemporary relationship be-
tween American civil religion and the American religious de-
nominations. Data consist of tape recordings of religious 
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services from a simple random sample of one-third of all 
churches in a metropolitan area of 500,000 (Akron, Ohio). 
The religious services were recorded on Sunday, July 4, 1976, 
the day of the American Bicentennial celebration. Analysis 
of data revealed that fifty-seven out of sixty Bicentennial 
services contained mention of the relationship between Amer-
ica's role in history and the conditions of ultimate reality. 
sites and Mueller (1978:9) describe the modal Bicentennial 
sermon: 
The modal sermon began with a historical recounting 
of the birth of the nation along with a discussion of its 
religious foundation. After this, and a brief discussion 
of the blessings the nation has received from God, the 
clergy either began listing specific threats to the Amer-
ican heritage and/or gave a more general and abstract 
warning concerning the problems which threaten the 
nation. 
The symbols and themes of Ameri~an civil religion appeared 
equally in sermons given across all churches in the sample, 
including Protestant and Catholic churches, black and white 
churches, and among ethnic churches. Some denominational 
differences were observed, but no denomination strayed out-
side the core set of civil religious values as defined by 
Bellah (1975). For example, a comparison of sermons given in 
Lutheran and Presbyterian churches revealed that in both de-
nominations clergy stressed a basic set of civil religious 
values which asked similar questions and arrived at similar 
answers about the role of America in history. Denominational 
differences were manifest at the level of language choice and 
theological context of the sermons, as sermons reflected each 
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denomination's theological heritage and own "denomination-
specific set of idioms" (Mueller and Sites, 1976:12). 
Lutheran sermons, for example, reflected the doctrine of the 
"two kingdoms," while Presbyterian sermons sought the estab-
lishment of the Calvinist "kingdom of God on earth." Because 
denominational and ethnic differences were not substantial, 
Mueller and Sites (1976:11) concluded that their data of-
fered some limited support for Bellah's thesis that American 
civil religion exists, and that American civil religion tran-
scends specific religious denominations. 
How are Mueller and Sites's findings to be interpreted 
with regard to Coleman's structural differentiation thesis, 
and Proposition II', which proposes that American civil reli-
gion is structurally differentiated from the religious com-
munity? The findings, that the values of American civil 
religion are manifest in the religious services of the Amer-
ican denominations, could be interpreted as a disconfirmation 
of the structural differentiation thesis. If the denomina-
tions espouse the values of American civil religion, can re-
ligious and civil religious systems be seen as differentiated? 
Careful examination of the data, however, reveals that the 
values of American civil religion and denominational values 
expressed in the sampled sermons are held at different levels 
of generality. !,1ueller and Sites's findings are consistent 
with Parsons's (1971) theory of the congruence of differenti-
ation and value generalization. Mueller and Sites found evi-
dence of civil religious values which were differentiated 
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from denominational theology, yet couched at a sufficiently 
high level of generality to overarch denominational differ-
ences. The findings are also supportive of Coleman's thesis 
and Proposition II. When the values of American civil reli-
gion are found to be manifest at a high enough level of gen-
erality within institutions with more particularistic value 
systems, it can be assumed that denominational and civil re-
ligious values are differentiated from one another, although 
the two sets of values may at the same time be generally con-
gruent. This combination allows for an American civil reli-
gion which is differentiated from the particularism of 
denominational theology, yet is sufficiently universal to 
overarch and integrate these institutions at the societal 
level. 
Ronald Wimberly 
Two recent empirical studies conducted by Ronald Wim-
berly (Wimberly et al., 1976; ~·limberly, 1976) also lend sup-
port to Proposition II, which states that American civil 
religion is structurally differentiated both from religious 
and political communities in the United States. Wimberly 
conducted two separate surveys of individual religious, po-
litical, and civil religious beliefs. (The methodological 
details of both studies are discussed in chapter VI, pages 
94-96.) Factor analysis of data taken from the first survey 
(which did not include a measure of political belief) reveal-
ed four distinct first order factors: civil religion, 
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religious belief, religious behavior, and religious experi-
ence. Second order factoring revealed that, while the civil 
religion dimension was positively correlated with several 
first order dimensions of denominational religiosity, the 
civil religious dimension remained distinct. Wimberly inter-
prets his findings as an indication of the existence of a 
separate, civil religious dimension which is differentiated, 
at least at the level of individual belief, from denomina-
tional religious belief (Wimberly et al., 1976:894-898). 
Wimberly's second sample, which was larger and more hetero-
geneous than the first, was surveyed on items of political 
belief as well as religious and civil religious belief. Fac-
toring of the religious and civil religious items produced 
the same four factors which emerged in the previous study. 
Rotation of the first order factors produced an interpreta-
tion similar to that of the first study: civil religion is 
a religious dimension distinct from denominational religion. 
Higher order analyses, however, indicated that the religious 
and civil religious dimensions were more closely associated 
in the second sample than in the first. 
Once more, Bellah's contention of a differentiated 
civil religious dimension is supported in regard to sev-
eral church dimensions. However, with this more hetero-
geneous sample, the second order civil religious factors 
are found to lie closer to church religion than they did 
in the crusade data. This implies that in a more diverse 
population, there is less distinction between civil reli-
gion and religion in general (Wimberly, 1976:345). 
Factor analysis of the second survey also revealed that civil 
religion items factored distinctly away from political items. 
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second order analysis found that civil religion and politi-
cal belief stayed together on one factor, and away from 
other political items (public behavior, social interaction, 
experience, private behavior, and political knowledge) (Wim-
berly, 1976:346-347). Thus, the civil religious dimension 
was found by Wimberly to be differentiated from both the re-
ligious and political dimensions of individual belief, as 
measured by the survey items. 
Wimberly's findings offer empirical support for both 
the civil religion hypothesis of Bellah and Coleman (summar-
ized in Proposition I) and the structural differentiation 
hypothesis of Coleman (Proposition II). Wimberly's data sug-
gest that American civil religion does exist to the extent 
that it is indicated by individual beliefs concerning the 
citizen's and the society's role in relation to conditions 
of ultimate meaning. With respect to the structural differ-
entiation hypothesis, American civil religion is found to be 
a separate, individual belief dimension which overlaps mini-
mally with individual beliefs concerning denominational reli-
gion and politics. Wimberly's findings should stimulate 
additional research efforts which will add further informa-
tion concerning the relationship of American civil religious 
beliefs with other religious beliefs and political attitudes 
of Americans. Only through additional research on American 
belief systems and their location within American institutions 
Will the structural differentiation hypothesis be confirmed 
or disconfirmed. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE FUNCTIONS OF AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 
In the previous chapters it has been proposed that 
American civil religion is a religious symbol system and an 
aspect of the American religious dimension. It has addition-
ally been proposed that American civil religion is structur-
ally differentiated from its closest institutional neighbors, 
the American religious denominations and the American politi-
cal community. These two assumptions lead logically to a 
third proposition, that American civil religion performs 
functions traditionally performed by religious symbol sys-
tems, but that these functions are performed within the dis-
tinct province of civil religion's influence: the roles of 
the citizen and the society in relation to conditions of 
ultimate reality. Proposition III states the hypothesis of 
functional differentiation, which logically follows from the 
structural differentiation hypothesis discussed in the prev-
ious chapter. 
Proposition III 
American civil religion performs specialized religious 
functions performed neither by church nor state. 
In order to determine if American civil religion per-
forms a specialized version of the functions performed by 
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, 
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other religious symbol systems, it is necessary to determine 
and clarify the function of religion for society. Although 
the functions of religion have been conceived of and ex-
pressed by sociologists of religion in various terms, three 
functions would most likely be acknowledged as important in-
dicators of religion's force in society: (1) the integrative 
role of religion; (2) the legitimating role of religion; and 
(3) the prophetic role of religion. These three functions 
of religion partially overlap with one another in the every-
day life of the society, but can be separately analyzed. 
The functions of religion for the individual, such as pro-
viding values for identity formation and personal meaning 
creation are acknowledged, but will not be explored in detail 
here. 
Religion as a Source of Integration 
The observation that religion may act as a source of 
integration sterns from the Durkheirnian tradition. Durkheirn 
defined religion according to this function as 11 ••• a uni-
fied system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things . . . which unite into one single moral community ... 
all who adhere to them" (Durkheirn, 1965:62). Durkheirn ident-
ified the integrating function of religionina primitive, un-
differentiated society in which members manifested their 
interdependence through moral bonds, strengthened by religion. 
The absence of religion would weaken these bonds and reduce 
the cohesion of society. As Kingsley Davis (1950:143) states, 
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It is the possession of common ultimate ends that gives 
the key to the integration of ends in human societies .. 
As between two different groups holding an entirely dif-
ferent set of common ultimate ends, there is no recourse. 
Modern societies are structurally differentiated and fre-
quently religiously plural, factors which call into question 
the integrative power of religion. Phillip Hammond ( 197 4) 
argues that Durkheim fails to go beyond the primitive stage 
of mechanical solidarity to account for modern religious 
forms such as pluralism. Hawmond agrees with Durkheim that 
in undifferentiated societies with mechanical solidarity in-
tegration is expressed in religious sentiments. But Hammond 
concludes that the integrating function of religion is an in-
adequate explanation of organic solidarity characteristic of 
religiously plural societies such as the United States. 
Hammond would reword Durkheim's thesis to state that rather 
than religion producing the cohesive society, cohesion is 
perceived to have a religious quality. Because conflict 
threatens societal cohesion, institutions which resolve con-
flict in modern societies will also take on religious quali-
ties. In religiously plural societies, the function of 
conflict resolution moves away from the domain of the churches 
and under the control of legal institutions. 
(1) Plurality of religious systems requires redefinition 
of order but does not escape the need for order. (2) 
Legal institutions therefore are called upon not only to 
secure order but to give it a uniformly acceptable mean-
ing as well. (3) The result is a set of legal institu-
tions with a decided religio-moral character (Hammond, 
1974:129). 
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In Hammond's view, the legal structures of modern society be-
come the new source of moral integration. Hammond (1974:129-
134) presents data from United States Supreme Court decisions 
to support his thesis of the "religio-moral character" of 
legal institutions and concludes that the religious qualities 
now attributed to the legal system are most clearly evidenced 
in American civil religion and institutionalized in national 
documents. 
American Civil Religion and Integration 
Determining the integrative potential of religion or 
its functional alternatives in a differentiated society is an 
important task for the sociologist of civil religion. If the 
integrating function of religion cannot be demonstrated in a 
differentiated society, sociologists like Richard Penn (1976) 
can argue that no overarching religious tradition can unite 
members and institutions. If, as Hammond suggests, religious 
functions and meanings shift to differentiating institutions 
such as the legal system, the possibility of new sources of 
integration remains open. American civil religion could be a 
modern, differentiated religious dimension potentially cap-
able of contributing to social integration at times of soci-
etal strain or conflict. Bellah's model of American civil 
religion, which stresses the unifying potential of American 
civil religion during times of national crisis, maintains that 
just such a religious dimension is now institutionalized in 
the United States. 
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John A. Coleman 
Coleman's (1970) elaboration of Bellah's model of 
transcendent universal American civil religion assumes that 
American civil religion performs an integrating function. 
"By definition civil religion is a religious system given to 
the social integration of society by providing for "national 
identity and solidarity" (Coleman, 1970:76). Coleman bases 
his assumption that civil religion is integrating "by defin-
ition" on Durkheim's classic definition of religion. In a 
subsequent proposition, Coleman (1970:76) goes so far as to 
state that, if it can be shown that civil religion and organ-
ized religion perform differing functions for society, "it is 
an empirical question whether organized religion is integrat-
ive or divisive in society." In Coleman's view, where civil 
religion is sufficiently differentiated, it may displace or-
ganized religion as a primary institutional source of socie-
tal cohesion. Thus, for Coleman the empirical question 
becomes one of determining whether or not denominational re-
ligion still provides any integration for modern society. 
Coleman is the only American civil religion theorist who 
takes such an extreme position on the integrative function of 
American civil religion. More typical are the more moderate 
positions of N. J. Demerath II and Phillip Hammond (1967) and 
Robert Bellah (1975) which propose that American civil reli-
gion has integrative potential but evidence of the actual 
performance of integration must be left open to empirical 
determination. 
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N. J. Demerath and Phillip Hammond 
Demerath and Hammond (1967:202-204) point out that de-
termining the role of religion for American social integra-
tion is complicated by the tendency of Americans to assume 
that "religion" and "denominational religion" are synonymous. 
American sociologists can easily fall under the assumption 
that the only religious symbol systems are denominational 
systems, and that religion functions only through organized, 
denominational structures. When the institution of religion 
is equated with the denomination, sociologists such as Rich-
ard Penn (1972) question whether the diversity of denomina-
tions can function to integrate a plural society. Penn's 
conclusion, which Robert Stauffer (1973:415) calls the ''end 
of ideology" thesis, portrays modern society as lacking the 
social structures to support moral integration (see also 
Luckmann, 1967). An alternative conclusion is suggested by 
Demerath and Haromond (1967:205) who suggest 'that modern soc-
iety may have "alternative structural arrangements" for per-
forming integration. Demerath and Hammond propose that 
American civil religion is one such structural alternative 
for integration in American society. They attribute the de-
velopment of civil religion in modern societies to "structur-
al circumstances, specifically differentiation and pluralism 
which force the separate institutionalization of the essen-
tially pragmatic from the essentially philosophic aspects of 
religion" (Demerath and Hammond, 1967:208-209). In a reli-
giously plural society, cognitive religious sentiments become 
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structured apart from ethical religious sentiments. The 
former become institutionalized in religious organizations; 
the latter, "the rules of general ethical conduct, become 
institutionalized chiefly in the religio-political realm . 
(Demerath and Hammond, 1967:210). Demerath and Hammond be-
lieve that it is the differentiated American civil religion 
which now performs the function of integration for the modern 
United States. 
If we now return to the basic Durkheimian issue of 
religion in the role of societal integration, it is prob-
ably correct to view America's civil religion as the 
proper analogue to the Arunta religion of which Durkheim 
wrote. Religion, broadly conceived, does play a role in 
integrating society, but such religion is not to be con-
fused with "churches" as they are commonly identified 
(Demerath and Hammond, 1967:211). 
The integrative function of American civil religion is attri-
buted, in part, to the inability of religious organization to 
agree theologically to provide sufficient unity concerning 
America's ultimate ends. American civil religion provides a 
source of religious unity.in the midst of denominational and 
theological diversity (Demerath and Hammond, 1967:212). 
Richard Fenn 
The position of Richard Fenn on the integrative func-
tions of civil religion has been discussed in detail in 
chapter VI, pages 77-86, in the analysis of Fenn's response 
to Bellah's model of American civil religion. Fenn views 
modern society as structurally differentiated beyond the ca-
pacities of religious systems to offer any overarching 
II 
133 
normative basis of integration. Several of Fenn's proposi-
tions concerning differentiation and its effects on religion 
serve as a summary of Fenn's position. 
1. There is a high degree of differentiation with-
in the cultural system, within the structural system, and 
between the two levels of the system. 
2. Instead of a single, overarching religious 
basis to the moral order or orders of a society, there is 
a plurality of systems of ultimate significance. 
3. To the extent that these several systems of 
ultimate significance are institutionalized in differen-
tiated structures and internalized in personality systems, 
they provide the sources of ideological conflict in 
modern society (Fenn, 1970:135). 
Fenn admits that the existence of ideological conflict does 
not necessarily imply structural conflict. But American con-
flicts are typically solved according to pragmatic criteria 
rather than by moral directives. 
The American system is distinguished by its capacity to 
slough off cultural conflict and to base structural rela-
tionships on proximate rather than ultimate concerns. 
To admit this, however, is to concur on an important 
characteristic of modern secular society: there is too 
great a cultural diversity to constitute a moral order. 
Morals there may be, but no order ... (Fenn, 1970:136). 
Fenn believes that moral choices exist for the individual in 
modern society, but that there is no overarching normative 
system which integrates individuals into a similar pattern of 
meaning and ultimate ends. Fenn would agree with Demerath 
and Hammond that traditional religious symbol systems no 
longer serve as primary sources of integration for modern 
society, but disagrees that civil religion is capable of 
assuming the function of integration. 
Fenn proposes that American civil religion may also be 
viewed as differentiated into two types: personal civil 
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religion, which assists the identity development of individ-
uals, and societal civil religion, which is supposed to com-
bine national and biblical symbols to integrate corporate 
actors into the social system. Fenn (1976:165) suggests that 
societal civil religion may have existed in the nineteenth 
century, when Judea-Christian and democratic values combined 
to integrate the individual into America's newly emerging 
social structures. Under contemporary conditions of increased 
differentiation "the nation's authority is deprived of the 
support of ultimate ends or of significance for the identity 
of the individual .. The nation does not have a unique 
identity and purpose which incorporates the individual" 
(Fenn, 1976:166). American civil religion fails in Penn's 
analysis to provide a sufficient moral basis for social inte-
gration. 
The differing positions of Fenn (1970; 1976), Coleman 
(1970), and Demerath and Hammond (1967) are evidence of the 
debate concerning the integrative role of American civil reli-
gion in the contemporary United States. Fenn is convinced 
that American civil religion can no longer integrate citi-
zens, while Coleman and Demerath and Hammond see American 
civil religion deposing traditional religious systems and be-
coming the major source of moral integration for modern soci-
ety. The integration debate seems to be a theoretical 
controversy of extremes: the "end of ideology" hypothesized 
by Fenn versus the transposition of ideology hypothesized by 
Coleman and Demerath and Hammond. Two additional voices in 
the debate, Conrad Cherry (1970; 1971) and Robert Bellah 
(1975; 1976a) suggest mediating positions concerning the 
integration hypothesis. 
Conrad Cherry 
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Cherry's (1970) symbolic study of American cults of 
the dead led him to conclude that American civil religion 
performs both integrative and divisive functions for Ameri-
can society. In early America, the funeral services of 
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams performed integrative func-
tions for the new nation, but by 1968 the funeral services 
of Robert Kennedy were both unifying and divisive for the 
society. Due to America's class, regional, and racial 
pluralism, certain groups react differently to the symbols 
of American civil religion. Cherry notes that some groups 
saw Kennedy's death as evidence that national values had 
failed to unite all citizens. Cherry (1971:19) raises an 
important issue when he asks how inclusive American civil 
religion can be in a pluralistic society. Can American 
civil religion, for example, include atheism and integrate 
atheistic citizens? How can American civil religion support 
the democratic principle opposed to the exclusion of any 
group and still maintain transcendent ideals? Can the val-
ues of American civil religion, which originated in Protes-
tant civic piety, truly integrate America's racial and 
religious minorities? And can these same values, developed 
within a particular national tradition, have international 
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integrative potential as Bellah (1974b) maintains (Cherry, 
1971:19-20)? Despite these questions and the divisions they 
may represent, Cherry would not agree with Penn that Ameri-
can civil religion entirely fails to integrate American soc-
iety. Although modern American civil religion is differen-
tiated along regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines, 
American civil religion constitutes a "national point of 
view" which may be both integrative and divisive (Cherry, 
1970:310). Cherry's analysis is useful in pointing out the 
sources of divisiveness in American society, but fails to 
suggest the conditions under which American civil religion 
may be expected to be either integrative or divisive. 
Robert Bellah 
Bellah (1974a:29) has defined American civil religion 
as an institutionalized collection of sacred beliefs about 
American society which provides integration through times of 
national crisis. Bellah has selected the biblical image of 
"covenant" to symbolize the integrative function of American 
civil religion. The American covenant refers to a normative 
symbol system, separate from the actual social behavior of 
Americans. Bellah does not maintain that the potential for 
unity found in the American covenant has always been fulfilled. 
Instead, the history of America is a history of the "broken 
covenant." "The Pilgrim Fathers had a conception of the cov-
enant and of virtue which we badly need today. But almost 
from the moment they touched American soil they broke that 
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covenant and engaged in unvirtuous actions" (Bellah, 1975:xv). 
For example, early Americans violated the concept of covenant 
through their policies toward the American Indian and in the 
institutionalization of slavery. In times of war, American 
civil religion has not always played an integrative role. 
"In both the Revolution and the Civil War commitment to the 
tenets of the civil religion led not to 'social integration' 
but to war and the near destruction of the nation" (Bellah, 
1976a:l54). In modern society racism and economic inequality 
remain primary sources of national division. Bellah would 
agree with Cherry that American civil religion has the poten-
tial both for integration and division, but unlike Cherry, 
Bellah has a partial explanation for the societal divisions 
which exist despite the institutionalization of American 
civil religion. Bellah sees divisions occurring along ideo-
logical lines when the transcendent universal values of Amer-
ican civil religion are interpreted by various segments of 
society in terms of their own theologies or ideologies. For 
example, there is "the theology of cultural sophisticates 
and the theology of Bible-believing Christians" (Bellah, 
1976a:l55). Protestants, Catholics, and Jews may also vary 
in their interpretations of American civil religion. Accord-
ing to Bellah, "there are many public theologies, but only 
one civil religion" (Bellah, 1976a:l55). Varying ideologies, 
such as those of different political parties, may also 
emerge. Bellah notes that in some societies the competition 
among theology, ideology, and civil religion may result in 
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deep societal division. In the United States such extreme 
divisions have been largely avoided (with the exception of 
the Civil War) because "the civil religion has never been 
universally shared but it has seldom if ever been faced with 
clearly formulated and massively popular alternatives, though 
it is possible that that is coming" (Bellah, 1976a:l55). 
Therefore, American civil religion is not integrative by def-
inition. American civil religion can foster integration only 
under the conditions of limited competition from alternative 
theological and ideological systems. 
Unlike Coleman, who assumes that American civil reli-
gion integrates society, and unlike Penn, who assumes that it 
does not, Bellah allows the question of American civil reli-
gion and integration to remain empirically open. As an ideal 
symbol system, transcendent universal American civil religion 
offers a moral basis of integration. Under actual historical 
and social conditions, American civil religion may succeed or 
fail to provide a source of social unity. But as long as the 
possibility of integration based on American civil religion 
exists, Bellah's view of American society must differ dras-
tically from that of Penn. Commenting on Penn's description 
of the collapse of the American moral order, Bellah observes 
that Penn's argument implies that an entirely new system of 
social relations has emerged in the United States. 
If American society is a mere "political and geo-
graphical shell"; if for most Americans "the society it-
self is taken into account only as a means to the individ-
ual's ends"; if corporate actors have monopolized the 
power in our society so that individual persons are 
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powerless and cannot even find justice in our legal sys-
tem, if, finally, Professor Penn is right in his comment 
that "American society is more accurately conceived not 
as a single system but as two: one belonging to corpor-
ate actors, and the other to persons," then the republic 
of Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln has ceased to 
exist. The "ancient faith" is gone, and it is only a 
matter of time, probably of very brief time, before our 
laws reflect the new reality. That new reality, if Penn 
is to be believed, is technocratic, corporate despotism 
(Bellah, 1976a:l57). 
Bellah calls upon Penn to provide empirical evidence for the 
"end of ideology" thesis. If, as Penn maintains, American 
society lacks sources of moral integration, it is up to Penn 
to document this change and demonstrate how a society so 
divided can still stand. 
Religion as a Source of Legitimation 
One way which religion serves to integrate society is 
through the legitimation of a moral order which binds adher-
ents. Peter Berger (1967:29) defines legitimation as "soc-
ially objectified knowledge that serves to explain and 
justify the social order." If members of a society do not 
share common definitions of reality, integration becomes 
problematic. Hax Weber recognized the link between legitima-
tion and integration. "Conduct, especially social conduct, 
and quite particularly a social relationship, can be orient-
ed on the part of actors toward the idea of the existence of 
a legitimate order" (Weber, 1947:124). Because societies 
attempt to legitimize their institutional arrangements in 
terms of an ultimate set of values, legitimation falls with-
in the realm of religion. Religion serves as a legitimating 
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agent in social life by providing an ultimate system of mean-
ing for social behavior. The link between religious legiti-
mation and social order is summarized by Weber. 
Wherever the direction of the whole wa¥ of life has been 
methodically rationalized (or systemat~zed) it has been 
profoundly determined by the ultimate values toward 
which this rationalization has been oriented. These val-
ues and points of view were thus religiously conditioned 
(Weber, 1958:286-287). 
Contemporary sociologist Peter Berger (1967:32) observes that 
religion is not the only institutional source of legitimation, 
but historically religion has played an extensive and effect-
ive role in "world-maintenance." 
In primitive and archaic societies, in which there is 
no differentiation between religious and political institu-
tions, the political order is typically viewed as a manifest-
ation of the sacred realm. Those in political power are 
conceived of as gods, or as representatives of a supreme 
power. Berger (1967:34) calls this the "microcosm/macrocosm 
scheme of legitimation" because the primitive or archaic soc-
iety tends to view itself as a microcosm of the larger cosmic 
order. In modern societies the microcosm/macrocosm relation-
ship tends to break down with the advent of increased socie-
tal complexity. Separation of church and state may result in 
the competition of religious and political systems of legiti-
mation. Berger (1967:47) proposes that "the less firm the 
plausibility structure becomes, the more acute will be the 
need for world-maintaining legitimation." Complex systems of 
legitimation tend to emerge in situations where 
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interpretations of reality are being challenged by alternat-
ives. Modern American society is characterized by the dif-
ferentiation of religious and political communities and by 
religious pluralism. Religious pluralism in particular 
creates a situation in which religious systems of legitima-
tion are in competition with one another. Pluralism, accord-
ing to Berger (1967:49) causes a "social engineering" problem 
for religious organizations which must compete with one an-
others' worldviews, and for society itself, which must find 
ways of integrating individuals and organizations with dif-
fering conceptions of reality. 11odern society, faced with 
the erosion of traditional meaning systems due to pluralism 
and the resultant competition, has an increased need for le-
gitimating systems. Whether or not a plausibility structure 
such as civil religion can provide the solution to modern 
society's need for legitimation is the subject of debate 
among sociologists of civil religion. 
American Civil Religion and Legitimation 
The major participants in the debate over the legitimat-
ing potential of American civil religion are Robert Bellah, 
Richard Fenn, and Robert Stauffer. Bellah's model of Amer-
ican civil religion is based on the Durkheimian assumption 
that social cohesion rests upon common moral understandings 
based on religious meaning structures. These moral and reli-
gious meaning systems provide an explanation and justification 
of the universe. 
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Such moral and religious understandings produce both a 
basic cultural legitimation for a society which is viewed 
at least approximately in accord with them and a standard 
of judgement for the criticism of a society that is seen 
as deviating too far from them (Bellah, 1975:ix). 
Bellah assumes that religious symbol systems contain the po-
tential for integration, legitimation, and prophetic guid-
ance. Bellah believes that American civil religion performed 
the function of legitimation for early American society, and 
carries the potential for renewal of this function in con-
temporary times. 
In the eighteenth century . . . there was a common 
set of religious and moral understandings rooted in a 
conception of a divine order under a Christian, or at 
least a deist, God. The basic moral norms that were seen 
as deriving from that divine order were liberty, justice, 
and charity, understood in a context of theological and 
moral discourse which led to a concept of personal virtue 
as the essential basis of a good society (Bellah, 1975:x). 
Bellah admits that the legitimating power of these American 
values has eroded. The concept of "virtue," for example, has 
a different meaning for the twentieth century American than 
for the eighteenth century Puritan. Yet alongside moral ero-
sion has come renewal. Contemporary Americans retain the 
value of individual freedom, and the concepts of liberty and 
justice inform the society's treatment of minorities and 
women to a greater extent today than in earlier times. In 
Bellah's view, the myths and symbols of American civil reli-
gion retain the power to help Americans interpret and legiti-
mate their social experience in the light of transcendent 
reality (Bellah, 1975:3). 
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Richard Penn 
Richard Penn, who argues that American society has no 
society-wide source of moral integration, additionally 
assumes that no religiously-based societal source of legiti-
mation exists. In Penn's view, modern religion provides 
little beyond a set of personalized meaning structures lack-
ing any societal function. Personal civil religion may pro-
vide meaning for individual identity development, but 
societal civil religion, which could provide a system of 
cultural legitimation, no longer operates in contemporary 
American life. American institutions are guided instead by 
criteria of functional rationality, which have no religious 
basis. "Americans may no longer be able to agree on ultimate 
ends, or what is worth doing, but only what is feasible or 
'appropriate'" (Penn, 1972:18). 
Robert Stauffer 
Robert Stauffer (1973) critiques the privatistic "end 
of ideology" view of Penn. Stauffer suggests that even a 
technically efficient means-oriented society requires the 
operation of some underlying cultural interpretation of the 
form by which means are accomplished. Max Weber's definition 
of legal rationality is recalled as one such type of cultural 
legitimation (Stauffer, 1973:419). In Stauffer's view, Penn 
has overlooked the fact that a technocratic political system 
requires its own legitimating worldview, and that functional 
rationality itself is a legitimating system of meaning. In 
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addition, Stauffer believes that privatists such as Fenn over-
look the possibility that social strains may create a demand 
for new forms of legitimation. One potential strain could 
occur as the Protestant Ethic work values clash with the 
economic requirement for limited participation in the labor 
force. "Fenn's sanguine implication that the society, pre-
sumably through expert management, will be able to adjust to 
structurally induced unemployment is dubious indeed" (Stauf-
fer, 1973:421). Stauffer sees differentiation and the result-
ant ideological debate characteristic of modern society to be 
fertile ground for the emergence of new ideological systems 
of legitimation. Stauffer would not argue with Fenn on the 
importance of the private sphere of religion. Stauffer 
would retain, however, the recognition that "both persistent 
and new forms of overarching cultural legitimations ... do 
exist" (Stauffer, 1973:422). Stauffer would include American 
civil religion among the potentially persistent forms of over-
arching cultural legitimation. Although Stauffer questions 
the prophetic function attributed to American civil religion 
by Bellah, he finds Bellah's work to be a useful model for 
the identification of modern legitimating systems which emerge 
in response to national strains. 
Religion as a Source of Prophecy 
The study of religion's prophetic role originated in 
the Weberian tradition which. distinguished between the 
priestly and prophetic styles of religious leadership. As 
Weber (1963) notes, the distinction between priestly and 
prophetic styles extends beyond religious leadership into 
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the whole symbol system of a religion. Contemporary sociolo-
gist Bellah (1975:ix-xi) writes of the prophetic role of re-
ligious values as "a standard of judgement for the criticism 
of a society which is deviating too far from them'' and as 
exerting "continuous pressure for higher standards of moral 
behavior." Demerath and Hammond (1967:212) subdivide reli-
gious prophecy into several dimensions. Prophetic influence 
may be direct or indirect, innovative or supportive of the 
status quo. Demerath and Hammond (1967:224) observe that 
"much of what passes for prophecy is really reinforcement of 
existing sentiment." In addition, it is useful to distin-
guish between prophetic attempts and successes. The sociolo-
gist studying the prophetic function of religion needs to be 
concerned with the conditions which facilitate or resist 
prophecy, and variations in prophetic impact, such as amount 
and direction of change (Demerath and Hammond, 1967:223). 
The prophetic role may be assumed to be linked to reli-
gion's integrative and legitimating roles. A direct and pos-
itive relationship among the three functions could be logic-
ally proposed. To the extent that a society is legitimized 
and integrated by a common set of moral understandings, the 
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greater would be the prophetic potential of these same moral 
values. Values which have the power to inform and unite 
would also have the power to judge deviation and demand be-
havior in conformity to higher standards. Bellah (1975:ix) 
assumes that this basic "relation between morality, religion, 
legitimation, and criticism" exists within social systems. 
Demerath and Hammond, however, assume an inverse relation-
ship between integration and prophecy, at least within the 
context of a particular religious organization. It is 
assumed that the more tightly moral values bind a social 
group, the less likely the status quo will be challenged, as 
such a challenge would threaten to destroy the very order on 
which the group is based. Referring to religious organiza-
tions, Demerath and Hammond (1969:230) note: 
... Such an integrative role militates against vigorous 
pursuit of the second major religious function, that of 
religious prophecy in the interests of social change. 
There is a very real sense in which the functions of inte-
gration and prophecy are hostile to one another within 
the contemporary church. This is the major reason why 
the source of religious prophecy itself has shifted to 
non-parish personnel and to officials high in the church 
bureaucracies who have no special parish flock to bind 
together. 
The tendency of prophecy to be exemplified more often by non-
parish religious leaders has been observed in empirical 
studies, such as Jeffery Hadden and Raymond Rymph's (1966) 
study, which found more non-parish than parish clergy active 
in Chicago demonstrations concerning public school segrega-
tion. It is not the purpose of this analysis to fully answer 
these questions concerning the conditions leading to 
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religious prophecy and the relationship between prophecy and 
integration. The objective is to suggest that these same 
issues relevant to the sociology of religion are also cru-
cial to the study of the prophetic role of American civil 
religion. 
American Civil Religion and Prophecy 
Discussion of the prophetic role of American civil re-
ligion can be found in preceding sections of this analysis 
which contrast the integrative, legitimating, folk religion 
model to the transcendent universal model of American civil 
religion (see part I, chapter III, pages 30-39; and part II, 
chapters IV and V) . Church historian Sidney Mead was one of 
the first to elaborate on the prophetic potential of American 
civil religion. In "The Nation with the Soul of a Church" 
(1967), Mead argues that due to the religiously pluralistic 
origins of the United States, Americans began looking to the 
society itself to perform the religious functions ordinarily 
performed by the established church. Within a pluralistic 
system, with no established church, the nation began to ful-
fill the traditional religious functions of providing cohe-
sion, personal meaning, and prophecy for historical roles. 
Differentiation between religious and political communities 
and religious pluralism are the key processes which Mead 
credits with producing a highly generalized American civil 
religion, partially separate from the denominations, but 
standing over them to guard against self-transcendent and 
particularistic tendencies. 
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Robert Bellah 
The sociological model of Robert Bellah has also 
stressed the prophetic function of American civil religion. 
Bellah (1974b:225) believes that American civil religion is 
founded on the belief that "the nation is not an ultimate 
end in itself but stands under transcendent judgement." 
American civil religion originated with the belief in a 
power higher than man and the society, and that belief has 
been periodically renewed at critical moments in American 
history. For example, the "Declaration of Independence speaks 
of the 'Laws of Nature and of Nature's God' that are clearly 
transcendent to and stand in judgement of the laws of the 
state" (Bellah, 1976b:l67). Bellah interprets the Declara-
tion of Independence as giving clear priority to the individ-
ual's relationship with God over his relationship to the 
state, as exemplified by the upholding of the right of citi-
zens to form a new government if the state should become 
destructive of individual rights. Bellah additionally affirms 
that "it is of the essence of the American civil religion that 
it 'challenges institutional authority'" (Bellah, 1976b:l67). 
He cites Lincoln's opposition to the Spanish American War 
(Bellah, 1974a:39) and Lincoln's 1857 speech decrying the 
Dred Scott decision (Bellah, 1976b:l68) as examples of the 
institutionally critical potential of American civil religion. 
Critical response to the prophetic function of American 
civil religion proposed by Bellah and Mead has come from folk 
religionists such as Marty and Herberg, privatists such as 
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Fenn, and an empirical study by Thomas and Flippen. The 
folk religionists portray American civil religion as an inte-
grative, culturally legitimating religious symbol system 
which is too generalized to have prophetic potential. Agree-
ing with Demerath and Hammond (1967), the folk religionists 
believe that emphasis on the function of religious integra-
tion precludes the exercise of prophecy. The privatist posi-
tion assumes that if religious symbol systems in general, and 
American civil religion in particular, perform no functions 
on the societal level, the prophetic role is also lost. And 
among the few empirical studies designed to test the tran-
scendent universal model of American civil religion, the 
earliest study finds no support for the existence of a tran-
scendent dimension of American civil religion. 
Hartin Marty 
In The New Shape of American Religion (1959) religious 
historian Marty portrays American civil religion as a reli-
gion in general lacking the moral and theological substance 
of denominational religion. American civil religion, in 
order to be acceptable to Americans of divergent religious 
backgrounds, is necessarily overgeneralized to the point of 
losing moral content and prophetic vigor. Americans might 
still believe in God, but the God of American civil religion 
has become "an American jolly good fellow" (Marty, 1958:39) 
unlikely to be the source of prophetic judgement. In a more 
recent adaptation of his work, Marty (1974:144) observes that 
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American civil religion can be either "priestly" or "pro-
phetic." (Marty's typology of priestly and prophetic forms 
of American civil religion is summarized in part I, chapter 
II,pages 36-38.) Thus Marty's most recent view of American 
civil religion includes the possibility of a dynamic tension 
between priestly and prophetic modes of civil religious ex-
pression. 
Will Herberg 
Sociologist Will Herberg (1960) also portrays American 
civil religion as a generalized folk religion which functions 
to provide a religiously plural society with an overarching 
basis of unity. Herberg concludes that the prophetic dimen-
sion found in biblical religion is absent from American civil 
religion, which serves instead the primary functions of le-
gitimating American culture and integrating American society. 
Andrew Greeley (1972:167), in an evaluation of Herberg's 
model, acknowledges that the prophetic function is lacking in 
American civil religion in its popular folk religion form. 
However, Greeley believes there is another, "elite" form of 
American civil religion based on the American values of dis-
sent, which has at times produced prophetic action. Bellah 
himself is aware that the transcendent dimension of American 
civil religion is not always operative in American society. 
At times the symbols of American civil religion are coopted 
into support of a pattern-maintaining folk religion, or 
twisted into religious nationalism. However, to Bellah 
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(1976b:l67) these manifestations are public theologies, not 
American civil religion in its ideal, normative form. The 
variables which Bellah (1975:xii) specifies as intervening 
in American society to foster the rise of public theologies 
include the rise of science, the market economy, and indus-
trial capitalism, all of which facilitate self-transcendent 
interpretations of American civil religion. 
Richard Fenn 
The privatist position on American civil religion, ex-
emplified by Fenn, assumes that the symbols of American 
civil religion have no overall cultural significance, and 
therefore cannot direct prophetic guidance for social change. 
In particular, Fenn argues that, when the symbols associated 
with American civil religion are used to legitimate existing 
institutions, their prophetic potential is nullified. Fenn 
(1976) selects the American mythic theme of building a new 
Israel as an illustration. Historically, the symbol of 
Israel was used paradoxically both to strengthen denomination-
al authority when Christians were in the minority, and to 
facilitate religious pluralism in nations like the United 
States. 
The "new Israel" theme attempted to assimilate the 
symbols of personal religious identity to the symbols of 
ecclesiastical authority, while the heretics asserted 
secret sources of personal identity and more generalized 
and abstract symbols of divinity than the God of the Old 
Testament. . . . The theme of the American Israel has 
attempted to achieve a similar symbolic interpretation 
between the symbols of personal identity and national 
authority; and I further argue that the synthesis, never 
complete even on the cultural level, is increasingly 
pulled apart by the development of separate corporate 
and individual systems of ideas, rules and values. It 
is a development which intensifies the antinomian ten-
dencies of popular religious culture (Penn, 1976:161). 
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Bellah's response to Penn is a reiteration of the distinction 
between public theology and transcendent American civil reli-
gion. In 1776, the symbolism of an American Israel was a 
part of public theology, not of transcendent universal Amer-
ican civil religion. If the new Israel symbolism was used to 
reinforce institutional authority, it was only serving the 
traditional legitimating function of public theology. Amer-
ican civil religion serves a legitimating function, but as 
Bellah notes, this legitimation is always conditional. 
Bellah (1976b:l67) recalls Weber's perspective on religious 
legitimation, which holds that "legitimation always involves 
an element of contingency, a linking of two spheres, the 
political order and ultimate reality, that are not in prin-
ciple fused." American civil religion conditionally legiti-
mates American culture, but because American civil religion 
is not fused with the culture, it is free to offer prophetic 
judgement when the nation violates its own transcendent 
ideals. 
~mpirical Studies 
There has been little direct empirical study of the 
prophetic function of American civil religion, but a few 
studies of the transcendent dimension of American civil reli-
gion provide relevant data. Thomas and Flippen's (1972) 
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content analysis of the editorials of a national sample of 
newspapers published during the Honor America .;.veekend, 
July 4, 1970, was designed as a test of Bellah's thesis of 
transcendent American civil religion. The coding instrument, 
intended to distinguish between civil religion items and 
their nontranscendent equivalents, relied on the mention of 
God as the main criterion of transcendent civil religiosity. 
Analysis of data revealed that a fairly large number of ~­
transcendent civil themes were expressed in the Honor America 
editorials, but few of the themes specifically referred to a 
transcendent deity. Evaluation of the measurement instrument 
used by Thomas and Flippen suggests an alternative interpret-
ation of their findings. Thomas and Flippen required that 
reference to a transcendent being be explicit, while implied 
transcendence (illustrated in the statement "America has been 
blessed") was coded as non-transcendent (Thomas and Flippen, 
1972:221). Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure items 
which reflect cultura~values so generally associated with 
transcendent origins that explicit mention of these origins 
may be considered unnecessary. Another content analysis, 
conducted by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978), using a different 
measurement instrument than that used by Thomas and Flippen, 
reported evidence of transcendent civil religious values 
among Masonic fraternal orders. Two individual belief 
studies conducted by Ronald ~Vimberly ('VVimberly et al., 1976; 
Wimberly, 1976) found evidence of a transcendent civil reli-
gious dimension of personal belief which is distinct from 
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individual political and religious belief systems. The data 
concerning the transcendent dimension of American civil reli-
gion are thus inconclusive. It is even more difficult to 
generalize these inconclusive results to the issue of the 
prophetic function of American civil religion. The acknowl-
edgement of a transcendent authority is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for prophecy. The results of both Joli-
coeur and Knowles, who found a high proportion of transcend-
ent civil religion statements in a national journal published 
by a traditional fraternal order, and lvirnberly, who found a 
positive association between transcendent civil religious 
beliefs and political conservatism could be interpreted as 
support for the Dernerath and Hammond (1967) hypothesis of 
an inverse relationship between religious integration and 
prophecy. On the surface it seems ~likely that conservative 
segments of the American ~ubJic, such as Masons and political 
conservatives, would be among the prophetic vanguard of the 
society, despite their adherence to the values of American 
civil religion. However, conservative organizations have 
been vocal in reactionary forms of prophecy, exemplified by 
the John Birch Society's advocacy of the return to the "orig-
inal principles of the American founders." Additional empir-
ical study is required before sociologists can confirm or 
disconfirm Bellah's hypothesis of American civil religion's 
prophetic role. 
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Sites and Mueller 
The most direct empirical test of the prophetic dimen-
sion of American civil religion is found in Sites and 
Hueller's (1978) analysis of sermons delivered on the occa-
sion of the American Bicentennial, July 4, 1976. The major-
ity of sermons given in a simple random sample consisting of 
sixty Protestant and Catholic churches contained both priest-
ly and prophetic civil religious themes. Prophetic themes 
were those components of the sermons which cited threats to 
the ~~erican heritage and social problems which could be (" 
solved only with God's help. Government scandal and corrup-
tion were the most frequently cited threats to America, fol-
lowed by poverty, racism, prejudice, big business and the 
concentration of wealth, and military involvement and the 
misuse of power. The majority of prophetic themes found in 
the sermons coincided with the issues which Bellah (1975) 
mentioned as examples of the "broken covenant" between the 
American nation and its transcendent authority. Sites and 
Mueller reported some denominational variation with respect 
to prophetic Bicentennial themes. For example, one-half of 
the Catholic clergy and one-third of the Episcopal clergy 
failed to mention any prophetic issues. It is possible that 
a denomination's tendency to take a prophetic civil religious 
stance is linked to the denomination's historical inclination 
toward either a priestly or a prophetic orientation. Never-
theless, some clergy in every denomination sampled mentioned 
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prophetic themes. Si~es and Mueller concluded that the pro-
\ 
phetic force in American civil religion is alive and can be 
evidenced in the sermons of contemporary American clergy. 
Conclusion 
There has been considerable theoretical argument, 
accompanied by scant empirical research, concerning the func-
tions of American civil religion in contemporary American 
society. The extremes in the debate are represented by 
Bellah's model, which argues that American civil religion 
performs the specialized religious functions of integration, 
legiti~ation, and prophecy for American society, and Penn's 
privatist position, which maintains that American civil reli-
gion is incapable of performing any societal function in con-
temporary times. There is, however, one common point of 
agreement among the participants in the debate. All agree 
that traditional religious symbol systems have become so dif-
ferentiated and privatized in American society as to be weak-
ened in their contributions to American integration, legiti-
mation, and prophetic judgement. Penn assumes that American 
civil religion has also been similarly weakened, or privatized, 
but does not specify what institutional forms do perform the 
functions necessary for societal self-maintenance. As 
Stauffer (1973) suggests, even a technological, rational soc-
iety requires some underlying cultural interpretation of the 
form by which means are accomplished and requires some agree-
ment on this interpretation to remain even minimally integrated. 
157 
American civil religion is a potential contributer to such 
legitimation and integration for contemporary society. It 
remains for empirical studies to test this logical, although 
still unconfirmed, hypothesis. A test of the prophetic func-
tion of American civil religion is more problematic. 
Stauffer (1973:424) sees American civil religion as an insti-
tutional alternative which is potentially able to assume the 
integrative and legitimating functions traditionally performed 
by religion in society. However, Stauffer is skeptical of the 
prophetic function which Bellah attributes to American civil 
religion. There has not yet been sufficient empirical study 
of the prophetic dimension of American civil religion to sub-
stantially support either Stauffer's or Bellah's position. 
Future research into the prophetic function would best view 
prophecy as Weber did, as one dimension of a continuum com-
posed of priestly and prophetic styles. Elaboration of the 
conditions under which a religion is more likely to manifest 
institutional reinforcement or challenge would be helpful in 
determining if American civil religion has primarily reflect-
ed priestly or prophetic orientations. While it has not yet 
been demonstrated that American civil religion performs spe-
cialized religious functions performed neither by religious 
nor political organizations, this hypothesis is promising. 
Even those in opposition to the hypothesis agree that in a 
society characterized by religious and political differentia-
tion neither religious nor political organizations exclusively 
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perform the functions of integration, legitimation, and pro-
phetic guidance. The institutional field is thus opened for 
other symbol systems, such as civil religion, to perform a 
contemporary version of the traditional functions of 
religion. 
CHAPTER X 
M1ERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AND 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
In a bibliographic essay on American civil religion 
Phillip Hammond (1976:171) poses the question, "What insti-
tutions promulgate, transmit, maintain and modify American 
civil religion?" The two preceding chapters have presented 
arguments and evidence which suggest that the values of Amer-
ican civil religion are congruent with the values of American 
religious and political institutions while being structurally 
and functionally differentiated from these institutions. 
Contemporary American civil religion appears to be controlled 
neither by the religious denominations nor the political sys-
tem, although civil religious values are manifest in both 
institutions at a high level of generality. The relationship 
between American civil religion and other American institu-
tions may be expected to follow a similar pattern. Three 
institutions to which scholars of American civil religion 
have addressed themselves are: public educational institu-
tions, religio-civic voluntary associations, and economic 
institutions. 
159 
160 
American Public Education 
In Piety in the Public School (1970), Robert Michaelson 
presents a historical analysis of the relationship among the 
American public schools, American denominations, and Ameri-
can civil religion. According to Michaelson, there was an 
early, close relationship between American religious and ed-
ucational institutions. The values of evangelical religion 
were formative factors in the rise of formal education in 
colonial America. Institutions of higher education, such as 
Harvard and Princeton, were founded to serve the primary 
function of Protestant ministerial education. The establish-
ment of the common school was itself a major cause of edu-
cated clergy, many of whom dedicated themselves to developing 
a nationwide system of general education. On his visit to 
the United States in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville ob-
served that American education was largely 11 entrusted to the 
clergy" (quoted in Michaelson, 1970:51). Although Tocque-
ville's statement is an exaggeration, early American educa-
tional systems, including the public schools, were influenced 
by traditional religious values and were expected to produce 
pious and moral citizens. American schools have also tradi-
tionally served the civil religious function of social inte-
gration. Michaelson (1970:57) states that "the school's role 
might be called religious not only in the goal of achieving 
moral character, but also in the development of a sense of 
community, of a common identity as Americans." In the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a series of legal decisions 
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both precipitated and reflected an increasing differentiation 
between public education and American religious organizations. 
Today, public education no longer manifests particularistic 
religious teachings, and public schools are neither expected 
nor allowed to perform the function of religious education. 
Although the special religious functions of the public 
schools have declined due to differentiation of educational 
and religious institutions, public schools continue to per-
form a civil religious function for American society. By use 
of historical data, this process of differentiation and its 
effects on the religious and civil religious functions of 
public education can be documented. 
Religious and Civil Religious Functions of 
Early American Public Education 
Bernard Bailyn (1960:21) has observed that, during the 
early colonial period, the major institutions of socializa-
tion and acculturation were the family, community, and church, 
rather than the school. It was not until the end of the col-
onial period that formal schooling became more universal, and 
thus a significant source of socialization. The force of the 
Great Awakening stimulated the founding of a number of colon-
ial colleges, whose graduates in turn established institu-
tions and standards for all levels of education. The awaken-
ers attempted to build an educational system which fostered 
religious piety as well as knowledge. Jonathan Edwards, who 
served briefly as president of Princeton, wrote in Thoughts 
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on the Revival that citizens should be educated "in common 
learning" and in "vital piety" (quoted in Michaelson, 1970: 
49). The early history of Princeton itself illustrates the 
fusion of religion, patriotism, and education which charac-
terized early American education. 
The Reverend John Witherspoon, president of Prince-
ton from 1767 until his death in 1794, eagerly combined 
piety and patriotism in his life and work. . .. He had 
not been in New Jersey a decade when he became one of the 
signers of the Declaration of Independence. Witherspoon 
early caught the vision of the new man and the new soci-
ety that were aborning in the new world. His college, 
which had been founded to produce zealous converts to 
Christianity, could as easily also produce zealous citi-
zens of the new republic (Michaelson, 1970:50). 
Michaelson credits evangelical religion as the major 
influence on early American formal education but notes that 
evangelically influenced schools were often directed toward 
patriotism as well as toward religion. "The habit of looking 
to the schools to produce learned piety and patriotism became 
so deeply ingrained in the American mind that few questioned 
its validity" (Michaelson, 1970:51). The expectations of 
higher education were extended to all educational levels, to 
the extent that American schools typically performed religious 
and civic functions along with general educational functions. 
The religious and civil religious functions of the school were 
not always in harmony, and conflict between religious particu-
larists and generalists was typical. Particularists were mo-
tivated to institutionalize denominational and/or sectarian 
religious values even in the public schools, while general-
ists advocated nondenominational, nonsectarian approaches to 
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morality in public education. Archbishop Hughes of New York 
exemplified the particularist viewpoint. Hughes conceived 
of religion in denominational terms, and worked for the 
establishment of a denominationally-influenced public educa-
tional system. Horace Mann and John Dewey represented· the 
generalist viewpoint. Both Mann and Dewey were influenced 
by the deistic, Jeffersonian philosophy of education which 
stressed the morality of natural, nondenominational religion. 
Mann opposed sectarianism and, along with Dewey, advocated 
that the public schools be based on a "common faith" in 
humanistic, democratic values. In the early conflict be-
tween particularists and generalists, both sides prevailed in 
certain respects. Particularism influenced public education 
into the twentieth century. Until the United States Supreme 
Court decisions of the twentieth century weakened religion's 
influence on the public schools, authorized prayer and Bible 
reading were commonplace features of the American public 
school system. Although advocates of these practices viewed 
them as nonsectarian, they were largely Protestant in orien-
tation, usually based on the King James version of the Bible 
and utilizing the Protestant version of the Lord's Prayer. 
As particularism slowly receded, however, the civil religious 
function of public education emerged more clearly. Particu-
larly during the late 1800s and early 1900s, when America 
experienced its heaviest waves of European immigrants, the 
public school was seen as the major institution for the 
Americanization and democratization of new citizens. Civics, 
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citizenship, and patriotism courses infused the public 
schools, and the schools began to play "a role comparable to 
that of the initiatory rites of a primitive tribe" (Michael-
son, 1970:149-150). The public schools' role in fulfilling 
the civil religious function of social integration is summar-
ized in Michaelson's (1970:156) statement that" ... the 
common school brings common experience which precipitates a 
common faith which is essential to common welfare." 
There is historical evidence that the American public 
educational system performed both religious and civil reli-
gious functions from colonial times into the twentieth cen-
tury. Often these functions were in competition or conflict. 
As the twentieth century progressed, the sectarian influence 
in public schools would gradually decline, leaving civil re-
ligion as the only institutionalized form of religious ex-
pression remaining in American public education. 
Differentiation of Public Education 
from Religion 
The differentiation of American public education from 
religion is most clearly evidenced by twentieth-century judi-
cial decisions limiting the role of religion in the public 
schools. Over the past sixty years, the United States 
Supreme Court has ruled on a number of relevant cases. 
Michaelson (1970:194) presents a summary table of significant 
court cases (replicated as figure 7 on the following page). 
The first significant Supreme Court rulings of the 
twentieth century concerned the relationship between public 
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DESIGNATION NA.HE OF CASE 
Pierce Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
268 u.s. 510 
Cochran Cochran v. Louisiana 
281 u.s. 370 
Everson Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 
Allen Board of Education v. Allen 
392 u.s. 236 
Gobitis Minersville v. Gobitis 
310 u.s. 586 
Barnette West Virginia v. Barnette 
319 u.s. 624 
McCollum McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U.S. 203 
Zorach Zorach v. Clauson 
343 u.s. 306 
DATE 
1925 
1930 
1947 
1968 
"1940 
1943 
1948 
~ 
1952 
CENTRAL ISSUE 
Oregon•s mandatory public 
school attendance statute. 
Statute providing use of tax 
money for books for chil-
dren attending public and 
other schools. ---
Tax subsidy for bus transpor-
tation for children attend-
ing Catholic schools (N.J.) 
N.Y. statute requiring tax-
subsidized textbooks for 
parochial and private 
school students. 
Required daily flag salute in 
public school (Minersville, 
Pa.) . 
State Board of Education rul-
ing requiring flag salute 
in public schools. 
Released-time program on 
school premises (Champaign, 
Ill.) . 
Released-time program off 
school premises (N.Y.C.). 
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Unconstitutional 
(unanimous) 
Upheld 
(unanimous) 
Upheld (5-4) 
Upheld (6-3) 
Upheld (8-1) 
Unconstitutional 
( 6-3) 
Unconstitutional 
( 8-1) 
Upheld (6-3) 
Fig. 7. Significant Court Cases Related to Religion and the Public School 
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schools and private, parochial schools. In 1925, in Pierce, 
the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled against 
Oregon's mandatory public school attendance statute, thus 
supporting the right of children to attend private and reli-
gious schools. In the Cochran, Everson, and Allen decisions, 
the Court ruled that tax-supported services such as school 
books and bus transportation provided to public school child-
ren must be extended to children attending private and reli-
gious schools (Michaelson, 1970:193). Although the decision 
to extend services paid for by the public to students of 
religious schools might appear to result in the mixing of 
public and religious domains, these decisions actually aided 
the survival of a separate system of religious education. By 
upholding the right to private and religious education, the 
Court helped insure that religious alternatives to public 
education would continue to be available. 
The dominant direction of United States Supreme Court 
opinion on religion and public education began to be expressed 
in the 1940s. In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the pro-
visions of the First Amendment on religion were extended to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Explaining the 
implications of this decision, Justice Black subsequently 
wrote: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another (quoted in Michaelson, 1970: 
19 5) . 
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Later the Court applied the logic of Cantwell to the McCollum 
decision, striking down a released-time education program on 
public school grounds in Champaign, Illinois. The program 
offered religious instruction during school time on school 
premises. Although the released-time program was voluntary, 
the plaintiff claimed that her son had been harassed for non-
participation (Michaelson, 1970:196-197). The McCollum deci-
sion represented a strict separationist position which was 
characterized by Justice Black as "a wall of separation be-
tween Church and State" (quoted in Michaelson, 1970:197). 
In 1952 separation became accommodation as the Court upheld a 
released-time religious education program held off school 
premises (Zorach). Although the Zorach decision was inter-
preted by some legal scholars as a softening of the separa-
tionist stance of McCollum (Michaelson, 1970:198), the 
decision was still congruent with the concept of differenti-
ation between religious and public education. The Supreme 
Court at no time acted in such a way as to destroy the alter-
native of a separate system of religious education, as long 
as it was clearly separate, physically and temporally, from 
public education. The Engel and Schempp decisions of the 
1960s reaffirmed the "wall" between public and religious 
institutions when public school-sponsored prayer and devo-
tional Bible reading were ruled unconstitutional. Two essen-
tial factors in this decision were the "identification of 
the prayer as religious" and the decision that its use con-
stituted "an establishment of religion" (Michaelson, 1970: 
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194, 207). The Court rulings of the 1960s illustrate the 
trend toward differentiation. The extent of this differenti-
ation and the few areas remaining undifferentiated are sum-
marized by Michaelson (1970:206). 
On-premises released-time religious education, 
ceremonial Bible readings, and school-sponsored group 
prayer are excluded under McCollum, Engel, and Schemlp. 
But at least three things are left to the school fol ow-
ing these decisions: (1) accommodations of the type per-
mitted in Zorach; (2) ceremonies of a civic, patriotic, 
or secular nature in which religious terminology and al-
lusions appear; and (3) the "objective study of" or 
"teaching about" religion. Number one has the force of 
law; two and three are suggestive dicta. 
The immediate impact of the Supreme Court's separation-
ist decisions on the American denominations was varied. 
Roman Catholics generally opposed.the decisions, Jewish and 
liberal Protestant groups generally supported them, and other 
Protestant reaction was mixed. A fear of rising ~eculariza-
tion was typical in the groups in opposition. Michaelson 
(1970:232) notes, however, that as time went on many oppon-
ents of the separationist decisions changed their attitudes. 
In 1963, the National Council of Churches supported the 
Engel decision as offering opportunity to reexamine the 
issue of religious values and public education. The United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., which in the 1950s had 
issued a pamphlet identifying "our schools" as "a bulwark for 
our Protestant concept of morality, democracy and freedom," 
passed a statement in 1963 supporting Engel (quoted in 
Michaelson, 1970: 233). In 1964, The Lutheran Church in Ameri-
ca declared that its members should not be alarmed over Engel 
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and Schempp. American Catholics were much slower to accept 
separationism, but the positive ecumenical statements on edu-
cation by Vatican II led to a certain relaxation of Catholic 
opposition (Michaelson, 1970:234). Michaelson (1970:235) 
concludes that the separationist decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and the differentiation of public educa-
tion from religion, which resulted from the decisions, ulti-
mately had a dual effect on American religious groups. 
Initially, the separationist doctrine polarized religious 
opinion and organizations, but the separationist decisions 
ultimately facilitated interreligious dialogue. 
Public Education and American Civil Religion 
The United States Supreme Court's separationist deci-
sions promoted the institutional differentiation of American 
public education from religion. The religious content of 
public education was limited to the ''objective studyn of 
religion or to "ceremonies of a civic, patriotic or secular 
nature" in which religious terms were used (Michaelson, 1970: 
226). Civic expression remained the only avenue of religious 
expression officially tolerated in the American public school. 
In the Engel decision, Justice Black pointed out that, al-
though schools cannot sponsor religious exercises, they are 
free to sponsor patriotic exercises. The fact that American 
patriotism traditionally possesses a religious dimension 
complicates the issue of separating religion from public 
instructional content. Supreme Court decisions on the issue 
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of civil religious expression in public schools have gener-
ally maintained that religion can be tolerated in schools if 
it is contained in a patriotic, rather than a religious, 
ceremony (Michaelson, 1970:208-209). American public school 
students may recite the Declaration of Independence and sing 
the "Star Spangled Banner," both of which contain reference 
to God. Although the Court did not label such rites as civil 
religious, they contain an acceptable reference to the reli-
gious dimension of the polity. The Court sidestepped the 
issue of the civil religiosity of the pledge of allegiance to 
the American flag. In West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), the 
Court ruled that the state could not require students to pub-
lically profess a "patriotic creed," but the grounds for the 
decision concerned freedom of speech rather than freedom of 
religion sections of the First Amendment (Michaelson, 1970: 
210-211). In the arena of public school education, the Court 
has not ruled, other than in Barnette, on the restriction of 
civil religious expression in schools. Civil religious cere-
mony is one of the few remaining institutional outlets for 
religious expression in American public education. 
Although the religious content of public education has 
been severely restricted by the Supreme Court, there ha~ been 
no effort or intention to limit the moral dimension of public 
education. In 1951, the Educational Policies Commission of 
the National Educational Association recommended that public 
schools emphasize values shared by all Americans and become 
a major institutional source of socialization of these values. 
Ten values which the Commission agreed were common to the 
American people were: 
(1) Human personality--the basic value; 
(2) moral responsibility; 
(3) institutions as the servants of men; 
(4) common consent; 
(5) devotion to truth; 
(6) respect for excellence; 
(7) moral equality; 
(8) brotherhood; 
(9) the pursuit of happiness; and 
(10) spiritual enrichment (Michaelson, 1970:242). 
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This set of humanistic values, which does not contain refer-
ence to a supreme being or to a denominational creed, is 
representative of American civil religion of either the folk 
religion or common faith models. Despite the humanistic ori-
entation, the Commission was careful to stress the spiritual 
nature of these values, perhaps to reassure those who feared 
complete secularization of the public educational system 
(Michaelson, 1970:242). The values were also selected to 
represent ideals which Americans have in common, since the 
public schools have traditionally tried to perform an inte-
grative function for society. Michaelson notes the high 
level of public expectations for the public schools to foster 
American unity. 
The American public school came of age in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and with this maturity 
came even greater symbolic potency. Enrollments sky-
rocketed at a far more rapid pace than population growth. 
The percentage of the population in school increased 
dramatically. The public high school emerged as a new 
and crucially important institution. It continued and 
capped the work of the elementary school in socializing 
and Americanizing the youth. The comprehensive high 
school, offering a wide variety of subjects and experi-
ences to students from every class, every ethnic and 
religious group, became the most important symbol of the 
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unifying and democratizing role of the public school. 
In the American mind the public school became the primary 
institution of American democrac~ the cradle and bulwark 
of its liberties. It became a prime article of American 
faith to "believe in" the public school (Michaelson, 
1970:137). 
In the past, American public schools democratized and inte-
grated the immigrant. In more recent times, the public 
school has been the primary American institution charged 
with the moral task of racial integration (Brown v. Board of 
Education). In contemporary society, as the school continues 
to assume functions traditionally performed by American faro-
ilies and religious organizations, expectations for schools 
to serve religious functions are likely to increase, rather 
than decline. Because the Supreme Court ruled that public 
schools cannot become an establishment of religion, the reli-
gious function of the schools is increasingly expressed in 
civil religious terms, and focused on civil religious func-
tions. Public schools are expected to socialize students to 
the civil religious values of equality, brotherhood, and re-
spect for individual personality. These values are general 
and are intended to overarch the values of particular reli-
gious organizations, ethnic and racial groups, and class 
divisions. Public schools are expected to produce individ-
uals socialized to these values who are able to participate 
in an integrated common society. This expectation of social 
integration has not always been realistic. Michaelson (1970: 
263) observes that the "schools' record in handling plural-
ism has not been a particularly bright one. Textbooks, for 
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example, tend to project an image of a rising tide of national 
oneness of mind, ignoring the ebb of group differences." 
Whether or not the schools succeed in fostering generalized, 
civil religious values which can truly overarch national divi-
sions is, of course, the basic challenge to American civil re-
ligion which Bellah (1975) addressed as the "broken covenant." 
The American public schools have historically served as a ve-
hicle of the American covenant, and today many Americans con-
tinue to look to the schools as an institutional source of 
societal salvation (Michaelson, 1970:254-255). 
Voluntary Associations 
Warner's (1961) symbolic study of Memorial Day cele-
brations in an American community suggests that civil reli-
gion can be practiced by Americans through voluntary assoc-
iations such as veteran's organizations and religio-civic 
community groups. Research by Pamela Jolicoeur and Louis 
Knowles (1978) finds that fraternal orders still provide an 
avenue of civil religious expression for many Americans today. 
Jolicoeur and Knowles note that fraternal orders are likely 
institutional carriers of American civil religion because 
orders have traditionally performed both religious and civic 
functions. Fraternal orders are not "churches'' or denomina-
tions as such, but they engage in ritual celebrations based 
on shared myths and affirm a religiously-based morality. 
Several studies have noted the religious and moral dimensions 
of fraternal associations (Gist, 1940; Mackenzie, 1967; 
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Schmidt and Babchuk, 1972). Fraternal orders are also major 
advocates of patriotism and civic virtue. Orders are there-
fore among the associations most likely to promulgate the 
symbols of American civil religion (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 
1978:4). 
The fraternal order selected for study by Jolicoeur 
and Knowles was the Freemasons, an order founded in England 
in the eighteenth century and which has served as a model for 
other American fraternal associations. The estimated nation-
al membership of the Freemasons is four million adult males, 
encompassing ten million persons totally through affiliated 
organizations for families of members. Data concerning Free-
masonry were collected from issues of The New Age, a national 
Masonic journal, from 1964 to 1974. The New Age was selected 
for content analysis because it has the largest national cir-
culation among Masonic journals and because it is the offi-
cial journal of the Southern Jurisdiction of Scottish Rite 
Freemasonry, representing Hasons in thirty-five states. An-
alysis of data revealed that 60 percent of the 482 articles 
sampled were concerned with general topics, and 40 percent 
with topics specifically related to Masonry. Among the ar-
ticles devoted to general topics, 31 percent concerned Amer-
ican institutions and the American way of life, and 27.2 per-
cent concerned religion or civil religion specifically. The 
remainder of the articles dealt with historical subjects such 
as the founding of the nation. God was mentioned in 46.5 
percent of all articles in the sample, the Constitution was 
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cited in 19.2 percent, and the founding fathers were referred 
to in 21.6 percent (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978:10-11). 
Jolicoeur and Knowles interpret these findings as confirma-
tion of the hypothesis that Freemasonry is devoted to the 
maintenance of American civil religion. 
The Masonic model of American civil religion differs 
somewhat from the transcendent universal model of Bellah. 
Both the Masons and Bellah would be categorized in Marty's 
typology of kinds of civil religion (see figure 1) as repre-
sentatives of transcendent civil religion, which envisions a 
transcendent God who stands in judgement of society. Al-
though both the Masons and Bellah agree on the divinely tran-
scendent nature of American civil religion, they differ on 
the content of the prophetic message. According to The New 
Age, "the most serious challenges to the American way of life 
are Communism, creeping Federal control of the nation, and 
civil disobedience" (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978:17). Bellah 
(1975), in contrast, cites capitalism, racism, and sexism as 
major threats to the American covenant. Other differences 
between Bellah and the Masons are revealed by Jolicoeur and 
Knowles's data. Bellah sees Abraham Lincoln as a major pro-
phet of American civil religion, but The New Age articles 
contained more references to George \'lashington ( 12. 7 percent 
of the sampled articles) than to Lincoln (3.6 percent). The 
Freemasons emphasize the Revolutionary period and see the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights as symbols of the personal 
freedoms guaranteed to Americans by the government. The New 
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Age gives little attention to Civil War symbolism and its 
themes of sacrifice and rebirth which signify to Bellah the 
dissolution and renewal of the American covenant. The civil 
religion of the Masons is essentially conservative, emphasiz-
ing the defense of American institutions, while Bellah's civil 
religion challenges existing institutional arrangements to re-
new the spirit of the covenant. Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978: 
17) summarize their findings on the Hasonic model of American 
civil religion compared to that of Bellah. 
To summarize, Scottish Rite Freemasons stress the 
importance of the revolutionary era as the golden age of 
the nation. The Constitution and Bill of Rights together 
with the Declaration of Independence comprise the blue-
prints for the divinely-inspired society. The national 
dilemma of slavery and the crisis of the War between the 
States are largely ignored. The future of the nation 
depends on its citizens modeling themselves after the 
example of Washington and other revolutionary leaders in 
their devotion to God and country. While Masons agree 
with Bellah that the present time is an era of great cri-
sis for the United States, their prophetic message is a 
call to return to a former golden age rather than to 
forge a new society and new structures. 
Jolicoeur and Knowles's findings are congruent with 
Wimberly's (1976) data which showed a positive association 
between American civil religious beliefs and political .con-
servatism. Jolicoeur and Knowles believe, however, that al-
though the Masons hold a particular interpretation of civil 
religion, considerable diversity of views exists among other 
voluntary associations. Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978:18) sug-
gest that Bellah's model of a universal transcendent American 
civil religion is an ideal type within which there is varia-
tion in functional reality. Fraternal orders may function 
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as conservative, civil religious, denomination-like, class-
defending voluntary bastions, while other voluntary associa-
tions, such as the human potential groups and organizations 
like Transcendental Meditation, may potentially function as 
revolutionary civil religious "cults." Bellah (1974c:41) be-
lieves that the latter types of associations are "revolution-
ary" in the sense that they could foster "fundamental struc-
tural change, socially and culturally" based on a "shift 
away from the exclusive dominance of technical reason," al-
though Bellah admits that these groups "are quite incapable 
at the moment of supplying the revolutionary alternative." 
The empirical findings of Jolicoeur and Knowles and Bellah's 
ideas suggest that future research on voluntary associations 
as a vehicle for the practice of American civil religion 
would be fruitful. Research efforts should focus upon iden-
tification of voluntary associations which foster the values 
of American civil religion, classification of the associa-
tions' ideologies along a conservatism-utopianism continuum, 
and exploration of the relationship between the associations 
and other institutional carriers of American civil religion. 
The Economy 
According to Robert Bellah's (1975) analysis of contem-
porary American society, the values of American civil reli-
gion are in conflict with the central values of corporate 
capitalism. Civil religious and capitalistic values emerged 
together in the early history of the nation, but have since 
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become widely divergent. Hiding behind the facade of indi-
vidualism, corporate development has created a means-oriented 
economic system uninformed by ultimate concerns. A break in 
the American covenant is the result. 
The History of Utilitarian Individualism 
Bellah sees the American nation born under a dual myth. 
From the biblical tradition, Americans conceived of them-
selves as "God's chosen people" directed to build a "new Is-
rael" in the new world. The self-transcendent possibilities 
implied in the concept of a chosen people were tempered by 
the belief in a transcendent, prophetic God. This relation-
ship between citizen and deity is what Bellah calls the "Am-
erican covenant." A second powerful American myth has been 
utilitarian individualism. Utilitarian individualism orig-
inated in ancient Greek philosophy and has been carried to 
the modern era by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and later by the 
social Darwinists of the late nineteenth century. Utilitar-
ian individualism has run parallel to biblically-based Arner-
ican myths, both historically interacting in complex "rela-
tions of attraction and repulsion" (Bellah, 1974:34). Bellah 
elaborates first on the points of conflict between the bibli-
cal tradition of American civil religion and utilitarian 
individualism. 
Whereas the central term for understanding individual 
motivation in the biblical tradition was "conscience," 
the central term in the utilitarian tradition was "inter-
est." The biblical understanding of national life was 
based on the notion of community with charity for all 
members, a community supported by public and private 
r 
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virtue. The utilitarian tradition believed in a neutral 
state in which individuals would be allowed to pursue the 
maximization of self-interest and the product would be 
public and private prosperity (Bellah, 1974:34). 
There are also points of conjunction between American civil 
religion and utilitarian individualism. Both myths stress 
individualism, freedom, and morality, although for different 
purposes. 
The biblical tradition promised earthly rewards, as 
well as heavenly, for virtuous actions. The utilitarian 
tradition required self-restraint and "morality" if not 
as ends then as means .... The central value for util-
itarian individualism was freedom, a term that could 
obscure the gap between the utilitarian and biblical 
traditions, since it is a central biblical term as well. 
But for biblical religion, freedom meant above all free-
dom from sin, freedom to do the right, and was almost 
equivalent to virtue. For utilitarianism it meant the 
freedom to pursue one's own ends (Bellah, 1974:34-35). 
Ultimately biblical tradition was coopted by the utilitarians 
to the extent that religious and civil religious values were 
used to legitimate the achievement of self-interest. The 
American rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
were celebrated by utilitarian individualists as the right to 
pursue wealth and profit through the private enterprise system 
(Bellah, 1975:121). 
Corporate Capitalism 
Although the pure instrumentality of industrial capital-
ism was originally hidden behind the facade of civil religious 
values, the relationship between American civil religion and 
modern capitalism has become increasingly tenuous. Bellah 
(1975:130-131) believes that "the system of corporate industry 
that has grown up in the last century undermines essential 
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American values and constitutional order." Far from insuring 
individual rights and freedoms, corporate growth has dimin-
ished the power of the individual citizen. As examples, 
Bellah notes the decline of the small private business and 
the near disappearance of the autonomous family farm. Today 
the average American is a wage-earner in corporate industry 
or agribusiness. Along with the loss of economic autonomy, 
Bellah believes that individual citizens have lost political 
power to corporate hands. Today, political decision making 
is based on utilitarian considerations of corporate profit, 
at the expense of personal piety or public virtue. Bellah 
observes that the supposed benefits of the American economy, 
"prosperity, abundance, and wealth" are still not available 
to certain segments of the population and are ultimately un-
satisfying even to many who achieve them (Bellah, 1975:135). 
Analyzing the social protest movements of the 1960s and early 
1970s, which were notable for their inclusion of middle-class, 
educated American youth, Bellah concludes that the protest 
movements were symptomatic of a national religious crisis. 
That education and affluence did not bring happiness or 
fulfillment was perhaps as important as the fact that 
society did not seem to be able to solve the problem of 
racism and poverty .... The deepest cause ... was, in 
my opinion, the inability of utilitarian individualism to 
provide a meaningful pattern of personal and social exis-
tence ... (Bellah, 1974c:36),. 
Bellah cites the civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., as an example of religiously based response 
to the failures of utilitarian individualism. Bellah (1974c) 
also hopes that some of the anti-utilitarian religious 
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movements of the 1970s will provide visions which could serve 
as inspiration to renew the American covenant. In the econo-
mic sphere, Bellah (1975:136) advocates a form of "decentral-
ized democratic socialism" which, unlike the anti-individual-
istic socialism of the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba, would 
strike a balance between individual and societal needs. 
Bellah is not naively optimistic about either religious 
renewal or economic change in the United States. A critical 
test of the viability of contemporary American civil religion 
is its very difficult task of informing an economic system 
with a structure of ultimate meaning. 
Bellah's critic, Richard Penn, essentially agrees with 
Bellah that the contemporary American economy operates outside 
the context of ultimacy. Penn believes that modern economies 
become functional alternatives to religion and contain the 
sources of their own legitimacy. 
Finally, legitimacy in these most advanced societies 
depends on the capacity to meet most popular demands for 
participation in the polity and for high levels of con-
sumption rather than on the manipulation of religious 
symbols. Cultural integration on the level of religious 
beliefs and values, then, is under these conditions no 
longer either possible or even necessary for the mainten-
ance of motivation and order (Penn, 1972:17). 
Both Bellah and Penn agree that the ideology of American cor-
porate capitalism is incongruent with the valuesofAmerican 
civil religion. Disagreement between Bellah and Penn exists 
only on the level of response to the incongruency and recom-
mendations for the future of the nation. Penn records and 
analyzes the differentiation of economic and religious 
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institutions, a process he sees as smooth and evolutionary. 
Bellah registers concern that economic institutions are in-
creasingly disharmonious with traditional American values, a 
process he observes as conflictual and precipitous of both 
reactionary and revolutionary social movements. Bellah is 
also not unwilling to respond to what he sees as a crisis of 
meaning with a prophetic call for the establishment of an 
economic system congruent with the values of American civil 
religion. Another and perhaps synthetic position is offered 
by Robert Stauffer (1973). Stauffer believes that even a 
utilitarian economy requires some overarching basis of legit-
imacy. The renewal of American civil religion could provide 
this legitimacy, or new ideological systems may emerge in the 
future to provide legitimacy and guidance to the technologi-
cal economic sector of American society. 
Conclusion 
There is little sociological research on the relation-
ship between American civil religion and other American insti-
tutions. Three relevant studies are summarized in this 
chapter, but only one (Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978) was based 
on sociological research methods. Current knowledge, although 
quite limited, would support the hypothesis that most American 
institutions are in the process of differentiating from both 
traditional religion and civil religion. The institutions 
likely to be least differentiated from American civil religion 
are the traditional institutions of socialization and 
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integration: the family, religious organizations, religio-
civic voluntary associations, and educational institutions. 
These institutions would be expected to manifest civil reli-
gious symbols as a high level of generality. Sociological 
research by Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978) and historical re-
search by Michaelson (1970) support this hypothesis. Insti-
tutions performing instrumental functions, such as the econ-
omy and communications media, would be expected to exhibit 
the most differentiation from American civil religion. 
According to Fenn (1972), Thomas and Flippen (1972), and 
even Bellah (1975) it is problematic whether civil religious 
symbols continue to infuse these institutions today. Because 
available data are so limited, these hypotheses are quite 
tentative. The field is now open for sociologists to respond 
to Hammond's (1976:171) important question, "What institutions 
promulgate, transmit, maintain, and modify American civil 
religion?" 
PART IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL RELIGION 
CHAPTER XI 
THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION 
Four major propositions concerning American civil reli-
gion, adapted from the work of John A. Coleman (1970) are 
presented in the Introduction to the present study. Proposi-
tion IV locates the development of American civil religion 
within the context of general cultural evolution. By focus-
ing upon the process of differentiation, stated in Proposi-
tions II and III, Coleman concludes that the differentiation 
of American civil religion from other social institutions 
parallels basic evolutionary trends. The entire proposition 
set, with the final proposition added, is reproduced below. 
Proposition I 
American civil religion is the religious symbol system 
which relates the citizen's role and American society's place 
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning. 
Proposition II 
American civil religion is structurally differentiated 
from both the political community and the religious community. 
Proposition III 
American civil religion performs specialized religious 
functions performed neither by church nor state. 
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Proposition IV 
The differentiation of American civil religion from 
political and religious coromunities follows the general direc-
tion of cultural evolution. 
Proposition IV, which states that the structural and 
functional differentiation of American civil religion can be 
predicted by the general direction of cultural evolution, re-
quires further elaboration. In part III, chapter VIII of 
this volume, the evolutionary theories of Parsons (1971) and 
Bellah (1964) were discussed as predecessors to Coleman's 
(1970) theory of civil religious evolution. The evolutionary 
processes of differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion, 
and value generalization (Parsons, 1971:126) were shown to 
be the basis of Bellah's five ideal typical historical stages 
of religious evolution: primitive, archaic, historic, early 
modern, and modern religion. Although Bellah does not men-
tion the development of civil religion in his article on re-
ligious evolution, the evolutionary trends he observes are 
logically extended by Coleman to the differentiation of civil 
religion. Coleman finds religion, civil religion, and polit-
ical systems generally undifferentiated in primitive and 
archaic societies. In historic or early modern society, 
church-state separation develops for the first time, but 
civil religion does not yet appear in differentiated form. 
In modern societies, civil religion may continue in an undif-
ferentiated state, sponsored either by church or state. 
Another modern alternative is the development of secular 
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nationalism, a functional alternative to civil religion, ex-
emplified by the modern U.S.S.R. The other alternative, the 
development of a fairly autonomous, differentiated system of 
civil religion, is to be expected in the most modern, highly 
differentiated, religiously plural societal type. Coleman 
believes that this pattern of differentiated civil religion 
is evident in the contemporary United States. 
Coleman's theory of civil religious evolution is a log-
ical outgrowth of the evolutionary models of Parsons and 
Bellah. In order to compare Coleman's theory and Proposition 
IV to ideas advanced by other sociologists of religion, sev-
eral different theories of religious change will be examined. 
The ideas of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Joachim Wach, Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Bryan Wilson, Richard Fenn, and 
David Martin will be explored, with major attention given to 
each theorist's model of religious evolution and its implica-
tions for civil religious evolution. Because each of the 
selected theories proposes that religious evolution in some 
way results in secularization, the uses of the term "secular-
ization" will first be addressed. 
The Concept of Secularization in Theories 
of Religious Evolution 
On the most general level of analysis, each of the 
selected theories of religious evolution proposes that modern-
ization is associated with secularization. Secularization is 
a concept which has been used in different ways by different 
sociologists, resulting in analytic imprecision. Larry Shiner 
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(1968:208-209) notes that, besides the original meaning of 
secularization (the transfer of lands from church to civil 
control) , there are six other common uses of the term in con-
temporary sociological research: (1) decline of religion, 
(2) conformity with "this world," (3) disengagement of soci-
ety from religion, (4) transposition of religious beliefs and 
institutions, (5) desacralization of the world, and (6) move-
ment from a "sacred" to a "secular" society. Secularization 
as "decline of religion" refers to the loss of prestige and 
social acceptance associated with traditional religion. 
Empirical studies, such as Glock and Stark's Religion and 
Society in Tension (1957), which concluded that religion is 
losing its influence, exemplify the decline-of-religion type 
of secularization. Secularization viewed as "conformity with 
'this world'" would result in a society preoccupied with 
ordinary activities of daily life maintenance to the extent 
that religious boundaries between groups would disappear. 
Typical of this second meaning of secularization is Will Her-
berg's (1960) thesis that current, American religious identi-
fications are largely secular in nature and simply reflect 
acceptable ways of being a good American. Secularization as 
"disengagement of society from religion" refers to the pro-
cess by which social institutions separate themselves from 
religious understanding and control, leaving religion to mo-
tivate the private lives of individuals. This is essentially 
the theory of Peter Berger (1967) and Thomas Luckmann (1967). 
Shiner criticizes all three definitions of secularization for 
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ambiguity and dependence upon the definition of religion for 
derived meaning. For example, it is difficult to show secu-
larization as a decline of religion without specifying some 
original period of religious domination from which decline 
could come (Shiner, 1968:210). Shiner (1968:213) suggests 
that "the more descriptive and neutral"concept of differenti-
ation be substituted for secularization when either "decline 
of religion" or "disengagement of society from religion" are 
intended. 
The idea of secularization as a "transposition of reli-
gious beliefs and institutions" is a fairly precise meaning 
of secularization, referring to the transformation of sacred 
phenomena into phenomena controlled by humans. It was 
through "transposition" that the spirit of capitalism became 
a secularized version of the Protestant Ethic. "Desacraliza"-
tion of the world" also has a specific meaning based on 
Weber's process of rationalization and disenchantment. The 
final definition of secularization, "movement from a 'sacred' 
to a 'secular' society" is taken from Howard Becker's (1957) 
analysis. According to Becker, the secular society is the 
society open to change, not only from religious traditions, 
but also from any traditional beliefs. Becker's usage of 
secularization is the broadest of the six meanings, as it is 
derived from a general theory of social change. 
Due to the need for conceptual clarification and pre-
cise operational definition, Shiner (1968:207) recommends 
that social scientists either stop using the term 
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secularization, or recognize that it is "a comprehensive term 
covering three complementary processes: desacralization, 
differentiatio~ and transposition."' Typical of the concept-
ual imprecision criticized by Shiner is the work of Bryan 
Wilson, whose conceptualizations of secularization range from 
disengagement to desacralization to decline of religion. In 
Contemporary Transformations of Religion (Wilson, 1976:16, 20, 
11), for example, Wilson characterizes secularization through 
the observations that "the presidency that the Church once 
exercised over social life is gone" (disengagement); "modern 
society simply denies the authority of the Churches by ignor-
ing them" (decline of religion) ; and "we can observe a grad-
ual, uneven, at times oscillating trend, the general direc-
tion of which is none the less unmistakable, in the nature of 
human consciousness, towards ... a 'matter-of-fact' orien-
tation to the world" (desacralization). Applying Shiner's 
criteria for clarification, Wilson can be credited for his 
treatment of secularization as a complex phenomenon involving 
several separate but interrelated parts; but he can also be 
criticized for his failure to distinguish the different pro-
cesses involved in secularization. A more systematic treat-
ment of secularization is advanced by David Martin in A 
General Theory of Secularization (1978). According to Martin 
(1978:69), differentiation and "the onset of anomie" are the 
basic processes related to secularization. These processes 
are subject to cultural and historical variation, resulting 
in a variety of basic patterns of secularization. In order 
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to systematize these variations, Martin specifies a series of 
cultural frames, events, and categories which characterize 
the basic patterns of secularization. Basic patterns of sec-
ularization may be indicated, for example, by the degree of 
religious pluralism in a society, the degree of anti-clericism, 
the degree of cultic participation, and by other variables re-
lating to structural differentiation (Martin, 1978:59). By 
evaluating societies according to each indicator, a complex 
pattern of secularization emerges which is far more detailed 
and specific than Wilson's general use of the term seculari-
zation could provide. Martin is the one contemporary theorist 
who has made the greatest effort to conceptualize seculariza-
tion as a complex phenomenon affected by numerous variables 
and observable in a variety of cultural patterns. Due to the 
fact that Martin is exceptional in his precise treatment of 
secularization, the following analysis of theories of reli-
gious change remains hampered by the conceptual imprecision 
critiqued by Shiner. In the following analyses of the theories 
of Durkheim, Weber, Wach, Berger and Luckmann, Wilson, Penn, 
and Martin, specific terms such as differentiation and ration-
alization (desacralization) are substituted whenever possible 
for the more general ''secularization.n It is expected that 
this more precise delineation of the specific processes assoc-
iated with secularization will lead to a clearer understanding 
of patterns of religious evolution and the implications of 
these patterns for civil religious evolution. 
Selected Theories of Religious Evolution 
Emile Durkheim 
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Durkheim has proposed a unilinear, evolutionary model 
for the explanation of the religious changes which are assoc-
iated with industrial development. The model posits a uni-
linear movement of societies from the sacred to the profane 
polarity associated with the process of differentiation. A 
specific examination of Durkheim's model begins with his pri-
mary postulate which asserts that collective representations, 
the concrete symbols of the social group, constitute collec-
tive reality. The original collective representation, the 
religious symbol, is the basis from which all other represen-
tations evolved (Durkheim, 1965:22). Durkheim further posits 
a transition in the collective representations from sacred to 
profane, paralleled by a shift from repressive to restitutive 
law (Durkheim, 1965:53). From these postulated changes in 
the collective indicators of social reality, a core Durkheim-
ian hypothesis can be deduced: the movement from mechanical 
to organic solidarity. In terms of social organization, the 
transition occurs from segmental to organized social types. 
The segmental type, analogous to the homogeneous rings of an 
earthworm, is the social organization of the clan. The organ-
ized type, the product of the division of labor, is similar 
to a "system of different organs each of which has a special 
role, and which are themselves formed of differentiated parts" 
(Durkheim, 1964:181). The division of labor itself is caus-
ally linked with the growth of moral and material density. 
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Not mere population growth alone, but the increased cluster-
ing and interaction of populations are the stimuli which set 
off a complex chain reaction. Viewed historically, the 
material and moral density of society induced a division of 
labor, which produced organized societal types from segmental 
ones and organic solidarity from mechanical solidarity. 
These processes of transition are indicated empirically by 
the concrete changes in legal sanctions from repressive to 
restitutive forms, and the movement from sacred to profane 
collective representations. In highly simplified terms, 
structural differentiation produces movement from a sacred to 
a secular society. 
Unlike modern privatists, Durkheim does not predict 
that the common conscience would disappear under organic sol-
idarity in modern society. As society becomes more hetero-
geneous and differentiated, the common conscience would 
necessarily broaden to include individual differences. Durk-
heim spent a portion of his intellectual life shifting back 
and forth on the issue of moral crisis under organic solidar-
ity. On the one hand, he feared the breakdown of the moral 
community into a state of anomie. On the other, he offered 
solutions to combat anomie and explanations for the persever-
ance of morality. One explanation was the evolution of 
justice in restitutive law. Durkheim presents justice as 
the highest form of morality in organic society with individ-
ualism the last surviving mechanical form. The civil 
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religion which Durkheim envisioned for France was based on a 
combination of justice and rational individualism (Bellah, 
1973:xl-xli). 
Durkheim's model of religious change can be categorized 
as a unilineal model of progressive evolution from sacred to 
profane symbols. The sacred and profane stages are posed as 
polar opposites, with no intermediary stages defined. Al-
though Durkheim clearly associates the sacred to profane 
transition with the process of differentiation, users of the 
model have no clear indicators of the state of sacred beliefs 
at any given point in time, other than through the empirical 
examination of restitutive law and of the sacred belief sys-
tems themselves. Durkheim's model is therefore quite general 
and suffers from lack of specification of independent, depen-
dent, and intervening variables. Durkheim's assumption of 
unilinear differentiation might also be questioned by the 
observers of complex social reality. Nevertheless, Durkheim's 
model stimulated a series of linear theories of religious ev-
olution--most notably the theories of Wach (1962) 1 Parsons 
(1971) 1 and Bellah (1964)--which more clearly specify some of 
the variables suggested by Durkheim 1 and critically re-address 
the assumptions of evolutionary thought. Coleman's (1970) 
theory of civil religious evolution is partially derived from 
Durkheim's general model of cultural and religious evolution. 
Proposition IV's assertion that the differentiation of civil 
religion follows the general pattern of cultural evolution 
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assumes a Durkheimian view of evolution, minus the assumption 
of absolute unilinearity. 
Max Weber 
Weber is well-known for his study of religious change 
in the modern industrial period (Weber, 1948). Weber's con-
cept for the unilinear process of modernization is rational-
ization, a process which has important implications for 
religious systems. Through increasing use of rational bases 
for human social action, the world gradually loses its sacred 
character to causal and efficiency-oriented explanations of 
reality. Rationality refers to the functional rationality in 
which goal attainment is based on utilitarian principles. 
The effect of rationalization on religion is secularization 
or the "desacralization of the world" type (Shiner, 1968:215-
216). In the religious sphere, the trend of progressive 
rationalization is evidenced in the social attitude of "dis-
enchantment." 
Weber's study of the Protestant Ethic is an effort to 
gauge the effects of progressive rationalization in the con-
text of modern Protestantism. In particular, Weber was 
interested in the legitimating function of religion, and how 
that function might be affected by rationalization. Weber's 
conclusions on the Protestant Ethic thesis have been contro-
versial and open to varying interpretations and critiques. 
One commentator, David Little (1970) has made observations 
which have particular relevance to the relationship between 
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rationalization and system of legitimation. According to 
Little's analysis of Weber, rationalization and the rational-
legal type of authority assume increasing institutional dif-
ferentiation and autonomy, in contrast to the institutional 
dominance of the traditional system. Yet, religion always 
serves as a legitimating force, even for the process of ra-
tionalization. 
Wherever the direction of the whole way of life 
has been methodically rationalized, it has been profound-
ly determined by the ultimate values toward which this 
rationalization has been oriented. These values and 
points of view were thus religiously conditioned (Weber, 
1958:286-287). 
Little concludes that Weber found Calvinism and Puritanism to 
be congruent in their support of the capitalist ethos, and 
thus served as legitimating factors. 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
was written to suggest that some of the characteristics 
of the spirit of capitalism are contained in the theolog-
ical symbols and beliefs that could initially solve--or 
at least give some direction to--the crisis of order 
which attends the development of modern industrial soci-
ety (Little, 1970:13). 
Although neither Weber nor Little addresses himself to the 
issue of civil religion, Little's interpretation of Weber's 
theory of modernization is congruent with Coleman's theory of 
civil religious evolution. Both theories predict increasing 
differentiation as the basic evolutionary process. Both the-
ories also state that the crisis of order precipitated by 
differentiation must be addressed by an ultimate system of 
reference. For Coleman, this ultimate system of reference is 
civil religion. 
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Joachim Wach 
Wach's (1944) model of religious change throughout his-
tory contains many descriptive examples of the ways in which 
religious differentiation follows social differentiation. 
The result is somewhat similar to Bellah's (1964) differenti-
ation theory of religious evolution. Typical of Wach's model 
is his outline of three types, or stages, of church-state re-
lationship. In the primitive Stage 1, church and state are 
fused to the point that it is impossible to determine which 
institution dominates. In Stage 2 (comparable to Bellah's 
archaic and historic religions) both politics and cults gain 
strength, leading either to state establishment as a means of 
control over religion or the beginnings of the process of 
eventual church-state separation. In Stage 3 (Bellah's his-
toric, early modern, and modern religions) the state reacts 
to new and competing religions with the same alternatives of 
Stage 2--establishment or pluralism (Wach, 1944:299-302). 
Wach's model does not address the possibilities subsequently 
raised by Coleman (1970) for the variation of church-state 
relations in contemporary societies. Depending upon the lev-
el of institutional differentiation within a society, Coleman 
observes either an undifferentiated form of civil religion 
sponsored by either church or state, secular nationalism, or 
differentiated civil religion within a religiously plural 
context. 
Wach's linear model of religious change is not sophis-
ticated, but it sets the style of future, more elaborate 
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models developed by Parsons (1971) and Bellah (1964). Wach's 
treatment of religious evolution is to be credited for its 
analysis of secularization in terms of the more specific 
processes of social and religious differentiation. In Wach's 
view, it is the differentiation and pluralization of religious 
structures, not secularization, that is the characteristic 
and dominant religious process of the modern age. Proposi-
tion IV, which states that civil religious systems follow 
the same differentiating pattern as other religious systems, 
is a logical extension of Wach's model to the realm of civil 
religion. 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
The works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann on reli-
gion and modernization will be examined together, based on 
their collaboration in the development of the dialectical 
process theory presented in The Social Construction of Real-
ity (1966). The dialectical process theory traces the mech-
anisms by which social forms are "internalized" through 
socialization, "externalized" through social action, and "ob-
jectified" through reification and institutionalization, 
only to be internalized by the subsequent generation. 
Through this ongoing dialectical process social reality (in-
cluding religious reality) is "created." 
Peter Berger (1967) views religion as the human con-
struction of a "sacred cosmos'' (1967:25). During the dialec-
tic stage of objectification, religious constructions are 
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reified and become separated from the individual. When reli-
gious constructions begin to lose their power, due to indus-
trialization, cultural differentiation, or other forces 
inherent in religion itself, secularization emerges in a sim-
ilar dialectical process. Berger views secularization as 
both a societal and individual process. On the social level, 
secularization is the process whereby religions lose their 
legitimating influence over segments of society. This con-
ception of secularization is similar to Shiner's (1968:212-
214) secularization as "disengagement of society from religion." 
Secularization of consciousness refers to the individual loss 
of religious interpretations of the world and of the self. 
Through secularization, religion is no longer a source of a 
binding worldview and moral community but becomes privatized. 
In one sense, secularization (differentiation)· has acted as a 
disorganizing process, but it has also opened up a world of 
many religious and nonreligious modes of potential reorganiza-
tion. 
In a later work, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and 
Consciousness (with Brigitte Berger and Hansfield Kellner, 
1973), Berger specifies in more detail the components of modern 
consciousness and the processes of modernization. Modern 
(secularized) consciousness is indicated by the characteris-
tics of rationality, componentiality, multi-relationality, 
makeability, plurality, and progressivity. (1973:111-113). 
The processes of modernization include the primary processes 
of technological production and bureaucratization 
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(rationalization) , and the secondary processes of urbaniza-
tion, open systems of stratification, mass education, and mass 
communication (differentiation) (1973:103). The major trans-
mission process of rationalization and differentiation is 
cultural diffusion, by which the symbols of modernization are 
envied and copied (1973:139). In The Homeless Mind, Berger 
does not expand beyond his earlier conclusions on the impli-
cations of modernization for religion. Religious alienation 
and privatization continue to be the presumed result of mod-
ernization. Berger does predict the development of a non-
religious ideology, "demodernization consciousness," as the 
dialectical result of the objectification of modernizations. 
Although The Homeless Mind brings little new to the study of 
religious change, Berger's specification of the processes of 
modernization is important for the future use of the dialec-
tic process model for the study of religious evolution. 
Thomas Luckmann (1967) focuses more specifically than 
Berger upon the reorganization potential of secularization 
for religion. Luckmann begins his 1967 analysis by noting 
that the sociology of religion has frequently taken it for 
granted that the church and religion are identical. This 
assumption led to the conclusion that, when modernization 
began to undermine the traditional churches, religion was 
similarly undermined. Luckmann suggests that the study of 
the effects of modernization on existing religious institu-
tions actually obscures the fact that new religious meaning 
systems are being developed (1967:40). 
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Luckmann describes several alternative modes of adapta-
tion to the erosion of traditional religious meanings. The 
individual may alternatively make an individualistic "leap of 
faith" into a personal, religious meaning system; he or she 
may shift back and forth between traditional and secular def-
initions of reality; or he or she may develop an explicitly 
secular value system (1967:86). Church religion is thus one 
surviving organizational form of religion and is not disor-
ganized in the formal organizational sense of the term. Pri-
vate but still religious views of reality are also emerging, 
based (according to Luckmann) on the themes of autonomy, 
self-expression, self-realization, the mobility ethos, sex-
uality, and familism (1967:108-114). These themes are more 
or less identical to those specified by Richard Fenn (1972: 
17) as the only remaining functions of religion in modern 
society. Luckmann is also in agreement with Fenn (1970; 
1972; 1974) in his conclusion that the new, subjective reli-
gious forms are far less cohesive than traditional religious 
forms, and have a low degree of transcendence. The evolu-
tionary perspective is maintained in Luckmann's prediction 
that the religious trends he describes are irreversible by-
products of modern industrialism. 
Neither Berger nor Luckmann specifies stages of reli-
gious evolution associated with stages of modernization. 
Differentiation and its impact on religious construction of 
reality proceeds in an unspecified evolutionary manner, 
marked only by the dialectical process stages of objectification, 
externalization, and internalization. Neither Berger nor 
Luckmann deals explicitly with the functions of religion, 
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but both generally predict a decline of the role of tradi-
tional religion in fostering social integration and legiti-
mation of meaning. Both predict a weakening of traditional 
religious structures, the privatization of religion, and the 
development of multiple sacred and secular ideological choices 
for the modern individual. Although Berger and Luckmann do 
not include civil religion as one of the possible religious 
choices in contemporary society, presumably civil religion 
could provide an alternative mode of adaptation to the ero-
sion of traditional religion. But the fact that neither 
theorist considers civil religion for this purpose suggests 
that privatism does not offer strong support of a theory of 
civil religious evolution. 
Bryan Wilson 
Wilson draws both on Durkheim's assumption of unilin-
ear differentiation and on Weber's process of rationalization 
as bases for a modern theory of secularization which charac-
terizes religion as declining in influence, becoming desac-
ralized, and differentiating from other institutions. With 
the advent of industrialization and technological develop-
ment, the "slow process of change in the thinking of men has 
been steadily to make religious belief and practice . 
difficult for modern man" (Wilson, 1976:12). The result is 
that "traditional theology, church organization, and sacred 
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rituals appear to be fundamentally irreconcilable with the 
values, lifestyles, and functional imperatives of advanced 
industrial society" (Wilson, 1968:73). Sources of the de-
cline of religion are to be found in the processes of differ-
entiation and rationalization, particularly manifest in ''the 
decline of community," "increased social mobility," and 11 the 
impersonality of role relationships" (Wilson, 1976:99). 
Where these processes are observable, particularly in Western 
societies, societal responses include ecumenism, voluntary 
destructuration, incorporation of rationalization, eclectic-
ism, and charismatic renewal (Wilson, 1976:85). These re-
sponses to religious erosion are all viewed as manifestations 
of the overriding process of secularization. Even counter-
secular forces such as religious renewal are characterized as 
merely ephemeral substitutes for declining traditional reli-
gious organizations. 
Although Wilson posits the erosion of religious beliefs 
and institutions along a line of progressive rationalization, 
he is aware of cultural and historical variation in religious 
evolution. The unique feature affecting the American pattern 
of religious evolution has been the structure of denomina-
tional pluralism. Wilson believes that the American pattern 
of interdenominational competition is itself a manifestation 
of religious decline. "That competitiveness itself reflects 
one of the primary secular values of American life." As a 
result, "American churches function as voluntary associations 
and voluntaryism itself may account for their institutional 
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resilience" (Wilson, 1968:77-78). In Wilson's (1968:79) view, 
religious organizations in America function as "surrogate com-
munities based on the will for togetherness," performing emo-
tional functions for individuals, but failing to provide 
sources of societal legitimation and regulation. 
Wilson's theory of the progressive decline of religion 
in modern society has implications for the study of American 
civil religion, although Wilson limits his own analysis to 
denominational religion. Wilson's assumption of unilinear 
religious decline and desacralization leads to a privatistic 
position. Wilson concludes that religious cohesion (and by 
implication, civil religious cohesion) is lost in the ration-
alized, differentiated society. "Modern societies have ceased 
to depend on an integrated consensus of values as the basis 
of cohesion" (Wilson, 1976:113). New religious movements are 
dismissed as too transitory and uninstitutionalized to provide 
new bases of societal integration and legitimacy. The poten-
tial of civil religion to perform these functions is not even 
considered. Application of Wilson's assumptions to American 
civil religion would lead to the conclusion that American 
civil religion, like other religious forms, has declined in in-
fluence. If American civil religion persists at all, it 
would be manifest as nationally self-transcendent folk reli-
gion. 
Wilson's theory is limited by the assumption of unilin-
ear secularization. Once secularization is predicted, all 
observable religious forms are necessarily viewed as eroding, 
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inadequate, or transitory. The persistence of religious sym-
bols and the phenomenen of religious renewal are not adequate-
ly explained. Wilson's assumptions further lead to the 
prediction of a societal crisis. Wilson (1976:114-115) warns 
that "no persisting society can leave people to do their own 
thing" while observing that "we know no moral order to give 
meaning to our social order." If these statements are accu-
rate, presumably modern society no longer exists. Yet there 
is evidence which suggests that modern social orders do per-
sist. Wilson fails to confront this evidence and is drawn 
into a paradox which remains unsatisfactorily answered. This 
paradox could be addressed by recognizing civil religion as a 
potential source of social cohesion and legitimation for mod-
ern society. 
Richard Penn 
Richard Penn's basic assumptions concerning American 
civil religion appear in chapters VI and IX of the present 
study. In a recent work, Toward a Theory of Secularization 
(1978), Penn locates the evolution of civil religion within 
the general context of religious evolution by specifying the 
emergence and subsequent decline of civil religion as one 
stage of secularization (differentiation) . The five steps 
in Penn's theory of secularization are: 
Step 1 Differentiation of religious roles and institu-
tions. 
*Differentiation may be partial, continuing and 
reversible. 
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Step 2 Demand for clarification of boundary between reli-
gious and secular issues. 
*Conflict between religious ethnic groups and the 
larger society. 
Step 3 Development of generalized religious symbols or 
ideology: the "civil religion." 
*Problems of authenticity arise in the political 
use of religious themes. 
Step 4 Minority and idiosyncratic definitions-of-the-
situation: secularized political authority. 
*The dispersion of the sacred. 
Step 5 The separation of individual from corporate life. 
*Religious groups differ in their conceptions of 
the scope of the sacred and in their demands for 
integration of corporate and personal values sys-
tems (Penn, 1978:xvii). 
Penn predicts that civil religion will emerge as a societal 
solution to transcend particularistic ethnic and religious 
identities which might divide society. Civil religion is a 
socially constructed myth, which is more or less believable 
depending upon societal, and particularly political, condi-
tions. The power of civil religion is weakened, for example, 
when ''the state itself departs from the standards of civil 
religion, while continuing to invoke its symbols" thus leav-
ing citizens "caught in a 'double-bind' between dissent and 
loyalty" (Penn, 1978:41). When political or economically 
motivated activity is masked by the symbols of civil reli-
gion, the symbols become tarnished and lose their transcen-
dent and unifying potential. In the final stages of secular-
ization, the state loses its sacred character, while "a 
wider range of personal and social activity comes to acquire 
sacred significance," until the boundary between secular and 
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sacred realms corresponds to the boundary between societal 
and personality systems (Penn, 1978:54). 
Penn (1978:53) acknowledges that his theory of religious 
evolution leads toward a "death of society" position. Unlike 
Wilson, Penn is willing to confront this issue by questioning 
the process by which sociologists infer that a morally based 
social order exists. 
I have also become increasingly skeptical as to 
whether there exists an overarching set of beliefs that 
most Americans hold to be true of God and man, let alone 
true for this nation. References to such a cultural 
whole by social scientists and politicians are forms of 
mystification, in short, ideology. What is it, after all, 
of which individual citizens are a part? What is that 
"society" and where are its boundaries? For what does it 
stand and what are its essential standards (Penn, 1978: 
ix)? 
Although Penn's five steps lead toward the moral dissolution 
of society, the trend is not portrayed as totally unilinear. 
There is dynamic tension between the trend toward desacraliz-
ation of the societal system and the contrary trend of "de-
secularization" in other areas of social life. "As political 
authority becomes secularized various individuals, groups, 
and institutions turn to religious culture for support in 
their increased claims to social authority" (Penn, 1978:55). 
As the state is demythologized, private religious mythologies 
become more demanding and competitive. By recognizing the 
dynamic relationship between secularization and deseculariza-
tion, Penn acknowledges that religious change is a complex 
process manifest through seemingly paradoxical trends and 
countertrends. Penn remains closed, however, to the 
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possibility of desecularization at the societal level leading 
to the renewal of American civil religion. "To establish the 
existence of such a cultural whole inevitably requires a leap 
beyond the data" (Fenn, 1978:51). Although Fenn is only will-
ing to discuss American civil religion in the past tense, the 
fact that he includes civil religion as a critical phase of 
religious evolution is a contribution to the study of the re-
lationship between general religious trends and patterns of 
civil religious evolution. 
David Martin 
In A General Theory of Secularization (1978) David Mar-
tin outlines a series of propositions designed to specify the 
conditions under which religious institutions lose influence 
and religious beliefs become desacralized. The resulting 
theory is more specific and complex than the other theories 
surveyed here, because more than one basic pattern of secu-
larization is proposed. Differentiation is specified as the 
major universal process affecting religious change in modern 
societies. Martin is careful to note that, although universal 
processes may be expected to occur, they are not invariate 
and are subject to influence from a number of cultural fac-
tors. Cultural "frames" through which differentiation flows 
include major historical events, such as the Reformation or 
the American Revolution; the influence of major ideologies, 
such as Calvinism or enlightenment thought; and the relation-
ship between religion and cultural identity (Martin, 1978:4-9). 
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These general cultural frames suggest additional categories 
of variables which Martin isolates as particularly crucial to 
the formation of basic patterns of secularization. Major cat-
egories include: (1) whether the society is Catholic or not; 
(2) whether the religion is monopolistic or not; and (3) 
whether the society has developed through internal conflict 
or conflict against external oppressors (Martin, 1978:17). 
Variations in these categories result in the basic patterns 
of secularization observable in different societies. Al-
though Martin (1978:59) considers as many as eight different 
patterns of secularization, the dominant types are the Anglo-
Saxon, American, French, and Russian patterns, described 
below: 
(1) Anglo-Saxon 
(2) American 
(3) French (or Latin) 
(4) Russian 
Institutional erosion, erosion 
of religious ethos, maintenance 
of amorphous religious beliefs. 
Institutional expansion, erosion 
of religious ethos, maintenance 
of amorphous religious beliefs. 
Massive religious beliefs, ethos 
and institutions confronting mas-
sive secularist beliefs, ethos 
and institutions. 
Massive erosion of religious be-
liefs, ethos and institutions 
but maintenance of the beliefs 
and the ethos within the surviv-
ing religious institutions (Mar-
tin, 1978: 7-8). 
Hartin suggests a number of additional characteristics by 
which the basic patterns can be identified and better under-
stood. Basic patterns of secularization can vary according 
to the degree of anti-clericism, the status of the clergy, 
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the degree of cultic participation, the influence of intel-
lectualism in religion, the extent of democratic or communist 
influence, the existence of religious political parties, and 
the type of civil religion, among other factors (Martin, 1978: 
59) • 
Martin's complex schema can be illustrated by examina-
tion of one of the four major patterns of secularization--
the American case. According to Martin, the American pattern 
of secularization was framed in a pluralistic, Protestant soc-
iety which was strongly shaped in a revolution against foreign 
rule. The result is a society where church and state are dif-
ferentiated, where denominations and sects have proliferated 
and command large memberships, and where religious organiza-
tions play an important role in the sponsorship of charitable 
and welfare endeavors. The clergy, however, lack social power 
and are "assimilated to the concept of rival entrepreneurs 
running varied religious services on a mixed laissez-faire 
and oligopolistic model," and "religious styles constantly 
adapt and accept vulgarization in accordance with the stylis-
tic tendencies of their varied markets" (Martin, 1978:28). 
American religious organizations remain influential on some 
measurements (membership and professed belief) and show de-
cline on others (social power, maintenance of theological 
rigor). Unlike Bryan Wilson, Martin does not portray secular-
ization as an absolute trend. Differentiation, as framed by 
the unique American cultural configuration, has produced a 
mixture of secular and religious forms. Individual response 
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to secularization is also complex. Personal responses to the 
differentiation of ~~erican society include: (1) "apathy 
which retires from explicit institutional religion"; (2) a 
turn to mysticism as a reaction against fragmentation and 
meaninglessness; and (3) a search for functional equivalents 
to religion in the family, community, or commune (Martin, 
1978:93). Within American culture a religious cycle of re-
sponse to differentiation can be detected. 
American religion then comes to operate as a feeder 
system whereby old-fashioned evangelical denominations 
pull in new recruits and pass them on to liberal bodies 
(Glock and Stark, 1968). These then lose members to mys-
tical cults which in turn reassemble behind the Protes-
tant Ethic (Martin, 1978:31). 
Martin's propositions lead to a theory of religious evolution 
in America which incorporates both linear and cyclical change. 
A central feature of the complex pattern of American 
religious evolution as characterized by Martin is the exis-
tence of American civil religion. 
Any characterization of the United States must em-
phasize the fact that it represents a very high degree of 
differentiation in that church is formally separated from 
state, and even religion from school, and yet the overall 
social order is legitimated by a pervasive civil religion 
(Martin, 1978:28). 
Martin views American civil religion as a by-product of the 
American cultural frame of church-state separation, the syn-
thesis of Protestantism and enlightenment thought, and the 
Revolutionary experience of internal cohesion against external 
domination. Like Robert Bellah (1975), Martin locates the 
historical origins of American civil religion in the fusion 
of Puritan and Enlightenment principles of the American 
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founders, 'l.vhich led to the institutionalization of church-
state separation. Because no monopoly religion existed, the 
moral basis of the social order was necessarily derived from 
general values which could overarch particular religious or-
ganizations. 
. . . It is just this explicit separation of church from 
state that enable a pluralistic religion-in-general to 
buttress the higher level legitimations of American soci-
ety .... Such legitimation must, of course, not only be 
general, but vague. They must be above specific denomin-
ations and specific institutional arrangements, whether 
these be religious or secular (Martin, 1978:70). 
In Parsonian terms, differentiation is accompanied by value 
generalization (Parsons, 1971). Martin is aware of both the 
structural strengths and weaknesses of American civil reli-
gion. The fact that the values of American civil religion 
must be highly general to unite a pluralistic society is not 
necessarily a weakness. "If an ideal is sufficiently broad, 
it cannot be compromised by poor political performance and 
corruption, but acts rather as a potent point of moral ap-
peal" (Martin, 1978:70). A typical response to the Watergate 
scandal, for example, was the isolation of Richard Nixon as 
an immoral individual rather than the total condemnation of 
American standards of political morality. Yet, Richard Penn 
(1978) has warned that the symbols of American civil religion 
are vulnerable to manipulation for political and economic 
goals, with loss of public faith a common result. Martin al-
so acknowledges this structural problem, but predicts that, 
if the vision of American civil religion remains future 
oriented, the covenant is less likely to be broken. 
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Of course if an ideal becomes too successful a generation 
may arise which expects it to be realized in the proximate 
future. Then alienation must follow, as for example hap-
pened in the 1960s. Broad religious legitimations encoun-
ter a limit because their promises must either remain in 
the long-term future or be compromised by contemporary 
performance (Martin, 1978:70). 
Martin's portrayal of American civil religion recalls Bellah's 
(1975) image of the broken covenant. American civil religion 
is seen as constituting a generalized system of national le-
gitimation, cohesion, and prophecy, which under specific con-
ditions can fail at one or all of these areas of performance. 
Variations in the performance of American civil religion are 
not automatically viewed by Martin as evidence of the death 
of American society. 
Martin's theory of religious evolution begins where 
many of the other theories cited in this chapter tend to end: 
with the processes of differentiation and rationalization in 
modern society. Instead of assuming that these modern trends 
proceed invariably to a universal decline of religion, Martin 
seeks sources of cultural variation which significantly shape 
religious change. Martin provides a theoretical framework by 
which variations in religious evolution may be studied empir-
ically. Martin's approach differs from that of unilinear 
theorists such as Bryan Wilson, who tend to interpret all be-
havior as manifestations of secularization once seculariza-
tion has been assumed. 
Martin's theory, however, has its own limitations. 
Some of his variables overlap with one another; he is unclear 
about the number of basic patterns of secularization to be 
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specifiedi and he fails to distinguish independent from depen-
dent variables clearly. Despite these limitations, Martin 
has developed a general theory of religious change which can 
account for a variety of cross-cultural religious patterns, 
as well as the specific patterns of religious evolution with-
in a single society. When Martin's theory is applied to the 
United States, a number of religious and "secular" phenomena 
are revealed, including the presence of American civil reli-
gion. American civil religion is portrayed as the religious 
symbol system of the nation subject to the same evolutionary 
influences and shaped by the same cultural frame as other 
American religious forms. By viewing civil religion as one 
variable in the context of religious change, r1artin contrib-
utes perspective both to the study of religious evolution and 
to the study of American civil religion. 
Evaluation of the Theories of 
Religious Evolution 
Among the theories of religious change which have been 
considered in this chapter and also in chapter V, religious 
evolution has been variously conceived of as occurring uni-
linearly between two discrete poles (Durkheim) , along the 
progressive line of rationalization (Weber and Wilson) , alona 
a continuum of cultural and religious differentiation (Par-
sons, Wach, Fenn, Bellah, and Coleman), in a dialectical pro-
cess of social reality construction (Berger and Luckmann), 
and as a complex combination of linear and cyclical processes 
within cultural frames (Martin). S. N. Eisenstadt (1964:375) 
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notes that two critical stumbling blocks for evolutionary 
models have been: (1) the assumption of linearity, and (2) 
failure to fully specify the systemic characteristics of 
major developmental stages. The models of Durkheim, Weber, 
Wach, Parsons, and Wilson are all limited, in differing de-
grees, by the stumbling block of assumed linearity. Among 
the linear theorists, only Bellah and Coleman are careful to 
note that their models are not dependent upon the absolute 
linearity of differentiation. Like Eisenstadt, Bellah (1964: 
358) and Coleman (1970:76) are willing to foresee stagnation 
and breakdown as potential outcomes of evolution. Martin's 
model, which accounts for both linear and dialectical trends, 
does not assume that universal trends such as differentiation 
always occur (Martin, 1978:3). The dialectical model of Ber-
ger and Luckmann has been included for discussion primarily 
because it does not maintain a linear perspective. 
The models of Durkheim, Weber, Wach, Berger and Luckmann, 
Wilson, and Fenn are also limited by their failure to specify 
the defining systemic characteristics of evolutionary stages. 
Parsons is the most explicit in elaborating the variables of 
cultural change and the historical details of each evolution-
ary period. Bellah and Coleman focus upon only one of Par-
sons's change variables--differentiation--but present a more 
systematic explanation of the characteristics of religious 
organizations and their symbol systems at each stage of reli-
gious or civil religious development. Martin presents defin-
ing categories for the basic patterns of secularization 
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without reliance on an explicitly historical evolutionary 
sequence. Of the two criteria for useful evolutionary models 
noted by Eisenstadt, avoidance of rigid linear assumptions 
and specification of systemic characteristics, Bellah's model 
of religious evolution, Martin's model of secularization, and 
Coleman's model of civil religious evolution meet both criter-
ia. 
The models of Durkheim, Weber, and Wach serve as intel-
lectual predecessors of the Parsonian evolutionary model, 
elaborated and adapted by Bellah and Coleman. The classic 
theories of religious change advanced by Durkheim, Weber, and 
Wach are highly congruent with Coleman's model of civil reli-
gious change, stated in Propositions I through IV. Proposi-
tions I through IV, and Proposition IV in particular, pro-
pose nothing radically new for the sociology of religion 
beyond inclusion of the concept of civil religious evolution 
as an aspect of religious evolution under the specific condi-
tions of social differentiation and religious pluralism. 
Additional variables and cultural configurations affecting 
civil religion are suggested by Martin's contemporary secu-
larization theory. The Berger and Luckmann dialectic model 
does not directly contradict Propositions I through IV, but 
neither does it provide a supportive framework. Berger and 
Luckmann take a privatistic position, similar to that of 
Bryan Wilson and Richard Fenn, which foresees traditional re-
ligious systems losing significance for modern society. 
Neither Berger and Luckrnann, Wilson, nor Fenn would predict 
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the renewal of any overarching religious symbol system, in-
cluding civil religion, in modern societies. Privatism has 
no place for Proposition I, which affirms the existence of 
American civil religion. It is concluded that the four basic 
propositions concerning American civil religion receive their 
greatest support from Durkheimian and Parsonian evolutionary 
thought, and the least support from modern privatism. The 
contemporary theories which offer the strongest conceptual 
framework for the study of civil religion are the theories 
of Bellah, Martin, and Coleman. 
CHAPTER XII 
THE M1ERICAN CASE 
John Coleman (1970), as we have seen, has proposed 
three types of civil religion in modern societies: (1) con-
tinued undifferentiated civil religion, either church spon-
sored or state sponsored; (2) secular nationalism; and (3) 
differentiated civil religion. Church-sponsored civil reli-
gion is observable when an established religious tradition 
provides the context for sacred civic symbols, as in the case 
of the Khomeini government of Iran. State-sponsored civil 
religion, exemplified by Restoration Japan, may be observed 
when the political system institutes a self-transcendent 
cultus. Secular nationalism, a functional alternative to 
civil religion typified by the U.S.S.R. arises when a histor-
ical religious tradition is associated with a pre-revolution-
ary government and cannot serve as a symbol of a modernizing 
revolutionary state. Coleman believes that the third type of 
civil religion, differentiated civil religion, is observable 
only in the United States. In a highly differentiated soci-
ety like the United States, civil religion tends to follow 
the pattern of differentiation and move away from either po-
litical or religious sponsorship. And in a religiously 
plural society like that of the United States, there is no 
need for the functions of civil religion to be performed by 
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a secular v~rsion of nationalism. The historical strength of 
the American religious tradition, combined with the absence 
of religious establishment, set the stage for the differen-
tiation of a religiously oriented but non-church-sponsored 
civil religious system. The two specific conditions assoc-
iated with the rise of differentiated civil religion are 
institutional differentiation and religious pluralism. 
In part III of the present study, theory and research 
have been cited to support the thesis of a differentiated 
civil religion in the United States. Most significant are 
Wimberly's (1976) empirical findings that a measurable, 
civil religious dimension of belief is distinguishable from 
either religious or political belief systems. Coleman's 
theory and Proposition IV would predict that Wimberly's find-
ings of a differentiated civil religion are unique to the 
United States. Cross-cultural empirical research by Cole 
and Hammond (1974) points to a similar conclusion. It is 
Hammond's (1974) thesis that in modern, religiously plural 
societies, the function of societal conflict resolution 
moves away from the domain of traditional religion and comes 
under the control of legal institutions. The legal struc-
tures of modern society become the new source of moral inte-
gration. In Hammond's research with Cole, the following 
argument is tested: 
. . . (1) The condition of religious pluralism creates 
special problems for social interaction; (2) social in-
teraction in such situations is facilitated by a 
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universalistic legal system; (3) a universalistic legal 
system may, therefore, be elevated to the sacred realm 
(Cole and Hammond, 1974:187). 
The major variables, examined for ninety-two nations, were 
religious pluralism, societal complexity, and legal develop-
ment. Religious pluralism, measured by the number of reli-
gious groups comprising at least 2 percent of a society's 
population, was expected to be related to the level of soci-
ety complexity, measured by indicators of levels of communi-
cation, technology, bureaucratic organization, and money and 
market complex. Both pluralism and societal complexity were 
expected to be related to degree of legal development, mea-
sured by the extent of legal repression. Evidence of repres-
sion signified that legal development was low, while absence 
of repressive laws indicated a higher level of legal develop-
ment (Cole and Hammond, 1974:181-183). Analysis of data found 
support for the hypothesized inverse relationship between 
legal development and societal complexity. Although religious 
pluralism itself is a type of societal complexity, it was ex-
pected and found to have an inhibiting effect on "secular" or 
economic indicators of complexity. Analysis of data also in-
dicated a positive relationship between legal development and 
societal complexity. Societies with the highest levels of 
legal development were the most complex. Additionally, data 
revealed that, as religious pluralism increases, the positive 
association between societal complexity and legal development 
also increases. Figure 8 illustrates the findings. Substi-
tuting the terms used in Propositions I through IV for the 
SOCIETAL 
COMPLEXITY 
/ 
RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM 
+ LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Fig. 8. Relationship between Religious Pluralism, 
Societal Complexity, and Legal Development 
(Cole and Hammond, 1974) 
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terms used by Cole and Hammond, their results could be dia-
gramed as they appear in figure 9. Figure 9 leaves the direc-
tion of the relationship between religious pluralism and 
institutional differentiation unspecified, as Cole and 
Hammond's data on this relationship are questionable. 
Cole and Hammond are not reluctant to apply their find-
ings to the issue of civil religious development. 
The question that arises is to what civil religious 
implications there may be in the role played by legal in-
stitutions in a religiously plural society. It can be 
ventured that if people experience conflict, they attempt 
to resolve it. . . . It is here that the law may be turned 
to, especially to the degree that it is "universalistic," 
thus overriding whatever parochial conditions have stood 
in the way .... But if ... the agencies of this legal 
order use the language and imagery of purpose and destiny, 
if they not only resolve differences but also justify 
their resolution, it is easy to see how someth1ng ldenti-
fiable as civil religion could emerge (Cole and Hammond, 
1974:186) .• 
Cole and Hammond suggest that, in a religiously plural soci-
ety, conflict can be generated through a clash of religious 
meaning systems. If the conflict is to be resolved, some 
overarching system of meaning must develop which can integrate 
the conflicting systems. If this overarching system of inte-
gration, the legal system, adopts universal language and acts 
to legitimate behavior as well as to resolve conflict, it 
constitutes a system of civil religion. Cole and Hammond 
expect most plural, complex, and legally developed nations 
to feature civil religious orientations in their legal sys-
terns. The United States, although not included in the sample 
of nations, is singled out as the society most likely to ex-
hibit civil religious symbols in its legal order. 
INSTITUTIONAL 
DIFFERENTIATION 
/ 
RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM 
+ DIFFERENTIATED 
CIVIL RELIGION 
Fig. 9. Hypothesized Relationship between Religious 
Pluralism, Institutional Differentiation, and 
Differentiated Civil Religion 
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Certainly central to the alleged American civil re-
ligion is the notion of ''fair play" (see Bellah, 1967) . 
. The legal order has institutionalized this ideal as 
the doctrine of due process, and thus it is in the legal 
arena that fair play is most often celebrated. Such a 
process, we think, illustrates our contention that the 
legal order may take on erstwhile religious duties. Hore 
than this, insofar as the notion of due process is not an 
isolated cultural item but part of a coherent ideology 
with its accompanying institutional arrangements, we may 
speak of this "package~ as a civil religion (Cole and 
Hammond, 1974:187). 
Other nations found to rank high in societal complexity, reli-
gious pluralism, and legal development (e.g., Bulgaria, May-
ala, The Philippines, and Trinidad) are treated as developing 
nations whose level of civil religious development should be 
reflected in their legal systems. Cole and Hammond do not 
consider their findings to be conclusive but suggest that 
civil religious development is a cross-culturally observable 
evolutionary phenomenon related to other indices of societal 
development. The clearest indicator of civil religious de-
velopment today may be found in the legal system of the soci-
eties under study. 
American Civil Religion and the 
Jud1c1al System 
The results of Cole and Hammond's study point to legal 
systems as institutional carriers of civil religion. Although 
in all societies the legal order is an arm of the state, in 
the United States the governmental structure of checks and 
balances results in a judicial system which is semi-autonomous 
from legislative and executive branches. Officials in the 
judicial system are appointed by executives to rule on laws 
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enacted by legislators, but judicial officials also have the 
power to declare laws unconstitutional and to judge elected 
officials for legal offenses. To the extent that the judi-
cial system can override decisions made in other governmental 
systems, the judicial system may be seen as partially differ-
entiated from other branches of the state. In the United 
States the judiciary has the autonomy to take a prophetic 
stance with regard to other political and social institutions. 
Phillip Hammond hypothesizes that the American system 
of religious pluralism is the key variable which contributed 
to the expansion of judicial influence in the United States. 
In a religiously plural society, the judiciary is required to 
maintain order and develop universally acceptable explanations 
for legal decisions. With the expansion of the judicial sys-
tem, "the judiciary has adapted the task of articulating the 
collective moral architecture" (Hammond, 1974:129). Hammond 
cites several United States Supreme Court cases which illus-
trate the "developing rhetoric'' of civil religion as revealed 
through the judicial system. The cases cited by Hammond all 
concern issues of church-state separation, a major legal 
arena whereby the society's "commitment to religious liberty 
(pluralism) makes impossible the documents (precedents, rhet-
oric) of any ~ religious tradition; so a new religion is 
found" (Hammond, 1974:133). 
In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
226 (1892), the "moral architecture" constructed by the Court 
reflected the Protestant civic piety of the nineteenth century. 
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The Court held that a law prohibiting the importation of 
aliens for labor did not prevent a church from hiring a for-
eign minister. The Court affirmed that ''we are a Christian 
people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted 
upon Christianity" (quoted in Hammond, 1974:130). By the 
time of United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), the 
Court had developed a separationist position with regard to 
church and state. The Court was asked to decide if citizen-
ship should be denied to a person unwilling to fight in the 
nation's defense. Although the Court acknowledged the right 
of freedom of religious belief, it held that the nation's 
goal of survival was primary. Citizenship was denied, justi-
fied by the ultimate objective of national survival. In two 
subsequent conscientious objector cases, United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163· (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333 (1970), the Court broadened the concept of religious 
belief to include views other than orthodox monotheistic be-
liefs. Both Seeger and Welsh were granted conscientious ob-
jector status on the basis of "moral, ethical or religious 
beliefs about what is right or wrong" (quoted in Hammond, 
1974:131). The Welsh decision affirmed that in a religiously 
plural society an individual's own perception of his beliefs 
as religious was of prime importance in the Court's recogni-
tion of them as religious. With the Seeger and Welsh deci-
sions, "'religion' for legal purposes becomes simply 'con-
science'" (Hammond, 1974:132). The multiplication of reli-
gious definitions within society required the Supreme Court 
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to redefine religion in a way to reduce religious conflict 
and foster social integration. The authority to make deci-
sions on issues of ultimacy as they affect the nation illus-
trates Hammond's thesis that the courts are the architects 
of "common religion 11 or "civil religion" (Hammond, 1974:133-
134) . 
Legal scholar Robert McCloskey (1972) agrees with 
Hammond that both the structure and ethical influence of the 
United States Supreme Court have expanded in the past forty 
years, beginning with the period of the Stone Court (1940-
1945) established after the New Deal. The majority of major 
Court decisions res~ricting the role of religion in the public 
schools (see figure 7 of the present study) occurred during 
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Americans have learned to ex-
pect the Court to perform the dual functions of interpreting 
and applying the law fairly and ethically to the issue under 
consideration. "America does expect the Court to be both 
courtlike and statesmanlike, a law-finding and a value-judging 
agency, and the modern Court has enthusiastically endorsed 
that dual conception of its duty" (HcCloskey, 1972:294). The 
expectation for ethical judgements by the Court does not imply 
that all Americans agree with the ethical outcomes of judicial 
decisions, or that all Americans even support the judiciary's 
right to render such decisions. Public protest of the Engle 
(1962) and Schempp (1963) decisions declaring public school-
sponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading unconstitutional 
was widespread (see pp. 169-170 of this volume). Segments of 
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the public were also outraged at the desegregation decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Gold-
stein v. Collin, 99 U.S. 277 (1976), in which the Court ruled 
that an American Nazi group could demonstrate publicly in a 
community with a large Jewish population, is a recent example 
of a judicial decision which aroused public criticism on a 
national scale. McCloskey suggests that public reaction to a 
judicial decision is often confused due to the failure to dis-
tinguish between the functions of the courts. 
I suggest that our evaluation of a Supreme Court 
decision--or of a whole line of judicial conduct--ordin-
arily depends on one or more of three different judgement 
components: the question of what have been called above 
historical-technical standards, the question of power, 
and the question of value. In other words, in criticiz-
ing a judicial action we say that the Court has misread 
the Constitution, or that it has overtaxed its power cap-
abilities, or that it has chosen the wrong ethical solu-
tion (McCloskey, 1972:292). 
The very fact that judicial decisions are often unpopular 
with the public suggests that the ethical function of the 
judiciary becomes at times a prophetic expression of the val-
ues of American civil religion. Martin Shapiro provides some 
general examples of the prophetic stance historically assumed 
by the Supreme Court. 
In the last analysis there is something compelling 
about an institution that can say with authority that the 
south may not preserve slavery any longer, that one man's 
vote is not to be worth seventeen times that of another, 
that the police too must obey the law, that the poor and 
ignorant are entitled to the same legal protection as the 
rich and educated, that one man may not tell another man 
what he may not read or what he must pray. The ability 
of the Court to say these things, not on the basis that 
they would help us achieve more than the Russians or 
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soothe powerful and demanding social interests, but be-
cause they were somehow right, returns us to the myster-
ious (quoted in McCloskey, 1972:vi). 
There are numerous subjects of modern Court decision 
which illustrate the civil religious functions of the judici-
ary. The separation of church and state issue explored by 
Hammond (1974) and the issue of religion in the public 
schools, discussed in chapter X of this volume, both directly 
address the society's role with regard to multiple definitions 
of ultimate reality. The civil rights decisions, such as 
Brown, evoked the ethical principle of fairness while inter-
preting the law to protect the rights of minority citizens. 
Less obvious in their civil religious implications, but rele-
vant nonetheless, are numerous other judicial decisions con-
cerned with the civil religious values of individual freedom 
and social equality. A recent illustrative example is the 
United States Supreme Court decision on the death penalty in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
Furman concerned two ethical issues: the right of the 
state to impose the death penalty and the equal application 
of punishment. The three defendants in the case, who had re-
ceived death sentences, appealed their cases to the Supreme 
Court arguing that the death penalty constituted "cruel and 
unusual punishment" and therefore violated the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. The Court refused to rule that cap-
ital punishment per se is cruel and unusual. The Court did 
rule that the death penalty was unconstitutional in these 
three cases because its imposition constituted racial 
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discrimination. The Court left the way open for states to 
develop nondiscriminatory capital punishment laws to be ap-
plied fairly and uniformly. In Furman the Court sidestepped 
the issue of the morality of capital punishment itself to 
address another moral issue: social inequality. The Court 
noted that the death penalty was rarely invoked, and, that 
when imposed, was carried out primarily on blacks or members 
of other minority groups. Justice Brennan, concurring with 
the Furman decision, noted that "when the punishment of death 
is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is le-
gally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it 
is being inflicted arbitrarily" (Furman v. Georgia, 1972:239). 
Justice Marshall, noting that capital punishment was inflict-
ed more often upon blacks compared to whites, more upon men 
compared to women, and more upon the poor compared to other 
economic classes, made a prophetic call for legislative 
change. "So long as capital sanction is used only against 
the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators 
are content to maintain the status quo, because change would 
draw attention to the problem and concern might develop" (Fur-
man v. Georgia, 1972:365-366). 
The morality of capital punishment itself was a secon-
dary issue in Furman. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opin-
ion, attempted to define "cruel and unusual" punishment. 
Brennan states that the Court cannot define "cruel and unus-
ual" punishment in general, but must instead decide each case 
of punishment to determine if it is cruel and unusual. 
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Constitutional guidelines for evaluation of punishment are 
based on three fundamental principles: that (1) 11 even the 
vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common dig-
nity"; (2) "the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe 
punishment"; and ( 3) "a severe puni.shment must not be unaccept-
able to contemporary society" (Furman v. Georgia, 1972:272-
286) . The civil religious nature of the three principles is 
self-evident, as the principles directly concern the American 
civil religious values of human dignity and social equality. 
The final guiding principle of the Court evaluates the society 
and its moral consensus as the final arbitrator of the life or 
death of its citizens. Subsequently, in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 
s. Ct. 2909 (1976), the Court went a step beyond Furman to 
decide that capital punishment is not invariably unconstitu-
tional, leaving the way open for state legislators to develop 
acceptable death penalty statutes. The Furman and Gregg deci-
sions demonstrate the Supreme Court's active role in construct-
ing the moral architecture of the nation. 
Several examples have been selected from United States 
Supreme Court cases to illustrate Hammond's (1974) thesis 
that interpretation of the law has civil religious implica-
tions. The judicial decisions chosen as examples are by no 
means randomly selected. 
could be found. However, 
Contrary decisions on similar issues 
the direction of judicial decisions, 
or the popularity of such decisions, are irrelevant to their 
consideration as civil religious. Whether the courts rule 
that capital punishment is or is not unconstitutional, the 
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courts are addressing an ethical issue with ultimate implica-
tions for state and citizen. In the United States, the judi-
cial system is in a unique position with regard to the legit-
imation of civil religious values. The rhetoric of American 
civil religion can be found outside the courtroom, in politi-
cians' speeches or clergymen's sermons, but nowhere except 
inside the courtroom does the rhetoric of American civil re-
ligion have such binding moral and legal force. Hammond 
questions the relationship between the generalized American 
civil religion espoused in other social institutions, com-
pared to the more particularistic moral architecture construct-
ed by the courts. 
What is not so clear yet are the connections between the 
civil religion as theology and the parallel civil reli-
gion as moral architecture. · How does "God," as portrayed 
in Presidential speech, relate to "due process," as por-
trayed in Supreme Court opinion (Hammond, 1974:155)? 
An answer to Hammond's question is suggested by Propositions 
I through IV and Coleman's thesis of a differentiated civil 
religion in the United States. If American civil religion is 
particularly formulated and legitimated by the judicial sys-
tern in the United States, then American civil religion is not 
entirely differentiated from the state, but is semi-differen-
tiated to the extent that the judiciary is itself semi-differ-
entiated from other governmental institutions. Further exam-
ination of the role performed by the American judicial system 
is recommended in conjunction with study of the evolution of 
American civil religion. 
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Conclusion 
Coleman (1970) proposes that under conditions of insti-
tutional differentiation and religious pluralism, a differ-
entiated form of civil religion will develop. Cole and Ham-
mond (1974) present cross-cultural data which suggest that 
the conditions necessary for the development of civil religion 
are the absence of a universally established religion, reli-
gious pluralism, and high levels of societal and legal com-
plexity. The United States is a society which meets these 
criteria, and therefore one in which differentiated civil re-
ligion would be expected to develop. Cole and Hammond predict 
that the conflict resolution function of a society's legal 
system will serve as an important indicator of the differen-
tiation of civil religion. Examination of the American legal 
system, particularly the judiciary, reveals numerous examples 
of conflict resolution legitimated by what Bellah (1975) de-
fines as civil religious ideals. Data cited in preceding 
chapters (part III) suggest that, although American civil re-
ligion is differentiated from other American institutions, 
highly generalized civil religious symbols are found in many 
American institutions and are embodied in the personal belief 
systems of many citizens. If Hammond's thesis is correct, 
the most value-specific source of American civil religion is 
the judicial system, where Hammond believes the "not-so-
elementary forms" of American civil religion reside today 
(Hammond, 1974:135). 
CHAPTER XIII 
CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 
In the preceding chapter, Coleman's theory of the evol-
ution of civil religion was applied to the Unitd States, the 
society most likely to demonstrate evidence of a differenti-
ated civil religion. But what of other modern societies? 
If the development of civil religion follows the lines of 
cultural evolution as stated in Proposition IV, differentiated 
civil religion could be expected in other differentiated.soci-
eties. An additional variable intervenes in the evolution 
of civil religion, however: the history of church-state re-
lations in the given society. According to Coleman's hypoth-
esis, a society can be differentiated but lacking differenti-
ated civil religion if it lacks a tradition of church-state 
separation. Great Britain, for example, is a differentiated 
society culturally similar to the United States. Yet, the 
British traditions of an established church and the divine 
right of kings are manifest today in the retention of a 
church-sponsored civil religion. State Shinto in Restoration 
Japan represents Coleman's other type of continued undiffer-
entiated civil religion: state-sponsored civil religion. 
The modern U.S.S.R. illustrates the secular alternative to 
civil religion, secular nationalism. The cases of modern 
Great Britain, Restoration Japan, and the U.S.S.R. will be 
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examined as examples of the variation in civil religious ev-
elution in modern and modernizing societies. 
Coleman (1970:70) states that the absence of civil re-
ligion should not be assumed merely because a differentiated 
system of civil religion has not appeared within a society. 
In the absence of differentiated civil religion, the functions 
of civil religion may be performed either by a church-span-
sored or a state-sponsored type. 
Church-Sponsored Civil Religion: 
Modern Great Britain 
Civil religion is church-sponsored when an established 
religious tradition within the society provides the context 
• for sacred civic symbols. Although there are ample examples 
of church-sponsored civil religion in the non-Christian world 
(e.g., modern Israel and the Islamic, Khomeini government of 
Iran), in Great Britain it is historical Christianity which 
sponsors the symbols of civil religion. The "civil religious 
concepts of the sacredness of the monarchical form of govern-
ment in the divine right of kings" and "the notion of the 
manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon nations in the unfolding 
providence of world history" are British traditions (Coleman, 
1970:70). In modern Britain, the monarchy retains little 
overt political influence, but the ceremonial influence of 
the monarchy is still pronounced. In a symbolic study of the 
British Coronation Service, Edward Shils and Michael Young 
(1953) present a description of the civil religious functions 
retained by the modern British monarchy. 
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Shils and Young (1953:65) base their study of the Brit-
ish Coronation Service on the assumption of the existence of 
a "general moral consensus of society" founded upon the stan-
dards and beliefs of societal members. Common consensual 
standards in Western societies include generosity, charity, 
loyalty, justice, respect for authority, dignity of the indi-
vidual, and the right to individual freedom. These consen-
sual moral values "restrain men's egotism" and "enable soci-
ety to hold itself together" (Shils and Young, 1953:65). The 
general moral consensus referred to by Shils and Young can be 
recognized as Bellah's (1976a) concept of creneral civil reli-
gion, which provides the religious discipline necessary for 
responsible moral citizenship and an integrated society. 
The special expression of moral consensus, or general civil 
religion, occurs during occasions of national celebration. 
Ceremonial occasions are important events in a society's life 
during which societal mores are ritually affirmed and renewed. 
Shils and Young (1953:67) contend that in British society 
"the Coronation Service itself is a series of ritual affirma-
tions of the moral values necessary to a well-governed and 
good society." Shils and Young present a symbolic analysis 
of the Coronation Service itself, and of the public partici-
pation in this civil religious celebration. 
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The British Coronation Service 
The central symbol of the service is the monarch's vow 
to abide by the moral standards of the society. Each portion 
of the service reaffirms the monarch's obedience to God and 
to the Church of England. 
The recognition 
The presentation of the monarch to the assembly by the 
Archbishop signifies Church sponsorship of monarchical author-
ity. "When the Archbishop presents the Queen to the four 
sides of the 'theatre,' he is asking the assembly· to reaffirm 
their allegiance to her not so much as an individual as the 
incumbent of an office of authority" (Shils and Young, 1953: 
68) . 
The oath 
On taking the oath of office, the monarch promises to 
govern all British subjects in accordance with the laws of 
state and the laws of God. By doing this, the monarch acknowl-
edges "the superiority of the transcendent moral standards 
and their divine source, and therewith the sacred character 
of the moral standards of British society" (Shils and Young, 
1953:68). 
Presenting the Holy Bible 
The Bible presented to the monarch symbolizes God's law 
and will, which are to continually inspire the monarch's pub-
lic decisions. "The Bible is the vessel of God's intention, 
a source of continuous inspiration in the moral regulation 
of society" (Shils and Young, 1953:69). 
The anointing 
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The Archbishop anoints the monarch with oil, a symbolic 
act which sanctifies her assumption of office. The anointing 
continues a tradition which began with the anointing of King 
Solomon, and has continued for all British rulers. After the 
anointing, the monarch "shows her submission before the Arch-
bishop as God's agent, kneeling before him while he implores 
God to bless her" (Shils and Young, 1953:69). 
Presentina the sword and the orb 
The sword presented to the monarch symbolizes the power 
to enforce social order. The sword is a dual symbol of author-
ity and potential destruction to any who would disrupt society. 
Throughout the remainder of the ceremony, the sword is carried 
unsheathed in front of the monarch, to remind subjects of 
"the protection which a good authority can offer them when 
they themselves adhere to the moral law, and of the wrathful 
punishment which will follow their deviation" (Shils and Young, 
1953:70). The monarch is next given bracelets of sincerity 
and wisdom and robed. These actions symbolize the transfor-
mation of a private individual into a public head of state. 
Once transformed, the monarch is invested with a sacred orb, 
symbolic of "the wider sphere of her power and of the respon-
sibilities for its moral use" (Shils and Young, 1953:70). 
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The Benediction 
The duties of subjects are featured in the Archbishop's 
Benediction which asks God to give the monarch "'wise counsel-
lors and upright magistrates; leaders of integrity in learn-
ing and labor; a devout, learned, and useful clergy; honest, 
peaceable, and dutiful citizens'" (quoted in Shils and Young, 
1953:70). The monarch is admonished to obey God, and her sub-
jects are in turn commanded to obey her. 
Shils and Young's analysis of the Coronation Service 
reveals a central theme of church sponsorship of civil reli-
gious symbols. The Archbishop of the Church of England, as 
God's representative, invests the new ruler with authority. 
The religious investiture of political authority aptly illus-
trates Coleman's concept of church-sponsored civil religion. 
According to Shils and Young, the significance of church-
sponsored civic rituals has not disappeared in the modern era. 
For example, the last Coronation Service and Procession were 
"shared and celebrated by nearly all the people in Britain" 
in "a great nation-wide communion" (Shils and Young, 1953: 
70-71). The celebration was widely exposed on radio, tele-
vision, and in magazines and newspaper accounts. Along with 
the many explanations offered for the popularity of the Cor-
onation (e.g., commercialization and the British love of cere-
mony), Shils and Young (1953:71) suggest that public interest 
was motivated primarily by desire for "communion with the 
sacred." Just as the Coronation Service was a religious 
event, public involvement also took on aspects of religious 
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ritual. Gift giving, a typical feature of many religious 
celebrations, was evident in several manifestations. Many 
subjects sent gifts to the Queen, community organizations 
gave gifts to children and the elderly, and many people cele-
brated the occasion by giving gifts within their own fa~ilies. 
Shils and Young (1953:74) compare the public festivities to 
an orgy in the sense that orgiastic expression commonly fol-
lows a religious experience. 
Shils and Young's observations also reveal examples of 
the civil religious function performed by the Coronation. 
The Coronation Service is a socially integrating ceremony. 
Public participation in the last Coronation went beyond the 
level of individual entertainment to become a collective 
affirmation of societal unity. Family unity, symbolized by 
devotion to the Royal Family, was also fostered by involve-
ment in the Coronation. 
The Coronation, much like Christmas, was a time 
for drawing closer the bonds of the family, for reassert-
ing its solidarity and for re-emphasizing the values of 
the family--generosity, loyalty, love--which are at the 
same time the fundamental values necessary for the well-
belng of the larger society (Shils and Young, 1953:73). 
But family solidarity was not reinforced at the expense of 
national unity. "On this occasion one family was knit to-
gether with another in one great national family through 
identification with the monarchy" (Shils and Young, 1953:76). 
Shils and Young believe that even class divisions were at 
low ebb during the time of the last Coronation. They observe 
that a "degree of moral consensus" has developed in the 
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various classes in modern Britain, along with a 11 decline in 
the hostility of the British working and middle classes 
towards the symbols of the society as a whole and towards the 
authorities vested with those symbols .. (Shils and Young, 1953: 
76). Class accommodation is not attributed to the Coronation, 
but the accommodation observed during the Coronation is con-
sidered symptomatic of the integrative power of British church-
sponsored civil religion. 
The monarchy is one pervasive institution, standing above 
all others, which plays a part in a vital way comparable 
to the function of the medieval church . . . --the func-
tion of integrating diverse elements into a whole (Shils 
and Young, 1953:79). 
Shils and Young's analysis of the Coronation's integrative 
function minimizes genuine sources of societal conflict which 
may not have been evident at the particular time of the Cor-
onation Service. Shils and Young's treatment of British 
church-sponsored civil religion lacks Bellah's (1975) concept 
of the 11 broken covenant"--a civil religion which can both uni-
fy and divide society. 
Shils and Young cite several examples of the British 
monarchy's capacity to legitimate other social institutions. 
Military organizations, in particular, have ceremonial ties 
to the Crown. Other organizations with royal sponsorship in-
elude a multiplicity of voluntary associations, such as the 
Royal Society and numerous educational and medical facilities 
(e.g., St. Mary's Hospital and the University of London). 
Sponsorship by the monarchy endows each sponsored organization 
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with a sort of charisma binding each organization to the 
structure of the societal moral system. 
Every corporate body which has some connection with 
the sacred properties, the charisma, of the Crown thereby 
has infused into it a reminder of the moral obligations 
which extend beyond its own corporate boundaries. It is 
tied, so to speak, to the central value system of the so-
ciety as a whole through its relationship with Royalty 
(Shils and Young, 1953:79). 
It is not only institutions which are both defined and inte-
grated by the monarchy. Monarchical charisma can extend to 
individual subjects, especially during times of ritual cele-
bration. On the day of the Coronation Service, crowds waited 
patiently in the rain for some glimpse of the Queen, "waiting 
to enter into contact with the mighty powers who are symbol-
ically, and to some extent, really responsible for the care 
and protection of their basic values 11 (Shils and Young, 1953: 
75). The legitimacy of the British monarch's authority is 
derived from a transcendent authority. Each ritual of the 
Coronation Service is designed to symbolize the monarch's 
obedience to a higher power. When the Queen kneels before 
the Archbishop, for example, she indicates submission to 
God's higher authority. The sword presented to the monarch 
is the symbol of God's prophetic judgement, to be enacted 
through the Crown, against any violator of society's laws. 
Under Shils and Young's examination, the Coronation Service 
reveals rich imagery concerning the integrative, legitimating, 
and prophetic functions of the modern British monarchy. 
Shils and Young's analysis of the British Coronation 
clearly illustrates the form by which church-sponsored civil 
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religion can survive the modernization of a society. In the 
British case, the constitutional monarchy is recognized as 
the symbolic authority of the society, and this symbolic 
authority is clearly derived from the historic sponsorship 
of the monarchy by the established Church of England. Many 
British subjects who are not Church of England members, or 
who are not religious, still participate in the civil reli-
gious function of the monarchy. In this respect the British 
case differs from the situation of a nation like the Soviet 
Union where the monarchy was destroyed by revolution and 
modernization. In the U.S.S.R. a system of secular national-
ism developed to replace church-sponsored civil religion. 
Shils and Young suggest that Great Britain did not become a 
society of secular nationalism because public hostility 
against political authority was displaced from the monarchy 
to the leaders of competing political parties. As the polit-
ical power of the British monarchy slowly declined, its sym-
bolic authority was tolerated and even appreciated by un-
threatened politicians. "When protected from the full blast 
of destructiveness by its very powerlessness, royalty is able 
to bask in the sunshine of an affection unadulterated by its 
opposite" (Shils and Young, 1953:77). Church-sponsored civil 
religion might continue to persist in the modern or modern-
izing state only if its structures are used as an aid to the 
acquisition and maintenance of political power (e.g., the 
Khomeini government of Iran) or are considered politically 
neutral, as in the case of the British monarchy. Despite 
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the decline of the political power of the British Crown, 
Shils and Young conclude that the monarchy retains consider-
able social and moral significance for the integration of 
British subjects, the legitimation of institutions, and the 
prophetic guidance.of the society's course in history. 
Within its society, popular constitutional monarchy 
enjoys almost universal recognition in this capacity, and 
it is therefore enabled to heighten the moral and civic 
sensibility of the society and to permeate it with sym-
bols of those values to which the sensitivity responds. 
. . . The Coronation provided at one time and for pract-
ically the entire society such an intensive contact with 
the sacred that we believe we are justified in interpret-
ing it as we have done in this essay, as a great act of 
national communion (Shils and Young, 1953:80). 
State-Sponsored Civil Religion: 
Restoration Japan 
Civil religion sponsored by the state occurs in soci-
eties where the political system institutes a self-transcen-
dent cultus. The institution of a state-sponsored form of 
civil religion is most likely to occur in a society charac-
terized by competing religious traditions and an authoritar-
ian political system. When no religion is powerful enough 
to perform civil religious functions for the society, the 
state may assume these functions to intensify its power and 
establish its authority. Imperial Rome is one historical 
example of a society with state-sponsored civil religion. 
A modern example is found in the State Shinto of Restoration 
Japan. State Shinto was based on the belief in the divinity 
of the historical line of Japanese emperors. State Shinto 
was instituted as the state religion of Japan in 1868, at the 
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beginning of the Meiji era and was not formally disestablished 
until December, 1945. During this period, State Shinto func-
tioned as a form of religious nationalism despite official 
claims in later years that the Shinto national cult was not 
technically a "religion." Analysis of the religious origins 
of State Shinto during the Tokugawa period and of the civil 
religious functions assumed by State Shinto during the Heiji 
period provides evidence that State Shinto exhibited the 
essential characteristics of a state-sponsored civil religion. 
Robert Bellah (1957) found that the historical reli-
gious roots of State Shinto could be traced to the primitive, 
tribal religion of early Japan. Bellah (1957:87) notes that 
"the earliest Japanese word for government is matsurigoto, 
which means religious observances or worship. This would 
seem to indicate the lack of differentiation of function be-
tween the religious and political spheres." During the Toku-
gawa period (1600-1868), the historic lack of differentiation 
between religion and politics continued, manifest in the pop-
ular slogan sonno (revere the emperor) and the development of 
the concept of kokutai (national body) (Bellah, 1957:99). 
The ideas of sonno and kokutai were widespread, promulgated 
by two intellectual movements, the Kokugaku School and the 
Mite School. The major religious goal of the Kokugaku School 
was the restoration of the emperor to power. The ideas of 
the Kokugaku School proliferated during the nineteenth cen-
tury and influenced the subsequent Restoration in 1868 
(Bellah, 1957:102). The Mite School developed the idea of 
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kokutai as "a concept of the state in which religious, polit-
ical and familistic ideals are indissolubly merged" (Bellah, 
1957:104). The resulting national religion was to be cen-
tered on the figure of the emperor. Bellah concludes that 
the ideology of sonno-kokutai had an impact on the political 
modernization of Japan and contributed to the establishment 
of State Shinto. 
The civil religion of Restoration Japan was based on 
three dogmas of: (1) "divine imperial sovereignty," (2) 
"special guardianship extended to the land and its people by 
ancestral deities," and (3) "benevolent destiny" (Haltom, 
1947:9, 13, 19). According to the dogma of divine imperial 
sovereignty, the emperor's bloodline may be traced back to 
the sun-goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, the ancestress of the 
Japanese state. The emperor is considerced to be divine be-
cause he is the direct living embodiment of sacred ancestors 
of the nation's past. According to D. C. Haltom's analysis 
of State Shinto, "Shinto reaches its highest form of manifes-
tation in the worship of the emperor" (Haltom, 1947:12). 
The second Shinto dogma, which holds that the spirits of the 
sacred ancestors extend a special guardianship to Japan, is 
signified by the concept of Japan as "the Land of the Gods." 
The dogma of sacred guardianship affirms the transcendent 
nature of Japanese history. 
From the beginning they have received the impress of the 
creative wills of divine ancestors who foresaw the far-
distant future and gave to land and race and institutions 
an initial divine character that must be forever theirs. 
It means that these ancestral deities are eternally 
248 
living in the spirit world from which they mold the des-
tiny of the present according to their unchanging pur-
poses. The existence of such superlative benefits, man-
ifested in the form of sacred historical absolutes and 
immediate superhuman guidance, entails corresponding re-
sponsibility and loyalty on the part of the living 
(Holtom, 1947:14). 
From the dogma of ancestral guidance through history, the 
third dogma of benevolent destiny is derived. Japan is be-
lieved to be the "savior" of the rest of the world. Japan's 
mission in history is to expand the nation and extend the 
Japanese way to all other people of the world. The Japanese 
slogan "the whole world under one roof" symbolizes Japan's 
"special divine commission to expand sovereignty and right-
eousness over ever widening territories" (Holtom, 1947:20). 
State Shinto, in its basic dogmas, clearly fulfills Coleman's 
(1970:69) definition of civil religion as a religious symbol 
system which relates the roles of citizen and society in his-
tory to the conditions of ultimate meaning. 
The civil religious functions of State Shinto were per-
formed by the Japanese government. The first critical func-
tion addressed by the government at the beginning of the 
Meiji period was that of integrating Japan's heterogeneous 
population. The feudal heritage of Japan had left diverse 
rival clans scattered over the countryside. Japan was also 
religiously diverse. Restoration Japan housed Buddhists, 
Confucianists, Hindus, Moslims, Taoists, Christians, Secular 
Shintoists, and adherents of a variety of folk religions. 
The Japanese government needed an overarching symbol of 
national unity to integrate diverse local and religious 
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groups, and State Shinto provided this type of unifying sym-
holism. The newly restored imperial government in 1868 first 
attempted to establish unity by suppressing competing religions. 
Buddhism, which was associated with the discredited Tokugawa 
regime, was criticized. Christianity, a symbol of "Western 
imperialism," was banned until 1873. Later, under pressure 
from the West, religious pluralism was officially tolerated 
as long as the overarching State Shinto tradition was accept-
ed as the highest ethical authority. In order to facilitate 
religious integration, the Japanese government began in 1899 
to insist that State Shinto was not itself a religion. Jap-
anese Christians and Buddhists eventually accepted State 
Shinto as a non-competitor and adopted policies of coexist-
ence. The National Christian Council of Japan stated that 
"we accept the definition of the government that the Shinto 
Shrine is non-religious" (Holtom, 1947:169). Coleman be-
lieves that the religious integration attempted through State 
Shinto was only partially successful, thus illustrating one 
of the structural weaknesses of state-sponsored civil reli-
gion: conflict with historical religions. The dogmas of 
State Shinto came into particular conflict with the tenets of 
Buddhism and Christianity. 
Against the Buddhist doctrine of pacifism, State 
Shinto espoused the theory of the holy war. In particu-
lar, it shared with imperial Rome the apothesis of a 
living human in emperor worship. This could never rest 
easy on the Christians with their tradition against idol-
atry (Coleman, 1970:72). 
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Despite the structural weakness noted by Coleman, State 
Shinto proved to be a powerful integrating force for many 
Japanese. A traditional avenue of integration, the school 
was used for this purpose. In 1899, Order Number Twelve was 
issued by the Restoration government, bringing an end to all 
specifically religious instruction in public and private 
schools; instead, instructions in State Shinto were to be 
substituted. The goal was the replacement of traditional 
religion with religious nationalism which would unify the 
society for the accomplishment of its divine mission (Holtom, 
1947:76). 
A church-sponsored form of civil religion bestows an 
established, religiously based legitimacy on a political au-
thority. In the case of state-sponsored civil religion, the 
political order establishes its own legitimacy by proclaim-
ing the state to be a self-transcendent cult. All institu-
tions which serve the national cult are automatically legit-
imated, and opposing institutions (such as competing reli-
gions) are discredited. Yet, State Shinto might never have 
aroused world attention if it had not been used to legitimate 
Japanese territorial expansion. The dogma of benevolent des-
tiny, accompanied by an effective military, resulted in the 
extension of Japanese control to an overseas empire. Japan-
ese hegemony was accompanied by the establishment of Shinto 
shrines in conquered territories. 
Given the nature of the Japanese state and its insepar-
able association with Shinto belief and ritual, it is 
impossible to think of a political control apart from a 
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vigorous determination to secure the subordination of 
conquered populations to the central religious interest 
of the state. Where go the Japanese armies there go the 
Japanese gods (Holtom, 1947:157). 
The legitimation of Japanese hegemony illustrates an-
other structural flaw of State Shinto and other state-spon-
sored forms of civil religion. Coleman (1970:72) observes 
that there "was no humble sense of the nation being under God 
which would provide leverage for prophetic critique of the 
civil religion from the organized churches." Holtom presents 
a similar observation concerning State Shinto's prophetic 
failure. "The Japanese state ... had been a sacred church 
... and, like other churches, it was founded on the arroga-
tion that in the last analysis the validity of its decisions 
were superhuman and supernatural" (Holtom, 1947:176). 
The State Shinto of Restoration Japan exemplifies Cole-
man's ideal type of state-sponsored civil religion. In a 
society with a pluralistic religious tradition the Restora-
tion government was able to proclaim itself as a national cult 
in order to perform the functions of social integration, po-
litical self-legitimation, and legitimation of imperialism. 
Japanese Shinto was subject to both of the structural weak-
nesses Coleman finds in state-controlled forms of civil reli-
gion. First, State Shinto provoked conflict with competing 
historic religions, most notably Buddhism and Christianity. 
Secondly, State Shinto fell victim to its own nationally 
self-transcendent worldview, which led to the Japanese 
attempt, and failure, at world domination. The case of 
Restoration Japan illustrates the structural vulnerability 
of state-sponsored civil religion when extended beyond the 
society into the national arena. 
Secular Nationalism: Modern Soviet Union 
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Coleman views secular nationalism as a functional alter-
native to civil religion which is likely to appear "when the 
historic national religion is either too traditionalistic or 
too closely tied to prerevolutionary regimes to serve as the 
civil religion of a modernizing politico-economic regime" 
(Coleman, 1970:72). Secular nationalism provides a legiti-
mating symbol system which competes with the symbol systems 
of historic religions. Secular nationalism differs from 
state-sponsored civil religion primarily in its non-religious 
or anti-religious self-presentation. Secular nationalism 
performs civil religious functions for citizens and the soci-
ety while disclaiming religious significance. The Marxist-
Leninist ideology of the U.S.S.R. is a case in point. To the 
Western observer, Soviet communism is a worldview which "on 
one hand can be called a religion and, on the other, is to-
tally opposed to religion in all acceptable forms" (Zeldin, 
1969:101). Soviet Marxist-Leninism does not conceive of it-
self as a religion. It is opposed to traditional forms of 
religion, and yet it can be observed nonetheless to perform 
religious functions. The debate concerning whether Soviet 
communism is or is not a religion can be avoided by adoption 
of Coleman's term, secular nationalism. The religious 
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functions of Soviet communism are, however, of special inter-
est to the identification of types of civil religion. 
Zeldin's (1969:104) analysis of Russian ideology iden-
tifies three dogmas which have been transferred from the 
church-sponsored civil religion of the Czars to Marxist-
Leninist secular nationalism: (1) the conception of Moscow 
as "the Third Rome," (2) "the belief in the kingship of the 
holy Tsar," and (3) the concept of "wholeness, symbolized in 
the term pravda, truth and justice." The messianic idea of 
"holy Moscow" or "Hoscow the Third Rome" developed in the 
fifteenth century when Rome fell to barbarian invasion and 
Byzantium came under Islamic domination. Moscow was then 
considered to be the world center of Christianity. Today, 
Moscow, now the capital of the U.S.S.R., has become the in-
spirational center of the Third International. The historic 
belief in the Czar as the divinely inspired teacher of true 
Christianity has been transferred to the Soviet Communist Party 
Central Committee, which is the new source of truth. The 
ideal of the unity of Eastern Slavs, symbolized in the con-
cept of pravda, "is now found in every aspect of Russian 
communism: in the total integration of life under communism, 
in the fusing of people into one mass" (Zeldin, 1969:107). 
Zeldin concludes that significant symbols of modern Soviet 
secular nationalism are congruent with the symbols of the 
Czarist-sponsored civil religion of the pre-revolutionary 
period. 
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·The religious functions of Soviet secular nationalism 
are apparent in numerous Soviet civil ceremonies, which have 
been researched by Jennifer McDowell (1974). t-1cDowell (1974: 
265) classifies Soviet civil ceremonies into two broad cate-
gories: (1) private ceremonies such as christenings and wed-
dings, which aid the identity formation of individuals; and 
(2) public ceremonies, celebrating national or local holidays, 
which aid social integration. The first Soviet civil cere-
monies were established shortly after the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion, with new ceremonies being added at various subsequent 
points in time. The public ceremonies celebrating newly cre-
ated national holidays, such as January 22 (the overthrow of 
the Czar), functioned to legitimate and solidify the new re-
gime by clearly symbolizing the break with the past. Private 
ceremonies, such as the "red baptism" and "red funeral," were 
established soon after the Civil War but fell into disuse by 
1930, only to be officially restored again in the 1950s. 
McDowell (1974:267) suggests that, in the early years of the 
Communist regime, the Russian peasants disliked the secular-
ism of the private ceremonies, while Communist Party members 
and members of the Young Communist League resisted their 
frivolous ceremonialism. 
Soviet scholars, P. P. Kampars and N. M. Zakovich (1967: 
35-38), present a categorization of Soviet civil ceremonies 
which assists analysis of the ceremonies' functions. Their 
major categories are: (1) Revolutionary State Holidays, (2) 
Laboring Holidays, (3) Civil Rituals and Mode-of-Life 
255 
Holidays and Rituals, and (4) Traditional Festivals Dedicated 
to the Times of Year and to Nature, to Wor~ and to Songs. 
The first category, Revolutionary State Holidays, includes a 
variety of national holidays such as. Lenin's birthday (April 
22) and the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revo-
lution (November 7) . Revolutionary State Holidays celebrate 
the nation's unique historyandoffer inspiration for the ful-
fillment of national destiny. A typical celebration of 
November 7, for example, includes a military parade, athletic 
demonstrations, and a civilian parade of 200,000 persons. 
The mass demonstrations of people, shouting slogans such 
as "'Long Live the Inviolable Unity of the Peoples of our 
Country!'" illustrate the integrative function of Revolution-
ary State Holidays (McDowell, 1974:271). Laboring Holidays 
honor the major occupational groups with holidays such as 
Railway Man's Day, Teacher's Day, Cattle-Breeder's Day, et 
cetera, and celebrate the anniversaries of particular collec-
tive farms and industrial plants (McDowell, 1974:270). La-
boring Holidays function to integrate diverse occupational 
groups into Soviet society and to reinforce economic achieve-
ment. Traditional Festivals Dedicated to the Times of the 
Year, to Nature, to Work, and to Songs include traditional 
Russian celebrations such as the New Year's celebration. 
Traditional Festivals, along with National and Laboring Hol-
idays, have received general popular support and have been 
successful as mechanisms of integration. Civil Rituals and 
Mode-of-Life Holidays and Rituals include civil christenings, 
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coming-of-age ceremonies, weddings, major wedding anniver-
saries, and funeral services. These Civil Rituals have ex-
perienced the least acceptance among the Soviet public, 
especially in rural areas. 
These ceremonies have met with the greatest public resis-
tance, for they do not contain the outer, public life of 
the individual, but rather the inner person .... This 
sphere has traditionally belonged to religion. Thus, at 
junctures of this type, adherence to traditional religion 
comes to the surface with the greatest clarity, for these 
personal ceremonies have at the same time a public char-
acter, and in a true sense force the issue of religious 
or political allegiance (McDowell, 1974:272). 
Despite the conflict of allegiances aroused by private Civil 
Rituals, available data indicate that these ceremonies are 
beginning to gain in popularity, due to the decline of tradi-
tional religiosity fostered by urbanization. One of the few 
remaining functions of traditional religion in the U.S.S.R., 
the sanctification of birth, marriage, and death, is gradu-
ally coming under the domain of the civil religion of Soviet 
secular nationalism. 
Upon examination, Soviet Marxist-Leninism is found to 
be a system of secular nationalism--a functional alternative 
to civil religion. Although defining itself in non-religious 
terms, Soviet secular nationalism performs the traditional 
religious functions of social integration and political le-
gitimation. Due to its self-transcendent stance, however, 
Marxist-Leninism excludes the role of prophetic protest from 
its civil religion. Coleman observes that the strains inher-
ent in secular nationalism as a replacement for a transcendent 
civil religion include persecution of religious citizens and 
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the limitation of religious and civil liberties. Both strains 
are observable in the modern Soviet Union. 
The Russian civil religion includes saints (Lenin 
entombed) , sacred feasts (May Day) and a crucial belief 
in Russia's special role in unfolding world history as 
the spearhead of the socialist revolution. In all impor-
tant ways this secular nationalism is a civil religion. 
The price for its successful and unchallenged hegemony, 
however, was religious persecution of Christians and 
Jews and severe restrictions on religious and civil lib-
erties (Coleman, 1970:73). 
Conclusion 
Proposition IV asserts that civil religious development 
follows the general direction of cultural evolution. The 
civil religious systems of four societies, in different 
stages of modernization, have served to illustrate the pos-
sibilities of civil religious evolution. Great Britain 
serves as an example of continued undifferentiated church-
sponsored civil religion, Restoration Japan exemplifies con-
tinued undifferentiated state-sponsored civil religion, and 
the United States typifies differentiated civil religion 
(see part IV, chapter II). The key variable Coleman isolates 
as a predictor of civil religious development is differenti-
ation. Implicit in Coleman's theory is a related variable: 
religious pluralism. Religious pluralism here refers to 
something slightly different from simply another manifestation 
of differentiation. Some societies have had fairly low levels 
of differentiation but have housed numerous major religions 
with thousands of varying sects. Historic India, Japan, and 
China serve as illustrations. Other differentiated societies, 
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such as modern Italy, are low in religious pluralism, being 
dominated by a historically established religion. Figure 10 
illustrates that variation in levels of differentiation and 
religious pluralism may be related to the type of civil reli-
gious system which is to be expected in the modern or modern-
izing society. The level of differentiation ranges from the 
high differentiation of the most developed society to the low 
of the modernizing society. Religious pluralism is indicated 
by the society's history of religious toleration versus a 
historically established religion. The secular nationalism 
of the U.S.S.R. is characteristic of a society with a history 
of an established religion (Russian Orthodoxy) and a low level 
of differentiation. Although the modern Soviet Union is 
approaching a high level of differentiation today, when 
Soviet secular nationalism was first imposed after the Bol-
shevik Revolution, the society was just emerging from feudal-
ism. For secular nationalism to develop under these condi-
tions, the established religion must be perceived as too 
traditionalistic to perform the civil religious fun~tions for 
a modernizing government (Coleman, 1970:72). 
In modern Great Britain, the established church and its 
historic sponsorship of the monarchy lost power gradually, as 
the society moved into the modern era. The monarchy, a major 
symbol of British church-sponsored civil religion, was re-
tained as a powerful national symbol because it threatened no 
vested political interest. The monarchy was not viewed as a 
symbol of failure to modernize and was instead viewed as the 
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inspiration behind the empire. Thus, in a highly modern so-
ciety, a somewhat traditional church-sponsored form of civil 
religion has been retained. 
Japan has historically tolerated a variety of religious 
traditions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Shintoism, and Chris-
tianity. Because no one religion was officially established, 
political interest groups felt required to institute a state-
sponsored cult to perform civil religious functions. The sym-
bols of State Shinto were derived from ancient cultural myths, 
the only Japanese religious symbols with the potential to 
unify diverse religious organizations. The traditional Jap-
anese absence of differentiation between religious and polit-
ical institutions (Bellah, 1957:87) also permitted the estab-
lishment of a powerful state-sponsored civil religion. 
The United States is a highly differentiated society 
with a tradition of religious toleration. Religion and pol-
itics have been officially differentiated since the writing 
of the Constitution. Because no religion was established 
which would perform civil religious functions, church-spon-
sored civil religion did not develop. The American revolu-
tionary tradition precluded the likelihood of Americans 
worshipping the head of state. Therefore, an American form 
of state-sponsored civil religion would not be expected to 
emerge. Secular nationalism was also an unlikely choice for 
the United States, given the American tradition of religios-
ity and opposition to atheism. Instead, if Propositions I 
through IV are valid, the United States was sufficiently 
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differentiated and religiously plural to facilitate the emer-
gence of a type of civil religion which was differentiated 
from both religious and political systems, but manifested in 
these and other institutions at a high level of generality. 
This chapter has attempted to place the development of Ameri-
can civil religion into a cross-cultural, evolutionary context. 
All societies can be conceived of as having civil religious 
functions. In undifferentiated and even many modern societies, 
these functions are performed by either an established religion 
or the state (Coleman, 1970:70). Compared to other societies 
exhibiting varying degrees of differentiation and religious 
pluralism, American civil religion can be explained as a dif-
ferentiated civil religion which developed to perform the 
specialized religious functions of a modern, plural society 
which were not being exclusively performed by either religious 
organizations or the state. 
PART V 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER XIV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has attempted to trace the intellectual 
development of the sociological concept, "American civil 
religion," and to order the body of civil religion research 
into a set of testable propositions. A survey of the lit-
erature revealed that the current state of knowledge con-
cerning civil religion (and especially American civil 
religion) is primarily theoretical. Philosophers, histor-
ians, and social scientists have advanced various theoret-
ical models of American civil religion: folk religions, 
democratic faith, religious nationalism, transcendent uni-
versal religion of the nation, and Protestant civic piety 
(Richey and Jones, 1974). This conceptual diversity pre-
sents a stumbling block to contemporary research. Probably 
the best-known sociological model of American civil reli-
gion, the transcendent universal religion documented by 
Robert Bellah (1967; 1975), has stimulated the greatest 
amount of empirical research (e.g., Thomas and Flippen, 
1972; Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976; Hueller and 
Sites, 1977; Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978). Bellah's model 
of American civil religion has been productive, due in 
part to its comprehensiveness. Bellah's concept of 
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transcendent universal American civil religion includes the 
other basic models of civil religion as elements of a more 
inclusive model. Bellah researched the origins of American 
civil religion in the American Puritan tradition, thus includ-
ing the model of Protestant civic piety as typical of early 
American civil religion. Transcendent universal civil reli-
gion also contains the option for the expression of common 
faith, folk religion, and religious nationalism. Through the 
image of the broken covenant, Bellah (1975) symbolized the 
self-transcendent application of American civil values. The 
productivity and inclusiveness of Bellah's model of American 
civil religion recommend it as the point of orientation for 
future research. A concise statement of Bellah's concept of 
American civil religion is adapted from the work of John A. 
Coleman (1970). Stated in this volume as Proposition I, 
American civil religion is viewed as "the religious symbol 
system which relates the citizen's role and American society's 
place in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning." This definition has the advantage of 
including reference to both the individual and societal lev-
els of analysis and has the potential to guide sociological 
research more specifically than have previous definitions 
derived from philosophical, historical, or early sociological 
traditions. 
Sociological research on American civil religion has 
been primarily concerned with the functions performed by 
civil religious systems and their relationship to other 
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social systems. Coleman (1970) hypothesized that American 
civil religion is structurally differentiated from both the 
political community and the religious community (Proposition 
II). Parsons's (1971) definition of differentiation, in con-
junction with Bellah's (1964) theory of religious differenti-
ation, represents the general theoretical framework from 
which Coleman's structural differentiation hypothesis is de-
rived. Empirical studies concerning the location of indica-
tors of American civil religion in other social institutions 
(e.g., Cole and Hammond, 1974; Mueller and Sites, 1976) have 
provided data in support of Proposition II. The greatest 
empirical support for the structural differentiation of Amer-
ican civil religion from religious and political communities 
is found in Wimberly's (Wimberly et al., 1976; Wimberly, 1976) 
empirical studies of individual civil religious belief. Wim-
berly finds American civil religion to be a separate, measur-
able, individual belief dimension which overlaps only minim-
ally with other religious and political beliefs. The limited 
amount of empirical evidence gathered to date suggests that 
the values of American civil religion are congruent with the 
values of American religious and political institutions, al-
though American civil religion is structurally differentiat-
ing from these institutions. The relationship of American 
civil religion to other American institutions is more problem-
atic. Historical and theoretical studies must be relied upon 
for the most part, with the exceptions of Jolicoeur and 
Knowles's (1978) study of American civil religion in a 
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voluntary association and Thomas and Flippen's (1972) anal-
ysis of American civil religion in the American press. There 
is, therefore, as yet little evidence to support the logical 
hypothesis that most American institutions are in the process 
of differentiation from both traditional religion and civil 
religion. The institutions likely to be least differentiated 
from American civil religion are the traditionally integrative 
institutions such as the family, the schools, and religio-
civic voluntary associations. Instrumental institutions, 
such as the economy and communications media, might be expect-
ed to exhibit the greatest degree of differentiation from 
American civil religion. However, much more research on 
American belief systems and their location within various 
American institutions is necessary before the structural dif-
ferentiation of American civil religion can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed. 
There are conflicting data concerning the functions of 
American civil religion. Demerath and Hammond (1967) , Cherry 
(1970), Coleman (1970), and Bellah (1967; 1975) find American 
civil religion to be an institutional source of social inte-
gration, while Fenn {1976) doubts this. Bellah and Cherry 
note American civil religion's dual function for social inte-
gration and division but fail to fully specify the conditions 
under which American civil religion is either integrative or 
divisive. Bellah also notes the power of American civil reli-
gion to legitimate other American institutions. He believes 
that the legitimating power of American civil religious 
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values has eroded but affirms the possibility of renewal. 
In Bellah's view, the myths and symbols of American civil 
religion are still sufficiently powerful to aid the inter-
pretation and legitimation of American social experience. 
Jolicoeur and Knowles's (1978) empirical study of the civil 
religious values still cherished by Masonic fraternal orders 
supports Bellah's position. Penn (1972), taking the position 
of religious privatism, theorizes that no religiously based 
system of cultural legitimation, including civil religion, 
exists for contemporary America. Stauffer (1973) agrees with 
Penn on the growth of the private sphere of religion but 
argues that ~ mechanism of cultural legitimation must 
operate in even the most rational, differentiated society. 
Stauffer finds Bellah's concept of American civil religion 
to be a useful model of a modern legitimating system. 
Research on the prophetic function of American civil religion 
also yields conflicting conclusions. Bellah's model of tran-
scendent, universal, American civil religion contains a po-
tential for prophetic judgement. Bellah's data on civil 
religious prophecy are primarily historical, as are the sup-
porting data of historian Mead (1967). Empirical research 
by Wimberly (1976) lends support to Bellah's model in the 
measurement of a transcendent civil religious dimension of 
personal belief. Critical response to the prophetic function 
of American civil religion comes from folk religionists 
Marty (1959) and Herberg (1960) and the empirical study of 
Thomas and Flippen (1972). There is not yet sufficient 
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evidence to confirm or disconfirm Proposition III, which 
states that American civil religion "performs specialized 
religious functions performed neither by church nor state." 
Yet the functional differentiation hypothesis is promising. 
Even those in opposition to the hypothesis would agree that, 
in a society characterized by church-state separation, neither 
religious nor political organizations exclusively sponsor 
social integration, cultural legitimization, and prophetic 
guidance. The field is open for other"symbol systems such as 
a differentiated civil religion to assist with the performance 
of these functions. It is the task of the sociologists of 
contemporary American society to determine if American civil 
religion does in fact play a role in the integration, legiti-
mation, and prophetic direction of the society. 
If subsequent research confirms that American civil 
religion is differentiating from religious, political, and 
other institutions and performing increasingly specialized 
functions as the religious dimension of the polity, such con-
firmation will be congruent with the predictions of the major 
sociological theories of religious evolution. The theories 
of religious evolution of Weber (1948), Wach (1944), Bellah 
(1964), Durkheim (1965), and Parsons (1971) each predict in-
creased differentiation of religious symbol systems due to 
modernization. Following the assumptions of these evolution-
ary theories, Coleman (1970) predicts the evolution of dif-
ferent forms of civil religion, based on the level of differ-
entiation and degree of religious pluralism. Adapting 
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Coleman's theory to the specific case of American civil reli-
gion, Proposition IV states that the differentiation of Amer-
ican civil religion from political and religious communities 
follows the general direction of cultural evolution. Ameri-
can civil religion may be an expected manifestation of pre-
dictable cultural patterns. Currently there is little empir-
ical evidence which relates directly to Proposition IV. The 
best cross-cultural examination of civil religious develop-
ment is presented by Cole and Hammond (1974) . Their data 
suggest that religious pluralism and high levels of societal 
and legal complexity are the specific conditions associated 
with the development of civil religious systems. The United 
States is the society in which these conditions are manifest 
to the highest degree and is therefore the society in which 
differentiated civil religion would be expected to develop. 
Additional cross-cultural research, expanding the Cole and 
Hammond study, would be necessary before any conclusions 
concerning evolutionary patterns of civil religious develop-
ment could be made. The present analysis has been forced to 
rely on more easily obtainable historical and symbolic studies 
of civil religion in other societies. Coleman's ideal types 
of modern civil religious evolution are illustrated by Holtom's 
(1947) and Bellah's (1957) studies of state-sponsored civil 
religion in Japan, Shils and Young's (1953) symbolic analysis 
of church-sponsored civil religion in Great Britain, and 
Zeldin's (1969) and McDowell's (1974) research on secular 
nationalism in the U.S.S.R. These selected cases are only 
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illustrative of modern civil religious development but will 
hopefully pave the way for more comprehensive and systematic 
cross-cultural comparisons. 
The present study summarizes the civil religion litera-
ture from several perspectives. Compiling and ordering the 
existing body of literature facilitates the task of determin-
ing future research directions. Today, conceptual debate 
still characterizes American civil religion theory, hindering 
the development of precise measurement instruments. Theoret-
ical problems could be reduced by accepting Coleman's (1970) 
definition of American civil religion as the religious dimen-
sion of the American polity and by adopting the conceptual 
framework advanced in Propositions I through IV as the basis 
for future research. Empirical problems remain. The sociol-
ogist of American civil religion is confronted with the task 
of locating empirical indicators of a generalized cultural 
symbol system. Thus far, most civil religion research has 
been conducted through content analyses (e.g., Bellah, 1967; 
Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Mueller and Sites, 1977; Jolicoeur 
and Knowles, 1978) and symbolic studies (e.g., Shils and 
Young, 1953; Warner, 1961; Zeldin, 1969; McDowell, 1974). 
Continued research of both types will aid the location and 
classification of civil religion symbols within American 
institutions. Subjects such as the local celebrations of 
national holidays are particularly rich data sources for sym-
bolic analysis. Symbolic case studies, however, are limited 
to the descriptive level of civil religious research, while 
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content analyses can be designed to yield explanatory data. 
The early content analyses, such as Bellah's 1967 analysis 
of presidential inaugural addresses, lack the precise measure-
ment instruments and sampling techniques of later studies 
(e.g., Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Jolicoeur and Knowles, 1978). 
Unfortunately, reliance upon widely differing measurement 
instruments has limited the comparability of the recent studies. 
In two different studies (Thomas and Flippen, 1972; Jolicoeur 
and Knowles, 1978), the same item was coded as "secular" by 
one set of researchers and as "civil religious" by the other! 
A valid and reliable instrument for the identification of 
American civil religious content is thus needed. Once such a 
coding guide is developed, it could be fruitfully applied to 
the following content areas: United States Supreme Court 
decisions, United States presidential inaugural addresses, 
political election speeches, sermons, official journals of 
religious organizations and religio-civic voluntary associa-
tions, commencement addresses, mass advertising contents, and 
mass communication media coverage of national holidays and 
times of national celebration and mourning. 
The most promising model for future civil religious 
research at the level of individual belief is Wimberly's 
(Wimberly et al., 1976) scale of American civil religious 
belief items. Wimberly's items (see Appendix) demonstrated 
ability to discriminate among other items of religious belief 
and political attitudes when administered to selected and 
random samples of Americans. Wimberly's civil religion items 
also have high face validity as a measurement of Bellah's 
transcendent universal American civil religion and score 
272 
high on indicators of reliability. Wimberly (1976:349-350) 
concluded that his research "extends support for the civil 
religion hypothesis" and advances American civil re.ligion to 
"the status of a social scientific concept." Continued appli-
cation of vVimberly' s American civil religion scale to addi-
tional samples and the continued refinement of his measurement 
items should advance the field of empirical knowledge concern-
ing individually held civil religious belief. 
The best empirical test of Propositions I through IV 
will probably not come from traditional modes of civil reli-
gion research in American sociology. Individual belief 
studies such as Wimberly's produce data which can only be 
applied at the individual level of analysis. Individual be-
lief data are directly applicable only to Proposition I, 
which states that American civil religion is the religious 
symbol system which relates the citizen's role and American 
society's place in space, time, and history to the conditions 
of ultimate meaning. Although Wimberly's individual belief 
studies have been cited in this analysis in support of Prop-
osition II, concerning the structural differentiation of 
American civil religion, this generalization from the level 
of individual belief to that of social structure is tenuous. 
Symbolic studies and content analysis have been limited to 
the context of one society and have failed to generate the 
comparative material necessary to test Proposition IV, which 
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concerns the cultural evolution of civil religious systems. 
If the entire proposition set is to be adequately tested, a 
modern, empirical version of Weberian socio-historical com-
parison is called for. Cole and Hammond (1974) have made the 
greatest contribution to this type of research effort in 
their cross-cultural institutional comparison of world soci-
eties. Additional cross-cultural data on civil religious sys-
tems need to be gathered to add to the data on societal com-
plexity and legal and religious systems compiled by Cole and 
Hammond. It is expected that, if cross-cultural data on 
civil religion are made available, they will generally con-
firm Proposition IV. It is also expected that the data will 
reveal that cultural evolution and concomitant civil religious 
evolution are more complex than Proposition IV predicts. For 
example, in many societies, civil religion will be in the pro-
cess of differentiating from religious or political domination 
and will not fit neatly into any of Coleman's ideal types of 
modern civil religion. Propositions II through IV and Cole-
man's types of civil religion are based on the possible var-
iation of only one variable known to be operant in the process 
of evolution: differentiation. Inclusion of other variables 
associated with evolution, such as adaptive upgrading, inclu-
sion,and value generalization (Parsons, 1971) would add com-
plexity to the research effort but would also generate more 
comprehensive information concerning the patterns of civil 
religious development. It is the conclusion of the present 
analysis that the study of American civil religion can best 
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be advanced by expanding research beyond the boundaries of a 
single societal case. Cross-cultural research is critical to 
the compilation of a comprehensive explanation of civil reli-
gious development. Cross-cultural research is also necessary 
for the prediction of the emergence of new civil religious 
systems and for the prediction of the continuation or decline 
of the American system of civil religion. 
This study has been dedicated to the purpose of concep-
tual clarification and theoretical codification and has been 
conducted as a necessary first step before actual empirical 
research on American civil religion can be done. It is the 
conclusion of this analysis that American civil religion is 
a viable sociological concept, deserving of and fruitful for 
continued scientific inquiry. Several directions for contin-
uing research have been elaborated with the hope and expecta-
tion that the information presented here will provide answers 
to some of the specific questions of the contemporary sociol-
ogy of American civil religion. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
CIVIL RELIGION ITEMS USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF RONALD WIMBERLY, 
DONALD CLELLAND, THO~~S HOOD, AND C. M. LIPSEY (1976:893). 
Civil Religion 
1. We should respect the president's authority since his 
authority is from God. 
2. National leaders should not only affirm their belief in 
God but also their belief in Jesus Christ as Savior and 
Lord. 
3. Good Christians aren't necessarily good patriots. 
4. God can be known through the experience of the American 
people. 
5. The founding fathers created a blessed and unique repub-
lic when they gave us the Constitution. 
6. If the American government does not support religion, it 
cannot uphold morality. 
7. It is a mistake to think that America is God's chosen 
nation today. 
8. To me, the flag of the United States is sacred. 
All items were scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." 
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